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TYRANNY OF THE JUDICIARY:
JUDICIAL DILUTION OF CONSENT UNDER SECTION 2 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
James Thomas Tucker*
"Every man takes the arm of the lawfor his protections as more effectual than
his own, and therefore every man has an equal right in the formation of the
government and of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged "' When
Thomas Paine wrote these words over two hundred years ago, he captured the
essence ofAmerican democracy. Having a voice in government means more than
merely casting a ballot. Instead, the basic right of all qualified citizens to grant or
withhold their consent mandates 'fair and effective representation ": a right to elect
representatives and participate in the decision making processes of government.
At the same time, the Founding Fathers recognized that voting itselfposed a
danger to a representative democracy. Majorityfactions were particularly troubling
because the principle of majority rule empowered them to silence the voices of those
in the minority. Consequently, the constitutional Framers installed the federal
courts as 'Judicial referees" that would protect minorities from the tyranny of the
majority. When it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress also envisioned
that thejudiciary would play an active role in protecting the right of minorities to
give or withhold their consent.
Yet, courts have optedfor a more passive approach that directly undermines the
voices of minorities in government. Out of "respect "for the democratic process, the
judiciary has protected consent only to the extent that it can do so in a "principled"
manner that does not overturn the will of the majority. As a result, minority voters
no longer must raise their voices against the tyranny ofthe majority, but the tyranny
of the judiciary. This Article discusses the impact of the judiciary's ill-advised
Associate, Bryan Cave, L.L.P., Phoenix, Arizona; Captain and Judge Advocate General
(JAG) Officer, United States Air Force Reserve; B.A., Arizona State University, 1988; J.D.,
University of Florida, 1994; M.P.A., University of Oklahoma, 1995; LL.M., University of
Pennsylvania, 1998; S.J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania.
This Article is dedicated to those who are denied a voice in the political process. I am
grateful for the assistance of Professor Lani Guinier, who graciously served as my thesis
advisor and provided me with invaluable advice and critical analysis of my views throughout
this endeavor. Furthermore, I appreciate Professor C. Edwin Baker's suggestions, which
helped me develop a more complete discussion of some of the constitutional issues discussed
herein. In addition, a special thanks to my academic advisor Professor Pamela Harris, Denise
McGary, Cynthia McKinney, and all of the faculty and staff at the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law who assisted me throughout the year. Moreover, I would be remiss if I did not
acknowledge the special contributions of my fellow LL.M. classmates, whose diverse
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wife Sue, whose love and unfailing support made this Article possible.
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approach to claims brought under section two of the Voting Rights Act, and
proposes an alternative approach more consistent with the. democratic theories
embodied in the Constitutionand section two.
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Our slavery is complete as long as we aresubject to regulationsmade by
a legislature,in the election ofwhich we had not a voice, and over whose
members we have not the least controul. If any thing could add to a
slavery in its nature so perfect, it would be, that we are under the
government of apower whose views may be distinct, andwhose interests
may be the opposite of ours.2
INTRODUCTION

Over one thousand voices joined in unison, singing "We shall overcome." The
trial stopped momentarily, while the echoes of these words drowned out the answer
of the witness on the stand. An eerie silence settled over the courtroom before the
attorney's examination of the witness resumed. Outside, the protesters were
marching arm in arm down the narrow boulevard in front of the courthouse,
temporarily blocking traffic. At first blush, the scene was reminiscent of
Montgomery, Alabama at the height of the civil rights movement. But this was
Tallahassee, Florida, in February 1996.'
In fact, throughout the United States, this scene has been replayed many times
in the last few years. However, the scenes differ from those of some thirty years past.
The protesters are no longer turning to federal judges for changes which will secure
for them true equality under the law, irrespective of race, color, or creed. That battle
has been won.4 Instead, the protesters raise their voices against the changes that

2 JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION 128 (1989) (quoting Anonymous, The Usurpations of England the [Cihief

Sources of the Miseries of Ireland-andthe Legislative Independence of this Kingdom, the
[O]nly Means of [Slecuring and [P]erpetuatingthe Commercial Advantages [L]ately
[R]ecovered28 (Dublin, 1780) (emphasis added)). Reid points out that, while this quote is
from a writer advocating the right of Irish Protestants to representation, it also supports the
same case for American colonials. See id This Article will demonstrate that the quote could

have been written today on behalf of many minorities attempting to participate in the
American political process.
3 See Residents Rally to Keep Brown's DistrictIntact, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Feb. 20, 1996, at 4B; Blacks Rally for District,TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 20, 1996, at 6.
' Of course, "equality under the law" does not necessarily mean that equality has been
attained in society. The vast disparities between whites and a number of minority groups in
household income, education, home ownership, and health coverage, among other things, are
a testament to the continuing presence of inequalities. See generally COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISORS, CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY

RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (Sept. 1998) (estimating 1997 census data of social and
economic indicators); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (rev. ed. 1995) (summarizing and comparing 1990 census data of whites
and minorities). The point merely is that there are no longer overt racial inequalities codified
by law.
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federal judges are making in how the law is interpreted.5 As a result of these
changes, the fabric of the equality they have gained seems to be unraveling.
This paradigm shift presents several issues, none of which can be resolved easily.
Perhaps the most important issue is determining how "equality" is defined. It is
axiomatic that equality cannot always be taken at face value. Treating all racial and
ethnic groups alike under all circumstances, without regard to socioeconomic
differences and other present effects of past discrimination, only might exacerbate
inherent inequalities further.6 In other words, the "shackled runner" argument still
has merit in America today.' In voting rights cases, the majority's dilution of a
s Compare Rep. Brown Apologizes Over Aide's Klan Remarks, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 14, 1996, at D3 (stating that an aide to Congresswoman Brown remarked that "[t]here
was a time when the people we were concerned about wore white sheets-now they wear
black robes"), with Jesse Jackson, White Sheets, Blue Suits, Black Robes, NEW PITT.

June 26, 1996, at A7. Jesse Jackson wrote:
We have witnessed the return of the white sheet crowd, sneaking in by night to
bum the churches of our people. We have watched the mean spirited maneuvers
of the blue suit crowd, the Gingrich Congress and many of our state legislatures,
as they try day after day to wipe out a half-century of social progress. Last week,
we saw the return of the black robes crowd, who with each decision, roll back
a little more of Dr. King's reconstruction.
Id Reverend Jackson made his comments in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 889 (1996), and Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). See Jackson,
COURIER,

supra.

For example, as some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out in a
separate statement on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the "equal application" of literacy tests
"would abridge 15th [A]mendment rights" because "the educational differences between
whites and Negroes" resulting from past discrimination in education effectively would
preclude many blacks from being able to register to vote. S. REP. NO. 89-162 (1965),
reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2554 (identifying the views of 12 members of the
Judiciary Committee relating to the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
' The image of the "shackled runner" was suggested by President Lyndon Johnson in a
1965 commencement speech at Howard University. See Lyndon B.Johnson, Commencement
6

Address at Howard University (June 4,

1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE

PRESIDENTS-1 965, at 636 (1966). Policymakers have used the "shackled runner" argument
to illustrate the compelling need for affirmative action to remedy past discrimination:
Imagine a hundred-yard dash in which one of the two runners has his legs
shackled together. He has progressed ten yards, while the unshackled runner has
gone fifty yards. At that point the judges decide that the race is unfair. How do
they rectify the situation? Do they merely remove the shacklesand allow the race
to proceed? Then they could say that "equal opportunity" now prevailed. But
one of the runners would still be forty yards ahead of the other. Would it not be
the better part of justice to allow the previously shackled runner to make up the
forty-yard gap, or to start the race all over again? That would be affirmative
action toward equality.
Mary C. Segers, Justifying Affirmative Action, in JAMES C. FOSTER & MARY C. SEGERS ET
AL., ELUSIVE EQUALITY: LIBERALISM, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
AMERICA 78 (1983) (quoting Earl Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, COMMENTARY, Jan.
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1972, at 4). The significant degree of underrepresentation of African-Americans, Hispanics,
and other significant racial and ethnic groups is the most obvious reason why continued
scrutiny of electoral systems is required. See generally MARTIN CARNOY, FADED DREAMS:
THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF RACE INAMERICA 112-15 (1994) (noting that what little
black political power there is exists at the local, not the national level); HACKER, supra note
4, at 235-36 ("Many black Americans still complain that almost all of the people governing
them are white .... Not only has every president of the United States been white, but at this
writing so are every governor and all but one senator .... Indeed, there are still many black
Americans who have yet to be represented by a person of their race at any governmental
level."); REDISTRICTING INTHE 1990s: A GUIDE FOR MINORITY GROUPS 25-27, 37-41, 52
(William 0. O'Hare ed., 1989) (describing underrepresentation of blacks and Hispanics
throughout the United States); Richard L. Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Election of
Blacks to Southern City Councils: The Dominant Impact of Electoral Arrangements, in
BLACKS INSOUTHERN POLITICS 245, 255 (L. Moreland et al. eds., 1987) (finding a large
degree of minority underrepresentation in Southern municipalities); For an extensive
discussion of minority representation in the South, see QUIET REVOLUTION INTHE SOUTH
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). It is important to note, however, that
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is not an affirmative action statute, but a means to ensure
that all voters have fair and equal access to the political system. Cf Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 675 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
[S]tate efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what has been
labeled "affirmative action." To the extent that no other racial group is injured,
remedying a Voting Rights Act violation does not involve preferential
treatment ....
It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to
provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process.
Id.; see also Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said:
"When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing? ", 14 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1237, 1247 (1993) (noting that voting rights remedies cannot be characterized as
"affirmative action" because they emphasize equal treatment, not that "the claims of
minorities are given more weight than those of identically situated whites"); Pamela S.
Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1202 (1996)
("[T]he Court's attempt to integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to
affirmative action is both misguided and incoherent."); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative
Action and [Mis]representation: Reclaiming the Civil Rights Vision of the Right to Vote
(forthcoming 1999) (on file with author) (criticizing the obstructionist tactics of opponents
of minority voting rights to label efforts to secure equal minority participation in the political
process as "affirmative action"). But see S. REP. No. 417, at 232 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 402 (additional views of Sen. East) (arguing that section 2's disclaimer
on the right to proportional representation will be ineffective because "analogous disclaimer
language contained in Title VII has not prevented courts from using affirmative action as a
remedy"); see also id at 92-93, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 266 (additional views of
Sen. Thurmond) (finding it "difficult ... to believe" that the "constructive effort" required
under the 1982 amendments to the bailout provisions of the Act is "intended to be employed
as anything other than a vehicle to promote 'affirmative action' principles of civil rights of
the voting process"); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 181 (1992)
(describing how the guarantee of voting rights to minorities has shifted to a guarantee of fair
results); Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality,
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minority group's voting power8 through consistent, overwhelming opposition to the
minority group's candidate of choice, 9 can render the "equal" right to vote virtually
meaningless. Quite simply, there are no easy solutions to the dilemma of trying to
treat all people alike in a voting system, while still affording everyone equality of
opportunity. Contrary to what a majority of the present Supreme Court might
believe, this problem cannot be avoided simply by declaring abstract commitments
to protecting the right to vote."0 Rigid, mechanical, court-created rules fail to account
for varying local contexts and difficulties in implementation, and inherently are
inconsistent with the flexible and adaptable protection Congress intended to provide
in the Voting Rights Act."
The Supreme Court's narrowing of the scope of voting rights claims has set these
events in motion. For example, in Shaw v. Reno, 2 the Court recognized, for the first
time, the viability of an equal protection challenge to race-based districting plans
designed to enhance minority representation. While some would argue this result is
not surprising in light of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,13 it has
had a far-reaching impact. Indeed, the Court expressed concern in other cases that
federal courts, the States, and the Department ofJustice were using the Voting Rights
Act to create enclaves of safe districts for different racial and ethnic groups. 4 In
The Public Interest, and the Politics of Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
127, 151 (Anthony A.

REPRESENTATION: SHA w V. RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS

Peacock ed., 1997) [hereinafter AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION] (indicating

that, in the wake of the 1982 amendments to section 2, "the VRA had become an unequivocal
tool of affirmative action"); Abigail Thernstrom, Voting Rights: Another Affirmative Action
Mess, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2031,2031 (1996) (asserting that protection of minority voting rights
is nothing more than an attempt to "provide maximum protection for minority candidates
from white competition").
8 See infra note 240 (discussing whether the right to vote is an individual right, a group
right, or both).
' See generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 24 (Bernard

Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING] ("Ethnic or racial minority vote dilution may be defined as a process whereby
election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting
among an identifiable majority group to diminish or cancel the voting strength of at least one
minority group.").
0 See infra notes 264-66, 295-300 and accompanying text (discussing the "majoritarian
default" position, whereby failing to address an issue in order to avoid making difficult value
choices is itself a substantive decision).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see infra notes 507-80 and accompanying text.
12 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
'3 See infra notes 674-84 and accompanying text.
"4 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,969-76 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,92227 (1995); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(criticizing "the currently fashionable mechanism of drawing majority-minority singlemember districts" which have been "aptly characterized as a process of 'creating racially
"safe boroughs .... (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1444
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perhaps the most telling statement of what this change in the law meant for these
groups, Justice Thomas observed, in Holder v. Hall,"that practice now promises to
embroil courts in a lengthy process of attempting to undo, or at least minimize, the
damage wrought by the system we created."' 5
The timing of these decisions apparently could not have been worse, in light of
the appearance that political equality for blacks was close at hand. 6 When Congress
enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965, there were only three black legislators in the
eleven southern states, six black members of Congress (none from the Deep South),
and fewer than 280 blacks elected to political office nationwide. By 1996, there were
more than 250 black legislators in the eleven southern states, thirty-nine black
members of Congress, and more than 8,200 blacks elected to political office
nationwide." Their election had given their constituents hope in two critical
respects. First, it appeared that the promise of "one person, one vote"'" was no

(1Ith Cir. 1988) (Hill, J., concurring specially))). Some commentators agree with the Court.
See Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at 69-73, 93; Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes

from a PoliticalThicket, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at
108-12, 115-16. But see Bernard Grofinan, The Supreme Court, The Voting Rights Act, and
Minority Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at
190-91 (stating that the claim that the Justice Department has engaged in a policy of
maximizing minority electoral success is mistaken and the "bleaching" argument-that the

Department has sought to use majority-minority districts to advance Republican interests-is
rebutted by the enforcement policies under the Clinton administration).
'5

512 U.S. at 905 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Some writers question, however, whether black electoral success actually translates into
true political empowerment. They instead argue that isolated electoral success simply might
alter the location of disenfranchisement from the ballot box to the legislature. See, e.g., LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 117-18 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the
6

Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 41-43
(1991); discussion infra notes 457-506 and accompanying text. During the debates on
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, Thaddeus Stevens recognized that giving blacks the
unimpeded right to cast ballots and elect candidates neither guaranteed they would be
protected from white hostility nor ensured their economic prosperity. See infra note 182; cf
infra note 20 (discussing whether electoral success leads to beneficial outcomes).
'" See Bill Rankin, Perspective: Electoral Districts and the Courts-An Act Under
Attack, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 8, 1997, at G6; see also QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH, supra note 7, at 383-86 (outlining the impact of the Voting Rights Act); Chandler
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A BriefHistory, in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY VOTING,
supra note 9, at 42-44 (describing increases in minority voter registration and officeholding
after passage of the Voting Rights Act); Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in
Minority Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 271,271-72 (1995) (outlining the impact of the Voting
Rights Act); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionalityof Racial Redistricting:A Critique of
Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1995) (discussing increases in minority representation
after the 1990 Census).
"8 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,381 (1963); see also supranote 314 and accompanying
text (discussing what "one person, one vote" seems to guarantee); cf discussion infra notes

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

longer just an aspiration, but was finally coming to fruition. Second, it seemed that
increased political representation had led to greater economic development and
opportunities for blacks and other racial and ethnic groups who had been neglected
for so long.' 9 In the midst of this2 apparent victory, the rules of the game seemed to
have been changed irrevocably.
293-325 and accompanying text (identifying what the Court has concluded "one person, one
vote" actually guarantees).
19 The question of whether black electoral success has led to beneficial outcomes for the
black community has been debated widely. Black Americans often have maintained the
"conviction that through politics they could influence government to act to improve their
social and economic status." Milton D. Morris, Black Electoral Participationand the
Distribution of Political Benefits, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE, reprinted in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 271,271-85 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). Many commentators have found that
substantive benefits in fact do flow to the black community. See, e.g., RUFUS P. BROWNING
ET AL., PROTEST ISNOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY
IN URBAN POLITICS (1984); JAMES W. BUTTON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: IMPACT OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES 15-26 (1989); Laughlin
McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 127779 (1989). Some judges have reached similar conclusions. See generally Johnson v.
Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1499-502 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (three judge panel) (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the many benefits to the black and white communities of north central

Florida which resulted from Congresswoman Corrine Brown's representation in a majorityminority district); Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119, 128 (W.D.. La. 1994) (three judge
panel) (Shaw, J., concurring) (noting "the great benefits that are derived by an increase in
minority representation in government"), vacated, 515 U.S. 737 (1995). On the other hand,
many scholars disagree, finding that black electoral success does not always translate into
"substantive representation," i.e., a situation in which "tangible policy and other benefits [are
secured] for minority voters." Richard H. Pildes & Kristen Donoghue, Cumulative Voting
in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 277 (1995). For examples of such
conclusions, see PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING (1996); Ankur J. Goel et al., Comment,
Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowerment, Local Control, and the
Implication of Being Darker Than Brown, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 418 (1988)
("Traditional civil rights strategies sought equality for people of color through access to the
dominant white culture, and were grounded in a vision of integration .... This concept of
equality promoted integration at the expense of economic and political empowerment, and
has been described as 'noneconomic liberalism."'); GUNIER, supra note 16, at 66-69

(critiquing the "responsiveness assumption" of black electoral success theory, whereby black
voters are said to "gain substantive policy influence by electing racial compatriots with
special attachment to and understanding of the black community and its distinctive
interests"); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1995)
(reviewing QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 7) (observing that in southern
politics, as "the Black population reaches a critical mass, White voters begin to see Black
participation as a credible threat; in reaction, White voters band together and develop more
conservative preferences").
20 There has been extensive debate over whether the narrowed scope of voting rights
claims actually will diminish the electoral success of minority candidates and flow of benefits
to minority communities. Professor Carol Swain believes it will not:
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When the Supreme Court actually has ventured into the "political thicket,"'" it
has done so half-heartedly, clinging to its own fixed, mechanical notions of "one
person, one vote"-population equality among districts 2 -at the expense of what the
majority in Reynolds v. Sims termed "fair and effective representation." 3 The Court
has been particularly uneasy in addressing vote dilution challenges, which require a
significant deviation in treatment from the comparatively easier cases of numerical
malapportionment and mechanisms that cause the outright denial of the ballot.
Instead, proof of minority vote dilution demands looking at election results and
' The Court's
determining whether those results are "fair."24
discomfort largely is
premised on its belief that assessing the fairness of electoral outcomes necessarily
requires it to adopt and to impose a particular democratic theory on the States.25

Voting rights activists, I believe, have overstated their case against the Court.
African-Americans and Hispanics have not been harmed by the Court's
redistricting decisions. Despite dire predictions to the contrary, Congress has not
been "bleach[ed]." Minority legislators, in fact, performed much better than was
predicted during the 1996 elections, as black Democrats who stood for reelection in invalidated districts were returned to office by respectable margins.
Carol M. Swain, Not "Wrongful" by Any Means: The Court's Decisions in the Redistricting

Cases, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 315, 318-19 (1997); accordAbigail Themstrom, More Notes from
a PoliticalThicket, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 117-21
(describing the argument that "[b]lack candidates cannot get elected in majority-white
settings" as "bleak and wrong," and pointing to black electoral success). Conversely, some
scholars have argued that the strong showing of minority candidates in the 1996 elections was
more a product of incumbency and high voter turnout by voters from the candidates' own
constituencies, and does not accurately reflect the need for continued judicial protection of
minority voting rights. See Clarence Page, Results are Deceptive in Redrawn Black Districts,

Hous.

CHRON.,

Dec. 1, 1996, at 3; see also Bernard Grofman, The Supreme Court, The

Voting Rights Act, and Minority Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 195-99 (summarizing statistics to rebut arguments by

Swain and Thernstrom that minority districts are unnecessary); Bernard Grofman & Lisa
Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 205, 248-57 (1995) (analyzing

statistics to rebut arguments by Swain and Thernstrom that minority districts no longer are
necessary). For additional discussion of the potential impact of Shaw v. Reno and other
recent voting rights decisions on minority representation, see generally Timothy G.
O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 45-48.
21 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556

(1946).
See infra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
24 Cf Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind
Society?, in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY VOTING, supranote 9, at 262 ("[Tlhe voting rights
controversy is really another variant of a long-standing dilemma in democratic theory: How
should minority rights be balanced against the majority will in a system of government that
derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed?").
25 Justice Thomas perhaps best articulated this discomfort in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994). See infra notes 591-629 and accompanying text; see also infra note 322 (collecting
22
23
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Surely, it is troublesome that the least democratic branch of government even should
be in a position to make sweeping changes to one of the most basic rights United
States citizens possess: the right to vote.26 The Court's outward expression of disdain
for adopting a democratic theory, however, merely begs the question and hides an
inner truth. The Court (or at least certain members of the Court) has adopted a
democratic theory, and it is inconsistent with the theory selected by the people's
representatives in Congress.27
Essentially, the Supreme Court has advanced a democratic theory that primarily
protects the individual right to cast a ballot and only sparingly protects against other
impediments to minority participation in the democratic process.2" This democratic
theory clashes with the type of relief from vote dilution that Congress afforded
minority groups in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.29 Congress intended
section 2 to reach past the ballot box and examine the actual outcome of elections to
determine "whether minorities have equal access to the process of electing their
representatives."3 Thus, section 2 codifies the democratic theory that having a
meaningful voice in the political process includes being able to join together with
other like-minded individuals to elect a candidate of choice, free from sustained,
discriminatory vote dilution by another group or groups of individuals. Moreover,
the democratic model adopted by Congress in section 2 also is consistent with the
Court's constitutional role in our political system.3 The result of the Court's
intransigence to fulfilling faithfully its constitutional check on majority factionalism
is that "consent of the governed"32 often means little more than "consent of the

citations of justices who have criticized the Court for engaging in matters of democratic
theory in the "one person, one vote" cases).
26 As John Agresto has observed, there is a "great paradox regarding judicial review":
Citizens trust the Court to apply basic constitutional principles "to work out our present and
our future in terms of our inheritance from the past. But that selfsame power contains within
it the most serious of potential dangers, the possibility that the judiciary will substitute its
principles for the Constitution's, and then actively enforce its visions autonomously and
unchecked."

JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 156-

57 (1984).
27 See infra notes 581-848 and accompanying text (discussing reliance of federal courts
on majoritarian default instead of the constitutional conception of democracy). In the context
of section 2, this position is particularly perverse. Many members of the Court have rejected
a constitutional conception of voting rights in order to avoid advancing a democratic theory.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. However, the Court also has rejected a
majoritarian conception of voting rights by disregarding the democratic theory advanced by
Congress in the amended section 2. See infra notes 591-712 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 293-506, 591-712 and accompanying text.
29 See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1994)); infra notes 507-80 and accompanying text.
30 S. REP. No.417, at 36 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.
31 See infra notes 48-280 and accompanying text.
32 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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majority"--only one half of the republican equation; and those in a minority are left
without a meaningful voice in government.
This Article will discuss the implications of the Court's usurpation of democratic
theory with regard to minority vote dilution claims brought under section 2. It will
examine how application of the Court's narrow view of the right to vote has
permitted lower federal courts essentially to rewrite section 2 in a way that virtually
assures a finding of no liability in all but the most egregious circumstances. In
addition, the Article will show how the Court's discomfort with overturning the will
of the majority-as expressed in elections-has encouraged the lower courts to
"explain away" even the most obvious cases of polarized voting. What has resulted,
the Article will argue, is the virtual evisceration of section 2 as a meaningful remedy
for minorities who have been denied access to the political process.
Part I begins by discussing the role of democratic theory in evaluating voting
rights claims. This discussion will provide some enlightenment as to the reasons the
Court has embarked on a dangerous, if not undemocratic, path in the voting rights
arena. As an initial matter, it will trace the development of the consent theory of
democracy espoused by James Madison and reflected in the Constitution and
Reconstruction Amendments.33 The examination of thisdevelopment will lead to an
analysis of the role of the judiciary in protecting voting rights. Part I also will
describe how the Framers intended the courts to act as "judicial referees" on the
political playing field, regulating the voting game to ensure that each participant has
a fair and equal opportunity to consent to their government.34 This Part concludes
with a proposal for nothing less than "judicially active" referees who, subject to
certain constitutional and practical limitations, will not be afraid to stop the game
when they observe one of the participants commit a foul.
Part II examines how the Supreme Court has fared in its role as referee. It will
demonstrate that functionally, the Court has examined the right to vote under a
"process democracy" continuum comprised of five types of claims: "structural
process" or "pure process" claims;" "quasi-structural process" claims;" "geography
process" claims; "submersion process" or "perverted process" claims;3" .and
"parliamentary process" claims.39 The first section will describe the "one person, one
vote" cases, wherein the Court professed to adopt a pure process approach to
malapportionment by treating it as a deprivation of individual access to the political
process. The second section will examine the Court's treatment of process
democracy claims, in which the Court generally has.treated pure process claims as
the most favored and, hence, the most protected, unlike parliamentary process claims,
which have received no protection at all from the Court (except to the extent that the

3 See infra notes 61-207 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 208-80 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 347-84 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 385-418 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 419-46 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 447-56 and accompanying text.
'9See infra notes 457-506 and accompanying text.
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outcomes the parliamentary process generates implicate a constitutional right
independent of the right to vote). The second section concludes with a description
of an alternative approach for judicial referees to follow along the continuum of
process democracy rights, consistent with congressional intent codified in section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.
Part III assesses, in detail, the record of the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts in policing perverted process claims (vote dilution claims under section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act). After discussing the democratic theory Congress adopted
when it repudiated the Bolden intent test40 in favor of a results test4 ' in the 1982
amendments to section 2, Part III will review the Court's interpretation of those
amendments in Thornburgv. Gingles42 and other cases. It also will outline how the
Court's line of decisions following Shaw v. Reno,43 while creating a claim
"analytically distinct" from actionable vote dilution, at the same time simplified the
lower courts' redefinition of section 2 by shifting vote dilution claims away from a
group focus and towards an individual focus. Thefait accompli then will be seen in
a number of lower court decisions, which this Part will use to illustrate the
devastating consequences of this paradigm shift." These courts have placed a
virtually insurmountable evidentiary burden on vote dilution claimants through
methodology which "explains away" dilution, namely, by attributing the presence of
racially polarized voting to unprotected non-racial causes, by completely deferring
to state interests, or by refusing to impose a race-conscious remedial plan. Part III
will illustrate that the democratic theory adopted by Congress and embodied in
section 2 has been disregarded in favor of an inconsistent judicial view of what
"voting" means in the American democratic system.
Part IV will show how the federal courts can lift themselves "out of the so-called
'political' arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation"45 in
assessing claims under section 2. It issues a challenge to the courts to deconstruct
theoretically the revived intent test they created and to return to their proper
constitutional roles of securing the right to vote for all voters. Part IV also will
reemphasize briefly the point made in Part I that protection of minorities from the
See infra note 551 and accompanying text.
4"See infra notes 545-59 and accompanying text.
42 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
4' 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993).
4 These decisions include, among others, Judge Higginbotham's majority opinion in
League of United LatinAmerican Citizens, CouncilNo. 4434 v.Clements ("LULAC II"), 999
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting section 2 claim because minority group's
electoral losses were attributable to "partisan politics"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994),
and Judge Tjoflat's opinions in both Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012
(11 th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam decision of court evenly divided on the proper
standards for analyzing a section 2 vote dilution claim), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991),
and Nipperv. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that the state's interest
in maintaining its judicial election system precluded implementation of remedies for any
section 2 violations that had occurred), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
4' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
40
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"tyranny of the majority" is a fundamental constitutional value which always has
been consistent with the Madisonian vision of democracy in this country.4 6 It will
urge the rejection of a narrower, individualist view of voting rights (which is
perfectly proper for other types of voting claims), in favor of the broader group rights
focus which was a principal part of the democratic theory adopted by Congress for
vote dilution claims. It then will describe a proper reading of the results test which
is consistent with what Congress intended, as well as with the constitutional limits
on Congress to adopt remedial measures under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Finally, it will suggest that federal courts should avoid their
shortsighted focus on alternative causal explanations for widespread, systemic,
racially-polarized voting, and return to the fundamental democratic principle codified
in section 2: determination of whether minority voters are denied their voice in
government by having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."47 In
that manner, this Article suggests that federal courts will resume their proper role as
judicial referees in protecting the process of democracy and related outcome
democracy rights of all Americans to exercise that most fundamental of rights: the
right to vote.
Until the federal courts return to the proper decision-making process, judicial
tyranny will continue unabated. It is time for judges, in the name of so-called
"neutral principles," to stop intervening to dilute and undermine the broad protection
afforded by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Instead, the courts must fulfill their
constitutional role as impartial referees and apply section 2 in the manner that
Congress intended. These judicial referees also must recognize which rules of the
game to apply. Just as it is improper to enforce the rules of football when umpiring
a baseball game, it also is improper to apply an individual focus to a group right (vote
dilution), or a constitutional standard (the intent test) when a congressional standard
(the results test) is appropriate. Section 2 will have meaning only when all players
are allowed to participate in the game of consent, and an appropriate balance is struck
between respect for majority rule and protection of minorities from the tyranny of
majority factionalism. Only then will the federal courts begin to enforce a view of

Cf GUINIER, supranote 16, at 3 ("The tyranny of the majority, according to Madison,
requires safeguards to protect 'one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part."'); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing ways to control the tyranny of factions). For an interesting discussion of
the Court's citations to The FederalistPapersin its decisions, see Buckner F. Melton, Jr.,
46

The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A CitationList and Analysis, 85 KY. L.J. 243 (1996-

1997).
47 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (emphasis added). As outlined in notes 507-80 and
accompanying text, infra, this language shows that section 2 covers two distinct areas. First,
it protects the rights of groups of voters to have a fair opportunity to select the representatives
of their choice. Second, it guards against attempts by the majority to deny groups fair and
effective participation through parliamentary processes that undercut their representation.
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"voting" that is consistent with the democratic theories embodied in the Constitution
and section 2.
I. VOICES IN GOVERNMENT: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING CONSENT

Voting rights have been contentious in this society because the definition of
those rights necessarily implicates a particular view of democracy. But what is
"democracy?" James Madison described it as a system in which "the people meet
and exercise the government in person."4 Quite obviously, the current system of
government in the United States does not meet Madison's definition. Instead, the
United States operates under what Madison termed a "republican government," in
which the people "assemble and administer [government] by their representatives and
agents."49 Accepting as true the premise that Americans live under a republican form
of government, therefore, it is that type of government to which this Article refers by
the term "democracy."
In order to function properly, democracy mandates that the governed have a
voice in their government. Because voting is the only structural mechanism for
expressing the voice of the people, it is a fundamental right "preservative of all
rights."50 But what is the nature of the right to vote? For some, it signifies
citizenship in a community.5 Others stress the symbolism of the right, either by
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 46, at 100 (James Madison). Madison's definition
of "democracy" is really a definition of "direct democracy"-the view that "[n]o one
represents people's interests better than the people themselves." DENNIS C. MUELLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 95 (1996). A well-functioning direct democracy necessarily
requires a small constituency. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 163 (2d ed. 1996).
In the United States today, direct democracy mainly is present in New England town
meetings. See MUELLER, supra, at 97-98. For an in-depth discussion of town meetings in
48

Selby, Vermont, see JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 39-135

(1980).
49

THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 46, at 100 (James Madison); see also THE

FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 46, at 82 (James Madison) (stating that in a republican

government, government is delegated to a small number of citizens elected by the rest,
"whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations").
50 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1876).
5'See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) ("To the extent that a
citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen."); KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1989) ("Voting

is the preeminent symbol of participation in the society as a respected member, and equality
in the voting process is a crucial affirmation of the equal worth of citizens."); Jennifer K.
Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175, 217778 (1993) (describing suffrage as "the first right of a citizen" because it is "the very essence
of self-government"); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: PoliticalEquality, 22
U.S.F. L. REV. 1,4 (1987) (arguing that voting is a means by which a "community confirms

an individual person's membership, as a free and equal citizen"); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-12 (1993)
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itself 52 or through its exercise. 3 Functionally, the right to vote is the way to choose
who stands in and speaks for the voters in government."' Therefore, voting can be
seen as a right to join with other like-minded individuals to elect a candidate of
choice.55 In addition, voting can be a means of expression, not only at the ballot box,
but through the deliberative process in government.56 Voting is also about power, as a
(explaining that one aspect of the right to vote is "civic inclusion," an outcome-independent
right to become a member of a community by casting a ballot that is counted); Joellen Lind,
Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffragefor the Voting Right, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 103,210 (1994) ("The issue of women's access to the vote became a means
of asserting their citizenship ....
"); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341
(1960) (observing that the result of the disenfranchisement of black voters was to

discriminatorily deprive them "of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including inter alia,
the right to vote in municipal elections," taking away their citizenship in the community).
52 See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIzENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
56 (1991) (describing voting as "the identifying feature of democratic citizenship in America,
not a means to other ends"); cf infra notes 555-63 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Thomas's view that the right to vote is a symbolic right that does not include a right to
representation).
13

See generally infra note 592 (noting Justice Scalia's belief that the vote is a

"mechanism for participation"); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 451 (1989) (stating

that one way to view the right to vote is "instrumental," when "[p]olitical participation is
valued ...
as a means to defend or further interests formed and defined outside politics...
[and] the experience of participation itself neither contains any positive values nor affects the
content of anyone's or any group's interests and ends"); see also Lind, supra note 51, at 10506 (noting that although "voting ought to be transformative... it is a disquieting fact that the
value of the vote seems more symbolic than substantive").
14 See generally Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,
363 (1997)
("Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression."); Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) ("[The purpose of elections is] to winnow out and finally
reject all but the chosen candidates."); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941)
("From time immemorial an election to public office has been in point of substance no more
and no less than the expression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates.").
5

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (establishing a cause of action for situations

in which "members of a class of citizens ...
have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice");
GUINIER, supra note 16, at 125 ("[T]he right of the individual to participate politically is a
right best realized in association with other individuals."); Karlan, supra note 51, at 1712-16

(noting that a second aspect of the right to vote is "aggregation," the right "to combine
individual preferences to reach some collective decision"); see also infra notes 240
(collecting citations of those who view the right to vote as a group right).
56 See generally AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

131 (1996) (asserting that political participation is important in a representative government
to improve "the greater chance for the genuine public conversation that deliberative
democracy seeks"); Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up ": Minority Political
Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 478 (1988)

(describing the importance of "diversity of perspective" in voting that enables voters "to
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method of participating in post-election policymaking" or obtaining desired results
and benefits.5" The right to vote can be some, or possibly all, of these things. But
most of all, the right to vote rests on the republican principle that the actions of
government must be based upon the consent of the governed.59
This Part of this Article describes the consent theory of democracy and the role
ofjudges as "referees" in enforcing that theory. The first section discusses how the
Founding Fathers established the constitutional basis of consent by designing a
political system mediating between majority rule and the need to protect minorities
from the tyrannies of majority factionalism.' The Framers intended judges to play
enlarge those deliberations of which they are a part"); Michelman, supra note 53, at 451
(explaining that under a "constitutive" view of the right to vote, the value of the right is "not
in any ulterior end but in the ends-affecting-the dialogic--experience of the engagement
itself"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31
(1985) (observing that under a republican view of government, voting was but one part of
a broader deliberative democracy in which "[d]ialogue and discussion among the citizenry
were critical features in the governmental process"); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive
Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331 (1993) (describing an "'expressive' approach to
participation" through voting); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1948) (arguing that freedom of speech is a product
of "the necessities of self-government by universal suffrage").
" See generallyGUINIER, supranote 16, at 36 ("A meaningful right to vote contemplates
minority participation in post-election policymaking as well as pre-election coalition building
and deliberation."); Karlan, supra note 51, at 1716-19 (discussing "governance," the third
aspect of voting-the right to be an integral part of "the practice of decisionmaking through
representatives").
58 See generally Unita Blackwell, Part of Mississippi Freedom Summer, 1964:
"Representation and the Right to Participate," in HARRY HAMPTON ET AL., VOICES OF
FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950s THROUGH
THE 1980s, at 180 (1990)
(I was only told when I started off that if I registered to vote, I would have food
to eat and a better house to stay in 'cause the one I was staying in was so raggedy
you could see anywhere and look outdoors. My child would have a better
education. At that particular point, our children only went to school two to three
months out of the year. That was what we were told. It was the basic needs of the
people.);
see also Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 19, at 281, 301 (describing some of the advantages
of cumulative voting as including "tangible substantive benefits" and receipt of "a fairer
distribution of public services").
" See supranotes 69-122 and accompanying text. For an additional discussion of what
the right to vote meant to blacks in the civil rights movement, see Tucker, supra note 7, at
Part I.

6 The United States is not unique in adopting a consent-based approach to government.
For example, international law expressly recognizes the fundamental right of people to give
or withhold their consent to their government. See generallyUniversal Declaration of Human
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 21(3), U.N. Doc. A/811 ("The will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government; and this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or
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a unique role in this "Madisonian compromise," by empowering them to be active
referees who would maintain order on the political playing field. The second section
of Part I discusses the manner in which the Reconstruction Amendments further
expanded upon and shaped the rules of the game that the judicial referees have to
observe in protecting the consent of the governed. Finally, the third section examines
the way judges should fulfill their roles as referees, as well as the proper scope of
their powers to regulate consent in our political system.
A. The ConstitutionalBasis of Consent
Today, the principal method by which people exercise their voice in government
is through the selection of their representatives in that government." However, that
was not always the case. In the years leading up to the American Revolution, the
right to elect members of Parliament was denied to roughly ninety percent of the
people of Great Britain and all of those living in the American colonies.62 Instead,
by equivalent free voting procedures."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, part III, art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. 172
(Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity... (a) To take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b)
To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors.);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, part 1,art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S. 212
(State parties undertake ... to guarantee ... [plolitical rights, in particular the

rights to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election--on the basis
of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the
conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service.).
61 There are other ways to have a voice in government independent of the right to vote
which often are more meaningful than the exercise of the ballot. For example, placing an
advertisement in a newspaper to promote a particular position often can have a substantially
greater impact on legislation than a single vote cast for a representative. Alternatively, one
can run for political office. The point simply is that the manner in which most individuals
have a voice in government is through their ballot.
62 See REID, supra note 2, at 52, 54-55. Even in the most representative colonial
legislatures, suffrage only was extended to one-sixth of the population. Women, children,
servants, and those without property all were ineligible to vote. See FORREST MCDONALD,
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 161-62 (1985); CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BARRIERS TO
REGISTRATION AND VOTING: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 24-26 (1988) [hereinafter BARRIERS

TO REGISTRATION AND VOTING]. Of course, "much of the white male population...
possessed the right to vote" in the colonial legislatures. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 167 (1969) (noting that "from 50 to 80 percent of the adult

white males were eligible to vote in the colonial period," and because white adult males
comprised only 20 percent of the population, only "10 to 16 percent of the whole population
[was] ... eligible to vote by the eve of the Revolution"). See also Christopher Collier, The
American Peopleas Christian White Men of Property:Suffrage andElections in Colonial
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a meaningful voice in government came in many forms at the time: "shared
interests, 63 "shared burdens," '"and "virtual representation." 65 The Stamp Act
controversy of 1765 shattered these theories of representation,' replacing them with
the idea of actual representation6 7 expressed by "no taxation without

and Early National America, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20

(Donald W. Rogers ed. 1990) [hereinafter VOTING].

The "shared interests" doctrine rested on the notion that one had a voice in government
if there was an elected member of that government who shared the same economic, political,
or social interest. There would be no harm in being unrepresented because the elected
member would protect this "Identity of Interests" to the benefit of the unrepresented
individual. REID, supra note 2, at 45-48.
4 "Shared burdens" meant that elected members of a government were burdened by the
same laws they imposed upon unrepresented individuals, "sharing with them the
consequences, costs, and hardships of the statutes they enacted, the taxes they imposed, and
the penalties they decreed." Id. at 48-50.
63

65

"Virtual representation" was the most common explanation for why those denied

suffrage nevertheless were represented in government. This idea applied with equal force to
non-electors in both Britain and the colonies, and Was described as follows: "'None are
actually, all are virtually represented; for every Member of Parliament sits in the House, not
as Representative of his own Constituents, but as one of that august Assembly by which all
the Commons of Great Britain are represented."' WOOD, supra note 62, at 174 (quoting
Thomas Whateley, The Regulations Lately Made [C]oncerningthe Colonies and the Taxes

Imposed upon Them, Considered 109 (London, 1765)). For an additional discussion of
virtual representation, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 166-67 & n.6 (1967); REID, supra note 2, at 50-62; WOOD, supra note 62, at
173-81. Americans always were uncomfortable with the idea of virtual representation
because of its focus on national, and not local, interests. The American colonials believed it
was necessary to have local representatives who would have sufficient knowledge of local
problems to be able to correct these problems through legislation. See REID, supra note 2,
at 84, 133-36.
66 Prior to the passage of the Stamp Act, Britain taxed only those provinces which had
been given actual representation in Parliament. See REID, supra note 1, at 26, 131 (noting
that Lord Chatham acknowledged that the American colonies were subject to the acts of
Parliament, but could not be taxed without representation). Imposition of the Stamp Tax on
the American colonies violated the principle of shared interests and shared burdens because
no member of Parliament shared the colonies' interest or burden-the colonies were
unrepresented and no one in Great Britain had to pay the tax. See id. at 62. Similarly, once
the identity of interests between the electors of Britain and the unrepresented colonies no
longer was present, the doctrine of virtual representation no longer was legitimate (if, indeed,
it ever was). See BAILYN, supra note 65, at 167-69.
67 See WOOD, supra note 62, at 597; see also id at 600 ("The representation of'the

people, as American politics in the Revolutionary era had made glaringly evident, could
never be virtual, never inclusive; it was acutely actual,and always tentative and partial."
(emphasis added)). The Tories attacked actual consent by suggesting that if this Whig view
of voting was correct, "then no man could be bound by a law unless he had personally voted
for a representative." Id. at 183.
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' Suffrage itself became "a basic prerequisite of representation" 69
representation."68
and the foundation for the belief that "'all lawful government is founded on the
consent of those who are subject to it."' 7
After the American Colonies secured their independence from Britain, the task
of ensuring that government in America would derive its "just powers from the
consent of the governed" fell to the Founding Fathers.7 One core element of
Madisonian democracy, consistent with the idea of consent ofthe governed, required
the republican principle of majority rule: "the idea that all the adult citizens of a
republic must be assigned equal rights, including the right to determine the general
direction of government policy."72 Majority rule raised the related question of who
would get the right to vote. There was widespread debate on this point at the
Constitutional Convention. The delegates finally opted for a scheme making voter

68 MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 28.
69 WOOD, supra note 62, at 182.
70 GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA

248 (1978) (quoting James Wilson). Consent was

seen as an important part of government for a number of reasons. First, consent endowed
legitimacy on government. Second, consent created a sense of obligation among the people
to obey their government's laws. Third, a government's laws received binding force from the
consent of the people. See REID, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also WOOD, supra note 62, at
600-02 (discussing how consent cemented the principle that "the rulers had become the ruled
and the ruled the rulers"); A. John Simmons, Tacit Consentand PoliticalObligation,5 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 274,290 (1976) (observing that "consent, be it tacit or express, may still be the
firmest ground of political obligation"); see generally Harry Beran, In Defense of the
Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority, 87 ETHICS 260 (1976-1977)
(discussing in detail consent as a basis for government); infra notes 327-334. The principle
of consent as a basis for republican government had its origins in the works of Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke, and the even earlier writings of Marsilius of Padua. See HELD,
supra note 48, at 46-47, 77, 80-82. For a discussion of the contributions of Hobbes and
Locke to The FederalistPapers,see generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE FEDERALIST(1984) (examining Locke's impact); GEORGE MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES,
AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: AN ESSAY ON THE GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

HERITAGE (1979) (examining the impact of both Locke and Hobbes on The Federalist

Papers).

"' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Framers envisioned
consent would come in two stages. First, the Constitution itself had to be accepted by popular
consent of the governed. Second, the government would have to rely upon "continuing
consent of the governed in regular elections." David F. Epstein, The PoliticalTheory of the
Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 77, 122 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990)
[hereinafter CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION].
72 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRACRATIC THEORY 31 (1956); accord

RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION 217-18 (1985); see also THE FEDERALIST

No. 10, supra note 46, at 80 (James Madison) (discussing the republican principle of
majority vote); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 46, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting
the "fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the
majority should prevail").
71 See MCDONALD, supranote 62, at 238-39. Madison proposed that suffrage for electing
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qualifications the same, "from time to time, as those of the electors of the several
States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures."74 Of course, many
States had limited the franchise to prevent "the lowest and most ignorant of mankind"
from participating in the "important business" of voting." It would be up to later
generations to expand the electorate.76
The second core element of Madisonian democracy focused on protecting
minorities from the untrammeled excesses of majority factionalism, 77 what has been
referred to as "protective democracy."78 The Framers of the Constitution were well
members of the House be limited to freeholders because he feared the propertyless would
lack respect for property rights and be subject to manipulation by those with property. The
constitutional convention rejected Madison's proposal. See Nathan Tarcov, The Social
Theory of the Founders, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 180-87.

Nevertheless, most states restricted suffrage to property holders until well into the nineteenth
century. See Sean Wilentz, Propertyand Power:Suffrage Reform in the United States, 1787-

1860, in VOTING, supra note 62, at 3 1-41.

MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 238 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 178 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (record of Aug. 6, 1787
proceedings)); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("[T]he Electors in each State shall have the
74

Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.");
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 46, at 325-26 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 46, at 351 (James Madison).

71 WOOD, supra note 62, at 168. These limitations on suffrage were not seen by the
Whigs as inconsistent with the republican principles of consent and majority rule. See id. at
168-69; MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 54-55. Instead, the republican principles viewed
equality of voting as "equality before the law." Thus, the Whigs had no problem denying the
right to vote to slaves, women, or children because they "did not have standing in law equal
to that of freemen." Id at 54.
76

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I (declaring that the right to vote cannot be

denied to former slaves and people of color); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (giving electors
qualified to vote under state law the right to vote for the two United States Senators from
their respective States); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (declaring that the right to vote
cannot be denied to women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § I (giving the right to vote for
President and Vice-President to residents of the District of Columbia); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV, § 1 (providing that the right to vote in federal elections cannot be denied to those
unwilling or unable to pay poll tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (stating that the right to
vote cannot be denied to citizens eighteen years of age or older).
71 Madison equated the threat of majority tyranny with the legislature and the threat of
minority tyranny with the executive, viewing each as "equally undesirable." DAHL, supra
note 71, at 9 (discussing THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supranote 46, at 309 (James Madison)).
However, Madison viewed majority factions as a greater danger to the republic than minority
factions. See infra text accompanying note 83. In addition, the Federalists viewed the
executive branch as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body." THE FEDERALIST NO.
73, supra note 46, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 "Protective democracy holds that, given the pursuit of self-interest and individually
motivated choices in human affairs, the only way to prevent domination by others is through
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versed in the troubling role of factions and parties in republican government through
David Hume's writings on the subject.79 Hume believed there were essentially two
types of factions: personal and real. "Personal factions-those of rival families and
their connections-he saw as arising most readily in small republics, where 'every
domestic quarrel ... becomes an affair of state."'' ° Hume divided "real" factions
into those based upon interest, principle, and affection." Factions based upon
majority interest and affection were the ones most troubling to Madison. Minority
factions were not difficult to remedy because "relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote."82
On the other hand, majority factions were particularly problematic because "the form
of popular government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens." 3 Quite obviously, "[i]f a majority
be united by common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."" .

the creation of... institutions" accountable to the will of the people. HELD, supranote 47,
at 75. In addition to Madison, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill also subscribed to a distinctly
protective form of democracy. See id.
at 88-100. For an examination of one view of how the
Supreme Court has applied a protective democracy model to voting rights cases, see James
A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the ConstitutionalStructure of PoliticalInfluence: A
Reconsiderationof the Right to Vote, 45 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1997).

" For a discussion of Hume's impact on Madison's discussion of factions, see generally
GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); Marc M. Arkin, "The

IntractablePrinciple:" DavidHume, James Madison,Religion, and the Tenth Federalist,
39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 148 (1995).
80 MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 162-63 (quoting 3 DAVID HUME, PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS 130-33 (Thomas H. Green & Thomas H. Grose eds., 1886)).
8l See id.
at 163; cf.THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 46, at 78 (James Madison).
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Id.
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 46, at 81 (James Madison).
83

id.

84

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supranote 46, at 323 (James Madison). Madison also alluded

to the protection of minorities from race persecution during his remarks at the Constitutional
Convention:
We have seen the mere distinction of color made in the most enlightened period
of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over
man. What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among
ourselves? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number?
Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the
mercantile interest. The holders of one species of property have thrown a
disproportion of taxes on the holders of another specie. The lesson we are to
draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by common sentiment,
and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure.
MORRIS, supra note 72, at 203.
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It is evident, then, that the two core elements of Madisonian democracy are
inherently at odds with one another.85 As a result, the "Madisonian compromise" was
an attempt to mediate "between the power of majorities and the power of minorities,
between the political equality of all adult citizens on the one side, and the desire to
limit their sovereignty on the other."86 Madison's efforts to reach this compromise
were two-fold.87 First, the dangers of majority factions could be reduced by creation
of a national government whose legislation would be the supreme law of the land,
and which would be "more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters."88 Presumably, these men
could pursue "the true interest of the country free from the turbulence and clamors
of 'men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs."' 8 9 Second,
Madison seized on Hume's "'radical suggestion that a republican government9"
operated better in a large territory than in a small one." 91 Madison argued:

85

See DAHL, supranote 71, at 90.

86

Id. at 4.

87

See generally McDONALD, supra note 62, at 165-66 (describing Madison's plan "to

create a national government that would have the power to veto state legislation," while at
the same time minimizing problems created by factions).
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 46, at 83 (James Madison).
89 WOOD, supranote 62, at 505 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (Julian
P. Boyd ed., 1950)). Wood criticizes this notion by observing:
The Federalist image of a public good undefinable by factious majorities in small
states but somehow capable of formulation by the best men of a large society

may have been a chimera. So too perhaps was the Federalist hope for the
filtration of the natural social leaders through a federal sieve into political
leadership. These were partisan and aristocratic purposes that belied the
Federalists' democratic language.
WOOD, supranote 62, at 615.
90

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
supra note 62, at 504. As James Wilson noted at the Pennsylvania Ratifying

9' WOOD,

Convention, history seemed to support Montesquieu's conclusion that republics operated
better in small countries, while large countries were destined to be ruled by a despot. It
appeared unlikely, however, that Americans would be willing to accept this result:

On one hand, the United States contain an immense extent of territory, and,
according to the foregoing opinion, a despotik government is best adapted to that
extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that, however the citizens of the

United States might, with pleasure, submit to the legitimate restraints of a
republican constitution, they would reject, with indignation, the fetters of
despotism.
Thomas L. Pangle, The Philosophical Understandings of Human Nature Informing the
Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 12 (quoting James
Wilson, Speech Before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in SELECTED
POLITICAL ESSAYS OF JAMES WILSON 163 (Randolph G. Adams ed., 1930)).
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Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. 92
Madison was optimistic that the combined effect of these solutions would be "a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."9 3
But who would protect the republic from the tyranny of factionalism if
Madison's two solutions failed? What ifthe Madisonian notion of "minorities rule" 4
was wrong because an insular majority could be formed out of "clusters of
cooperating minorities"? 95 What if the executive stood idly by and allowed the
legislature to ride rough-shod over the rights of those in the minority or, even worse,
directly assisted the legislature? Would the republic be destroyed?
Madison's answers to these questions was in the negative, resting on the
principle of separation of powers.' Montesquieu had popularized the importance of
separating the basic functions of government,9 7 what Madison called "a first principle
of free government."" Madison himself expressed the idea of separation of powers
by paraphrasing Montesquieu in The FederalistNo. 47: "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 99 Separation of powers was abandoned
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supranote 46, at 83 (James Madison); see also WOOD, supra
note 61, at 504-05 (discussing Madison's views on increasing the geographical size of a
republic to cure the defects from which smaller republics suffered). McDonald labels this
idea as "tinged with wishful thinking," but notes that it allowed the Federalists to overcome
two important obstacles to the creation of a federal government. First, it rebutted
Montesquieu's notion that republican government only was suited for small geographical
territories. Second, it buttressed the argument that a federal government properly could be
entrusted with power over the whole nation. See MCDONALD, supranote 62, at 166.
93 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 46, at 84 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 46, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The additional securities
to republican government .. .to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will
impose on local factions and insurrections ....).
14 DAHL, supra note 71, at 133 (describing Madison's belief that "specific
policies tend
to be products of 'minorities rule' in the sense that groups of minorities would have to join
together to form a majority on any particular piece of legislation, thereby rendering tyranny
by the majority improbable).
92

(1980).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 46, at 300-01 (James Madison).
97 See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (David W. Carithers ed.,
1977).
98 WOOD, supra note 62, at 152 (quoting James Madison, Government of the United
States, NAT'L GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 6, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
91 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 81
96

MADISON 91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900-19 10)).
99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 46, at 301 (James Madison); cf

MONTESQUIEU,
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only to the extent it was necessary for the power of the three branches of government
to mix in a system of checks and balances." ° Americans initially had embraced the
idea of separation of powers to prevent tyranny by the executive'' and, later, to
prevent tyranny by the legislature. 2 It was the judiciary, however, that benefited the
most from "this new, enlarged definition of separation of powers."'0 3 Thus, in the
event that the other elements of Madisonian democracy failed to prevent majority
factionalism, the task of saving the republic from itself would fall to the judiciary."°
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention generally agreed that the courts
had the power to strike down unconstitutional legislative acts, although the power of
judicial review was not included expressly in the Constitution. 5 As Hamilton wrote:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws
isthe proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in

supra note 97, at 202 ("When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
at 202
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be then no liberty."); id.
("[T]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.").
'oo See MCDoNALD, supranote 62, at 258. Checks and balances meant that "each of the
parts of the mixed constitution was supposed to restrain the power of the others in the interest
of a harmonious whole." Id at 81. Thus, constitutional checks and balances were yet another
constraint on the excesses of majority factionalism. See DAHL, supra note 71, at 82-83.
...
See WOOD, supra note 62, at 156-58 (describing concerns in 1776 with the ability of
strong state governors to control other branches of the government).
at 452-53 (describing concerns in the 1780s with the dangers of legislative
02 See id.
power and the ability of the legislatures to encroach upon the powers of the executive).
103 Id. at 454. In an insightful article, Sotirios Barber argues that a reading of The
FederalistPaperssupports an active judiciary and its attendant judicial activism. See Sotirios
A. Barber, JudicialReview and The Federalist, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 836 (1988).
But see AGRESTO, supra note 26, at 31 ("The modem defense ofjudicial power which
sees the Court as, by its nature, a liberal institution and the protector of minorities from
104

oppressive majorities requires of us too much historical and philosophical forgetting.");
DAHL, supra note 71, at 58-60 ("Americans are inclined to believe that the Supreme Court
is the deus ex machina that regularly saves American democracy from itself. This view is
difficult to support by the actual decisions of the Court.").
'o' See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (1965); MCDONALD,
supra note 62, at 254-58. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, was viewed as
one source for the judicial branch to exercise judicial review over acts of both the state and
federal legislatures. See MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 255-56; MORRIS, supra note 72, at
218. But see William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1,22 (1969) ("It is clear... that the supremacy clause itself cannot be the clear textual
basis for a claim by the judiciary that this prerogative to determine repugnancy belongs to
it."). For a thorough discussion of the foundations ofjudicial review, see DAHL, supra note
71, at 105-112; WOOD, supra note 62, at 453-63; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle of judicial review).
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fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or,
in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents." 6
Moreover, independence of thejudiciary was essential "to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals" from those who would embrace "dangerous innovations in
the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community."'0 7
Therefore, it is clear that under Madisonian democracy, the judiciary would protect
minority groups from being deprived of their constitutional rights by the majority.' °
The only remaining question is the extent to which such justice, that "great cement
of society,"'0 9 can "be pursued until it is obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
pursuit."" In other words, the issues remain whether the Constitution encompassed
the right to vote, and whether the courts should protected it from majority
encroachments.
The answer lies in the republican principle of consent."' If "[t]he fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
PEOPLE,"" 2 then without question "the right to suffrage" must be protected "as a
06
07

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 46, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id at 469; see also McDONALD, supra note 62, at 253-54 (discussing the debate at the

Constitutional Convention on the issue ofjudicial independence).
108
See supra text accompanying notes 85-104.
'09 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supranote 46, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton).
"o THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 46, at 324 (James Madison).
...See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
112 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 46, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 46, at 227 (James Madison) ("The genius of republican
liberty seems to demand ...

that all power should be derived from the people."); THE

FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 46, at 241 (James Madison) ("[W]e may define a republic
to be... a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body
of the people ....It is essentialto such a government that it be derived from the great body
of the society"); id at 244 ("The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the
people of America."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 46, at 294 (James Madison) ("The
adversaries of the Constitution :. . must here be reminded of their error. They must be told
that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone
... ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 46, at 313-14 (James Madison) ("As the people
are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter,
under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly
consonant to the republican theory to recur to the same original authority" when there are
changes to the Constitution or one branch encroaches on the power of another.); THE
FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 46, at 352 (James Madison) (stating that members of the
House of Representatives must have "an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 46, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring
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fundamental article of republican government.""' 3 A corollary to this basic tenet of
republican government requires consent of the people at the crucial stage of the
decision-making process." 4 If a majority of the electorate is permitted consistently
to deny the consent-i.e., the right to vote-of some of the people at the crucial stage
of the decision-making process, then the outcome of that process is inherently
illegitimate." 5 To hold otherwise would reward the majority for its tyranny and
encourage continued pursuit of its own "passions" or "interests," ' 6 something clearly
inimical to the republican principle of consent." 7 Consequently, the role of the
judiciary in resolving this problem is evident: "unblocking stoppages in the

to "[tlhe establishment of a Constitution... by the voluntary consent of a whole people").
Indeed, one of the principal defects of the Articles of Confederation was that they were not
based upon the consent of the people. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 46,
at 279 (James Madison) ("It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the
Confederation that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere
legislative ratification.").
". THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supranote 46, at 326 (James Madison).
"' Cf DAHL, supra note 71, at 145 (stating that the "normal" American process is "one
in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can

make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision"); ELY, supra
note 95, at 100-01 ("The Constitution

. .

. has sought to assure that

. . .

a majority not

systematically treat others less well than it treats itself-by structuring decision processes at
all levels to try to ensure.., that everyone's interests will be actually or virtually represented
(usually both) at the point of substantive decision."). It generally is true that the critical stage
of the decision-making process is "during vote counting in elections and legislative bodies."
DAHL, supra note 71, at 66. As Part II of this Article will show, however, that is not always
the case. See infra notes 281-580 and accompanying text.
"' Cf KARST, supranote 51, at 223 (observing that Charles Black and Alexander Bickel
"agreed on the central function of the idea of legitimacy: assuring the public, and a defeated
minority in particular, that the government's exercise of power was legitimate"); id at 195
(legitimacy is important because "both the rulers and the ruled-in American society,
political majorities and minorities-need to belong and to believe that the rulers can offer
justification for the exercises of power"); GUTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 28
("Members of the losing minority can accept majoritarianism as a fair procedure when it
yields incorrect results because it respects their status as political equals. The results of
majority rule are legitimate because the procedure is fair, not because the results are right.");
Abrams, supra note 55, at 478 ('"[N]onminority participants may favor enhanced minority
participation because of concern for the legitimacy of the governmental system."); Edward
Still, Voluntary Constituencies:Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote

Dilution in JudicialElections, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 354, 357 (1991) ("[T]he legitimacy
of the courts is enhanced if all major groups in society see some of 'us' on the court, even if
one of 'them' tries a particular case.").
116 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
"7
Cf EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 132 ("[P]opular government is less well suited to

protecting the rights of each part of the community-an end that.., is both fundamental in
itself and also generally a necessary condition for the public good as a whole.").
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democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and
denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage."11
Notwithstanding its strong rhetoric and the broad powers it gave to judges to
protect the voices of the people, the Framers' constitutional model of consent was
inconsistent, if not incomplete, in at least one critical respect." 9 On the one hand, the
Madisonian compromise purported to protect minorities from the tyranny of the
majority. 2 ' On the other hand, the Constitution itself embodied one of the clearest
possible examples of majority tyranny: recognition of black slavery. Moreover, even
those blacks who were free only enjoyed limited rights of citizenship which they held
at the pleasure of the state legislatures.'
As a result, the consent model of
democracy could not be realized fully until these disparities were corrected. The next
section of this Article focuses on the Reconstruction Amendments'22 and their central
role in elevating blacks and other minorities to an equal legal status with whites, or
those in the majority. The discussion shows how the three Amendments completed
the constitutional consent model and further defined the crucial role of judicial
referees under that model.
B. Blacks and Consent: The ReconstructionAmendments
Blacks always have been a part of American politics, although the strength of
their voice in government has varied considerably since the foundation of the
Republic. From the colonial era until the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment,
black political participation primarily came in the form of "pressure or nonelectoral
politics,"' 23 and only secondarily through "electoral politics," or the actual
opportunity to cast a ballot that would be counted.'24 While few states specifically
barred the right of suffrage to free blacks prior to 1787,125 people of the period
supra note 95, at 117.
...Obviously, black males were not the only ones denied the right of consent. See
generally Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that the Constitution
did not confer the right of suffrage upon women).
120 See DAHL, supra note 71, at 4.
118

ELY,

121
122

See Smith, supranote 725, at 239.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV.

123

HANES WALTON, JR., BLACK POLITICS: A THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

17-21 (1972). From the Colonial Era until the Civil War, pressure or nonelectoral politics
"evolved from attempts to attain freedom, to maintain the status of a 'free man of color,' to
remove discriminatory practices from different communities, and to have suffrage rights
given, extended, or returned." Id at 17-18. Much of the pressure politics transpired through
the efforts of the National Negro Convention Movement and related white Abolitionist
movements. See id. at 26-28.
124 Id. at 21-26.
'2
During the colonial and revolutionary era, the only colonies which expressly denied
suffrage to blacks were Georgia (1761-1787), North Carolina (1715-1735), South Carolina
(1716-1787), and Virginia (1723-1787). See W. Roy Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in

STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

231-32,234 (James W. Garner ed., 1914).
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generally accepted that blacks did not have the right to vote. 26 This result is
unsurprising when viewed in the context of the Constitution itself, wherein black
slaves were treated as only "three fifths of all other Persons.' 27
In DredScott v. Sanford, 21 the Supreme Court confirmed the widely held belief
that it was unnecessary for government to obtain consent from blacks, free or
otherwise. 29 According to Chief Justice Taney, blacks were not and could not

126 Legislation

disenfranchising blacks was not thought to be necessary. As Smith

observed:
In the early days, probably for two or three generations, the negro was looked
upon as an alien and in consequence was excluded from political privileges by

the English common law. By the time he had ceased to be regarded as an alien,
slavery had existed long enough to be taken as the normal status of his race, and
he was still denied the right to vote.
Id.
at 232.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
The
Confederate Constitution of 1861, which incorporated almost verbatim more than 90% of the

United States Constitution, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 125 (1995), included similar language. Cf CONFEDERATE
STATES OF AMERICA CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (1861) ("three-fifths of all slaves"), reprinted
in ANASTAPLO, supra, at 345. As originally enacted in the United States Constitution, the
three-fifths compromise mediated between the treatment of slaves as property subject to
taxation, and as persons subject to representation. Madison articulated the southern view for
this compromise as follows:
[W]e must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no
respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is that they partake of
both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons,
and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself,
but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being
subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the
capricious will of another--the slave may appear to be degraded from the human
rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal
denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and
in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and
his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against
others-the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the
society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere
article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character
of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 46, at 337 (James Madison). Madison himself accepted
this logic. See id.at 340.
,2860 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
129 Significantly, the Court also struck down the Missouri Compromise, which prohibited
slavery in any state or territory of the United States north of 360 30' north latitude, holding
that the federal government could not deprive a citizen of the right of property in a black
slave. See id.at 449-54.
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become "citizens" of the United States as the term was used in the Constitution,
absent a constitutional amendment:
[T]he legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the
Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who
had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable
instrument. 3 '
Allowing the individual states to decide whether blacks were citizens (of that state),
in addition to their constitutional power to determine voter qualifications,' did not
make states amenable to granting blacks the franchise. By 1865, most states limited
suffrage to white males.' Only two of the thirty-six states then in the Union, Maine
and Vermont, never had imposed any legal limits on the suffrage of blacks.'33 Blacks
also fully exercised the right to vote in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island. In addition, blacks were allowed to vote in New York, as long as they met
certain qualifications not required of whites-namely, they had to own property
worth two hundred fifty dollars and be citizens residing in the state for at least three
years. 34 It is worth noting, however, that in those states which granted free blacks
'30 Id. at 407. However, Chief Justice Taney also made it clear that a state could confer
state citizenship upon blacks and other "aliens":
For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State
had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of
citizen, and to endow him with all its rights .... Nor have the several States
surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the
Constitution of the United States. Each State may still confer them upon an alien,
or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons ... The

rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them.
Id. at 405.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
These states, with the year the restrictions were imposed either by state statute or
constitution, included Delaware (1792), Kentucky (1792), Ohio (1803), New Jersey (1807),
Maryland (1810), Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Connecticut (1818),
Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1821), Tennessee (1834), North Carolina (1835),
Arkansas (1836), Michigan (1837), Pennsylvania (1838), Florida (1845), Texas (1845), Iowa
(1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota (1858), Oregon (1859), Kansas
(1861), West Virginia (1863), and Nevada (1864). See WALTON, supra note 123, at 36; W.
Roy Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES INSOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS,
supra note 125, at 237-40. Georgia law did not limit expressly suffrage to white adult males,
although the clause in its constitution limiting suffrage to "citizens and inhabitants of this
state" was interpreted that way. WALTON, supra note 123, at 36; W. Roy Smith, Negro
Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS, supra note 125, at
237-40.
133 See WALTON, supra note 123, at 36.
131 See WALTON, supranote 123, at 21', W. Roy Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in
STUDIES INSOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS, supranote 125, at 237-40. Many blacks were
"'
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the franchise during this period, blacks comprised only a small fraction of the total
population.' 35
The Reconstruction Amendments ultimately would elevate black men to equal
citizenship. 36 The first step towards conferring upon blacks full citizenship and its
most manifest right, suffrage, was to abolish slavery altogether. Abolition came
slowly; in fact, immediately after the Civil War broke out, it looked like it might not
happen at all, in any form.' Nevertheless, preliminary steps were taken beginning
in 1862 with the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and federal
allowed to vote in various locations in the remaining thirty states, although such voting was
more the result of arbitrary application and enforcement of state constitutions and election
laws, than it was of legal enfranchisement. See WALTON, supra note 123, at 21-26; W. Roy
Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN 1IISTORY AND POLITICS, supra

note 125, at 237-39.
13s See generally A. Caperton Braxton, The Fifteenth Amendment: An Account of Its
Enactment, Address Delivered Before Virginia State Bar Association for the Year 1903, at
2 (1934) ("Of men over twenty years of age, in 1860, there were in New Hampshire, 91,954
whites and 149 negroes; in Vermont, 87,462 whites and 194 negroes; in Massachusetts,
339,085 whites and 2,512 negroes and, in New York, 1,027,305 whites and 12,989
negroes."). However, because of poll taxes and literacy requirements in Massachusetts, and
property and residency requirements in New York, "in 1860, there were only about 2,500

negro voters, not one of whom resided outside of New York or New England." Id. In fact,
prior to 1865, as the size of the free black population increased, the number of states allowing
free blacks to vote correspondingly decreased. See WALTON, supra note 123, at 22-23, 25.
36

See infra note 195 and accompanying text.

3 Initially, the northern states attempted to appease the secessionist southern states by
enticing them back into the Union. On March 2, 1861, two-thirds of each house of Congress
passed a proposed thirteenth amendment to the Constitution which permanently would have
guaranteed the existence of slavery in states where it then existed. The amendment failed to
take effect after being ratified by only two states. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 155 (1996); EARL M.
MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 13 (1990); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 108 (1993). Even Abraham Lincoln expressed a willingness

to compromise on the issue of slavery as late as August 22, 1862, shortly before he issued
the preliminary emancipation proclamation:
I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the
Constitution .... My paramount objective in this struggle is to save the Union,

and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without
freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I
would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I
would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because
I believe it helps save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not
believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe
what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe
doing more will help the cause.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), in ANASTAPLO, supranote
127, at 138-39.
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territories,138 the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act, 3 9 and the enactment of the second
Confiscation Act, 4 ° which freed all slaves owned by those in the rebellion who
escaped to Union lines or were confiscated (as property) by the Union Army. 4 '
Acting pursuant to his war powers, President Abraham Lincoln issued his
preliminary emancipation proclamation in September, 1862,142 followed by his final
Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863,' which freed all persons held as
slaves in States and parts of States that had seceded from the Union.'44 Still, it was
widely believed that Lincoln's actions were unconstitutional (particularly in light of
the DredScott decision), and that no mere executive order or act of Congress would
suffice to abolish slavery.'45 In addition, the Emancipation Proclamation left slavery
in place in the states remaining loyal to the Union (such as Delaware and
Kentucky), I" and there was some concern that nothing would prevent the return of
slavery at the end of the Civil War. A constitutional amendment was needed. It
came in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment,' 47 which the Senate passed on April
8, 1864, 48 the House passed on January 31, 1865,'14 and three-fourths of the states
ratified by December 18, 1865."50

138

See KYVIG, supranote 137, at 157; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13.

See KYVIG, supranote 137, at 157; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13.
See KYV1G, supranote 137, at 157; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13.
141 See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 157; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13-14.
142 See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 157; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13-14.
141 See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 157-58; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 13-14.
14 For a full text and commentary about the Emancipation Proclamation,
see ANASTAPLO,
supra note 127, at 135-67. The Emancipation Proclamation did not include those States and
parts of States that had remained loyal to the Union because Lincoln believed his war powers
constitutionally limited him to taking actions only against those states in the rebellion. See
id. at 157-59; KYVIG, supra note 137, at 158.
"' See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 158; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 14; RICHARDS, supra
note 137, at 110.
46 See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 158. During the Civil War, two of the other loyal slave
states, Missouri and Maryland, passed constitutional amendments abolishing slavery. See
MALTZ, supranote 137, at 25-26.
"'v The Thirteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
131
140

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
148 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1490 (1864), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 69
149 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d

(Alfred Avins ed., 1967).
Sess. 531 (1865), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 86.
150

See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 162.
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It became evident almost immediately that the Thirteenth Amendment did not go
far enough. The Amendment clearly reversed the Dred Scott decision to the extent
it allowed the federal government to deprive slave owners of their "property,"'' but
there was widespread disagreement over whether the effects of the Amendment went
any further. Many congressmen argued the Amendment "guaranteed freedman
natural rights,"' while others, along with President Andrew Johnson, maintained
that it "did no more than dissolve the master/slave relationship and that section two
[the enforcement provision] gave Congress no power to grant blacks any other
rights."' 53 Meanwhile, the southern states were recalcitrant in defeat by ratifying the
Thirteenth Amendment, while at the same time imposing harsh Black Codes that
came perilously close to the restoration of slavery.'54 Congress responded by a failed
attempt to enact the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,'55 and succeeded in enacting the
sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1866 over President Johnson's veto.5 6 While the Civil
'5'

See supra note 129.

152

MALTZ,

113

Id. President Johnson was openly hostile to the idea of federal imposition of black

supra note 137, at 27-28.

suffrage. See President Andrew Johnson, Exchange between the President and Negro
Spokesmen on Suffrage (Feb. 6, 1866), in RECONSTRUCTION, THE NEGRO, AND THE NEW
SOUTH 22-28 (LaWanda & John H. Cox eds., 1973) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTION]
(decrying black suffrage as leading to a race war because of the "enmity and hate" between
whites and blacks, arguing it was improper for the federal government to force suffrage on
states that did not want it, and opining that setting voter qualifications was a matter
exclusively belonging to the states).
""See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 163-64; MALTZ, supra note 137, at 37-39. The Black
Codes "'set up elaborate systems of bound apprenticeship, labor restrictions, vagrancy laws,
limits on property ownership and craft employment,' virtually chaining a black to his
habitat." RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 23 (1989)
(quoting MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 203 (1977)). In addition, they placed limits on
blacks in freedom to contract, to assemble, to bear arms, to receive an education, and to
preach as ministers, and prevented blacks from suing or testifying against whites. Punishment
for violating the Black Codes often meant being sold as a laborer--essentially, slavery. See
id.
at 23-24 & n.21; RICHARDS, supra note 137, at 126-27.
155See MALTZ, supra note 137, at 48-49; The Vetoed Freedmen's Bureau Bill (1866),
reprintedin RECONSTRUCTION, supranote 153, at 43-47. Among other things, the Bill would
have given the Freedmen's Bureau national jurisdiction over civil rights issues relating to
blacks and indefinitely extended the life of the Bureau (which initially was scheduled to end
one year after the cessation of hostilities). After it passed both houses of Congress, President
Johnson vetoed the Bill. See MALTZ, supra note 137, at 48-49.
"56See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1809, 1861 (1866), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 205, 210; Civil Rights Act
(Apr. 9, 1866), reprintedin RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 153, at 69-73. As enacted, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 did several things. First, in section 1, it defined a number of civic
and economic rights. See MALTZ, supra note 131, at 61-62. Specifically, it declared that
blacks and all other "persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign Power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3215 (1866),-reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
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Rights Act of 1866 largely repudiated the Black Codes,'57 there was a great deal of
concern over whether the Act was constitutional. The only basis for congressional
authority to enact the law was the Thirteenth Amendment, and it was doubtful that
the Amendment authorized anti-discrimination measures and the conferral of
citizenship on former slaves (especially in the face of the DredScott decision).' 8
Moreover, Republicans feared that "a hostile president, not to mention unrepentant
southern states, would seek to undermine legislative measures" passed by
Congress. 59
'
Accordingly, a constitutional amendment was proposed that would give binding
force to the anti-discrimination and citizenship provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866."6' The Republicans developed a two-fold approach to the proposed
amendment: first, they would include a number of measures in a single amendment
6
forcing the ratifying states to "confront a take-it-or-leave-it, all-or-nothing choice"; '

AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note

148, at 243. The Act guaranteed the rights of blacks as
citizens, except those convicted of crimes:
the same right in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. Section 2 established criminal penalties for violations of any rights outlined in section one
of the Act taken "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom." Id. For
a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see BERGER, supra note 154, at 22-30; MALTZ,
supra note 137, at 61-78.
' Compare supra note 154 (describing the Black Codes), with supra note 156
(describing the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
158 See BERGER, supra note 154, at 20-22; see also MALTZ, supra note 137, at 62-63
(discussing problems presented by the Act, including its application to private
discrimination). In his veto message to Congress, President Johnson raised many of these
issues, and particularly was concerned over the extent of federal intrusion into areas
traditionally regulated by the States. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-81 (1866)
(message from President Johnson), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEBATES, supra note 148, at 193-95. The fight over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
marked the beginning of the Civil War between President Johnson and Congress over who
would have control over Reconstruction. Historians generally have labeled the period from
the end of the Civil War until 1867 as "Presidential Reconstruction," and the period from
1867 until 1876 as "Congressional Reconstruction" or "Radical Reconstruction." See Chuck
Stone, Up from Slavery: FromReconstructionto the Sixties, in BLACK POLITICAL LIFE INTHE
UNITED STATES 37 (Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. ed., 1972).
'5
KYvIG, supra note 137, at 165.
60 Proposals for the amendment actually began to circulate while the Civil Rights Act of
1866 still was being debated. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 57

(1986).
161 KYVIG, supra note 137, at 167; see MALTZ, supra note 137, at 80-81. Kyvig observes
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second, they would make the amendment their "peace treaty," dictating terms under
which southern states that had seceded could be restored fully to the Union.'62 The
Fourteenth Amendment'63 was adopted by the Senate on June 8, 1866," 6 by the

that this approach was an intentional departure from earlier amending practice, in which
different proposals would be considered individually. See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 166-67.
According to Kyvig, the Republicans adopted this tactic to allow Congress (and not the
ratifying states) to make important decisions about content, and also to "encourage the
construction of an amendment around a coalition of interests" that might be only advocates
of particular parts of the amendment. Id; accord MALTZ, supra note 137, at 94.

See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 22 (1965); MALTZ, supranote 137, at 80; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITCAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43-44 (1988).
162

163

The Fourteenth Amendment states:
Section 1.All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, in Executive and Judicial officers of a State,
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall
be held illegal and void.
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House on June 13, 1866,165 and ratified by three-fourths of the States by July 28,
1868.166

Sections 1 and 5 are the most important parts of the Fourteenth Amendment in
terms of securing the rights of full citizenship for blacks.'67 Section 1, which was
considered widely by Congress to be one of the less important parts of the

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce; by appropriate legislation,

the provisions of this article.
amend. XIV.
See CONG: GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1866), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 137, at 237.
165 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866), reprinted in THE
U.S. CONST.
'64

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 137, at 238.

See Proclamation of Ratification (July 28, 1868), reprintedin RECONSTRUCTION, supra
note 153, at 88; GILLETTE, supranote 162, at 24. For a discussion of the debates in Congress,
the states, and the press over the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example,
BERGER, supra note 154, at 37-42, 82-87 (focusing on the ratification debate over the
Fourteenth Amendment in the press and in the states); JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO
166

FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-10

(1997) (examining the ratification process of the Fourteenth Amendment in southern states);
CURTIS, supra note 160, at 57-91 (providing an historical account of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Congress); NELSON, supra note 162, at 40-63 (discussing the
drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress and the states). Ratification
was secured from the southern states largely through congressional imposition of the Military
Reconstruction Act of 1867, which took away all political power of rebellious southern
governments and placed it in the hands of the military until they accepted the Fourteenth
Amendment. See KYVIG, supra note 137, at 172-73. Thaddeus Stevens, an ardent
Pennsylvania abolitionist and leader of the Radical Republicans in the House of
Representatives, rationalized this forced imposition of black suffrage on the South by stating
that "if it be just, it should not be denied; if it be necessary, it should be adopted; if it be a
punishment to traitors, they deserve it." GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 31 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1867), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEBATES, supra note 148; see also infra notes 182-83 (discussing Stevens's political and
economic motives for trying to secure black suffrage).
67 Sections 3 and 4 of the Amendment were measures designed to punish rebellious
southerners in their public and private capacities, respectively. See ANASTAPLO, supra note
127, at 180. For a discussion of section 2, see infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
Congressional Reconstruction forced the southern states to enfranchise all black males over
the age of twenty-one, while at the same time disenfranchising whites who had fought for the
Confederacy. The net effect was the enfranchisement of 672,000 blacks compared to a total
white electorate of 925,000, of which 100,000 whites were disenfranchised and 200,000
disqualified from holding office. See Chuck Stone, Upfrom Slavery: From Reconstruction
to the Sixties, in BLACK POLITICAL LIFE INTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 158, at 39.
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Amendment,168 essentially codified section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.169 The

first clause, declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are
citizens of the United States and the state in which they reside, expressly overruled
the contrary holding in Dred Scott. 7 The remaining three clauses of section 1,
See MALTZ, supra note 137, at 93. In fact, there was very little argument about section
1 in the floor debates. According to Maltz, only two "nominal Republicans," both Johnsonian
allies, attacked the provision as an intrusion upon states' rights. Id at 94.
169 Compare supra note 154 (Civil Rights Act of 1866), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1; see also BERGER, supra note 154, at 40-42. Thaddeus Stevens noted the similarities
between the two, but argued that the Amendment was needed nevertheless. According to
Stevens, without the Amendment there would be little to stop a subsequent Congress,
dominated by "the South with their copperhead allies," to repudiate the Civil Rights Act.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens), reprinted in
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 212. In addition, the
Amendment directly resolved the question of the constitutional basis for passage of the Civil
Rights Act, as many Congressmen, including Stevens, noted. See, e.g., id (statement of Rep.
168

Stevens); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2461 (1866) (statement of Rep. Finck),
reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 213; id at
2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEBATES, supranote 148, at 213; see also supranote 158 and accompanying text (discussing
concerns about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
170 See ANASTAPLO, supra note 127, at 173-74; see also supra notes 128-30 and
accompanying text (describing the holding in DredScott).As the congressional debates make
evident, the Citizenship Clause also clarified a latent ambiguity in constitutional law over
what constituted "citizenship." See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-67
(statement of Sen. Howard) (introducing and explaining the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148,
at 218-21; id. at 2768-69 (statement Sen. Wade) (expressing concern over how the word
"citizen" would be interpreted in the proposed Amendment), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 222; id at 2869 (statement
of Sen. Howard) (offering an amendment to the proposed Amendment defining the word
"citizen"), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at
223; id at 2890-97 (statements of Sen. Clark, Conness, Cowan, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Hendricks, Howard, Johnson, Saulsbury, Trumbull, and Van Winkle) (debating who was
included in the proposed definition of "citizen" and considering an amendment to specifically
exclude "Indians not taxed"), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES,
supra note 148, at 223-29; id. at 2938 (statement of Sen. Hendricks) (explaining section 1
of the proposed Amendment after a Republican caucus), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 229; id at 3031-33 (statement of Sen.
Henderson) (arguing that the proposed Amendment did nothing to change the current
definition of "citizen"), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra
note 148, at 234-35; id at 3040 (statement of Sen. Fessenden) (offering an amendment to
include the words "or naturalized" in the proposed Amendment), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 237; id at 3148 (statement
of Sen. Stevens) (commending the proposed Amendment's resolution of the definition of
"citizen"), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at
237
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including the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause, were intended to guarantee the rights of equal treatment before the
law to blacks (and others by implication, including non-citizens in the case of the
latter two clauses). 7 ' In other words, the remainder of section 1 "gave specific
meaning to American citizenship."'72 The enforcement power contained in section
5 was seen as crucial to ensuring that section 1 of the Amendment had continued
vitality and meaning: It provided that Congress, not the courts, was to ensure the
mandates of section 1 were kept through appropriate enforcement legislation." 3 In
this manner, the federal government could maintain a presence in the South (and
later, in other parts of the country), where the governments "were all too often either
71 See

KYVIG, supra note 137, at 167.

Id at 168. A number of questions concerning the scope of these protections have been
raised. First, there has been much disagreement over whether the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of section 1 was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and apply it to the states.
This issue is complicated by the fact that Senator Jacob Merritt Howard and Representative
John Bingham, its drafter, repeatedly stated that incorporation was intended, notwithstanding
the fact that many moderates in Congress and the ratifying state legislatures apparently
believed the contrary to be true. See MALTZ, supra note 137, at 113-18. Second, there is
some question about the extent of federal power that was intended to be permitted under
section 1 to regulate education and the right to vote. See id. at 109-13 (education), 118-20
(right to vote). Third, scholars widely have debated over the extent to which a demarcation
was made between citizens in the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and "all people" in the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See id. at 96-102. Finally, there has been much
discussion over the extent to which section 1 authorized legislation impacting upon private,
and not state, actions. See id at 102-06. Resolution of these questions about the range of
powers authorized by section 1 is beyond the scope of this Article. For additional discussion,
see generally BERGER, supra note 154 (giving background information on the Fourteenth
Amendment and concluding that the Amendment was intended to have a narrow scope
applying only to southern states); BOND, supra note 166 (examining the ratification process
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the southern states); CURTIS, supranote 160 (analyzing
historical arguments against the incorporation theory and concluding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to require the states to respect the guarantees of the Bill of Rights;
MALTZ, supranote 137 (discussing similar Fourteenth Amendment analyses).
"' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; ANASTAPLO, supra note 127, at 177, 181-82;
172

BERGER, supra note 154, at 89-90. But see CURTIS, supra note 160, at 130 ("Republicans
repeatedly said that the passage of the amendment put enforcement of its principles beyond
the power of congressional majorities. These statements clearly presuppose judicial
enforcement." (emphasis added)). Berger addresses Curtis's assertion, and it seems that the
plain language of section 5, not to mention the Court's interpretation of section 5 in Exparte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-46 (1879), and subsequent cases, shows that Berger has the
better of the two arguments. The reason for allowing Congress-and not the Court-to define
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is that "[firom at least DredScott onward the Court
was in ill repute." BERGER, supra note 154, at 90. See also ANASTAPLO, supra note 127, at
177. The Court's lackluster performance in giving content to the Reconstruction
Amendments until well into the twentieth century supports this reasoning (although Congress
did not fare much better on this account).
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unwilling or unable to provide protection for the fundamental rights of blacks and
Republicans."' 7 4
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment largely was shaped to prevent an
incongruous result posed by the first two Reconstruction Amendments. The
Thirteenth Amendment had emancipated approximately four million slaves in the
South.'75 The subsequent conferral of full citizenship upon southern blacks by
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-making them "whole persons" under the
Constitution-inherently was inconsistent with the three-fifths clause of Article I of
the Constitution.' 76 As a result, the three-fifths clause had to be eliminated in favor
of treating former black slaves as whole persons for purposes of congressional
apportionment. 77 However, northern Republicans were concerned with the perverse
outcome of the rebellious southern states gaining approximately fifteen additional
electoral votes and seats in the House of Representatives as a consequence of a forty
percent increase in population used to calculate representation. 78 At the same time,
three matters further complicated the issue of southern representation. First,
"[d]oubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended
Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly
on the subject."' 179 Second, black suffrage in the northern states was a practical
impossibility because of its unpopularity, 80 while at the same time Republicans
171 MALTZ,

supra note 137, at 104.

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 18 (1975).
'71

176

See supranote 127 and accompanying text.

177See generally S. REP. NO. 112, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1866), reprinted
in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 94 ("By an original

provision of the Constitution, representation is based on the whole number of free persons

in each State, and three-fifths of all other persons. When all become free, representation for
all necessarily follows.").
171 See Braxton, supra note 135, at 16; GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 21-22, 24-25;
ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, "A FREE BALLOT AND A FAIR COuNT": THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1893, at 4 (1990). The

Senate Report noted that "[a]s a consequence the inevitable effect of the rebellion would be
to increase the political power of the insurrectionary States, whenever they should be allowed
to resume their positions as States of the Union," and concluded that "the necessity for some
fundamental action in this regard seemed imperative." S. REP. No. 112, CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1866), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES,
supra note 148, at 94.
"' Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (giving states the power to establish voter
qualifications); see also JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 12 (1909) ("[R]egulation of the suffrage was a matter properly
belonging to the state governments.").
I" See GILLETrE, supra note 162, at 25-27; MATHEWS, .supranote 179, at 17. Between
1865 and 1869, constitutional amendments extending the franchise to blacks were passed in
only two states where the issue was placed before the voters. See GILLETTE, supra note 162,
at 26-27; Braxton, supra note 135, at 43-45. In 1868, in both of these states (Iowa and
Minnesota), black males over 21 made up less than a fraction of one percent of the voting age
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recognized that obtaining black suffrage in the southern states was crucial to their
party's continued vitality.' Third, many favored black suffrage both as a reward for
black service in the Union army during the Civil War, and also as a means for blacks
to protect themselves from southern hostility." 2 The result of reconciling these
competing concerns was a provision that "simply excluded from the basis of
population. See Braxton, supra note 135, at 43-45. In addition, Minnesota had rejected black
suffrage on two previous occasions (in 1865 and 1867), see id at 44, and passage only could
be secured by "placing the suffrage question on the presidential ballot to discourage ticket
splitting, and concealing the issue by labeling the question not 'Negro suffrage' but rather
'revision of section 1, [A]rticle 7."' GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 26. Seven states
(Connecticut and Wisconsin in 1865; Kansas and Ohio in 1867; Michigan and Missouri in
1868; and New York in 1869) where the question of repealing discriminatory voter
qualifications was considered, see supra note 132 and accompanying text, two territories
(Colorado in 1865, and Nebraska in 1866), and the District of Columbia in 1865, rejected
black suffrage by popular referenda. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 25-26; W. Roy Smith,
Negro Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS, supranote
125, at 240 n.2. In 1866, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered black suffrage based upon

the results of an 1849 referendum. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 27.
.8 See Braxton, supra note 135, at 16-17; GILLETTE, supranote 162, at 24-25; GOLDMAN,
supra note 178, at 4-5. Prior to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Governor Oliver
Morton of Indiana expressed concerns over whether southern blacks were capable of
exercising the franchise intelligently and suggested enfranchising them gradually until they
were educated like northern blacks. See Braxton, supra note 135, at 21; GILLETTE, supranote
162, at 48 & n.8.
182 See Braxton, supra note 135, at 8-10, 24-25; GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 22.
Thaddeus Stevens openly questioned whether giving southern blacks the right to vote would,
in fact, secure their protection from hostile whites and ensure their future prosperity:

In my judgment, we shall not approach the measure of justice until we have
given every adult freedman a homestead on the land where he was born and
toiled and suffered. Forty acres of land and a hut would be more valuable to him
than the immediate right to vote.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens), reprintedin
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 212. In other words,
Stevens believed suffrage alone would not make blacks truly equal, particularly if the
southern plantation system was still in place. Instead, blacks also needed to possess "equal
opportunity in a free-labor economy," backed by economic power that would allow them to
be able to have meaningful political opportunities. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1867, at 108 (1990) (abridged version of RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1st ed. 1988)). Therefore, Stevens proposed to "break
the power of the South's traditional ruling class" by confiscating 400 million acres owned
by the wealthiest 10% of southerners. 1d at 107. Such action would, according to Stevens,
"transform the Southern social structure, and create a triumphant Southern Republican

[P]arty composed of black and white yeomen and Northern purchasers of planter land." Id.
Most of the other Radical Republicans rejected Stevens' call for economic equality, believing
that suffrage would be sufficient by itself to allow blacks to achieve social equality. See id
at 107-08. One need only look at the continued economic submersion of blacks in this

country to realize that these hopes were misguided. See supra note 4.
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representation eligible male citizens to whom the vote was denied," with no reference
83
to "race or color."'1
The language and effect of section 2 were weak because they created little more
than a disincentive for southern states to deny the franchise to blacks discriminatorily,
with no similar disincentive for northern states. Accordingly, it became evident that
a more sweeping voting amendment was needed." 4 This conclusion was confirmed
by the 1868 elections, in which violence and intimidation against black voters in the
South was widespread.'85 Moreover, it became politically expedient for Republicans
to confront the delicate issue of black suffrage again directly because the 1868
election returns demonstrated their increasing vulnerability to Democrats in the
8 6
northern states.

As a result, maintenance of Republican political hegemony in the North was one
of the principal factors that motivated the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, even

"I GILLETTE, supranote 162, at 24. The enacted section 2 reconciled all of the competing
issues at the expense of a strong guarantee for and protection of the black vote. First,
although directed at the country as a whole, blacks made up such a small percentage of the
total population in northern states, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 175, at 22, that
it really only affected the southern states. See MATHEWS, supra note 180, at 14; Braxton,
supranote 135, at 28. Second, section 2 left voter qualifications squarely in the hands of state
legislatures, avoiding any infringement upon traditional state powers. See Braxton, supranote
135, at 28. Third, there was a widespread belief that the southern states would not want to
risk the loss of political power prescribed under section 2 and, therefore, would grant blacks
the right to vote. See id. In this sense, section 2 "was intended to reduce Southern

representation until the Negro would be in a position to divide, if not dominate, the political
power of the South." GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 25 (quoting JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 180 (1956)). Thaddeus Stevens largely was
responsible for the passage of this narrow protection of black suffrage, defeating a proposal

by Robert Dale Owen which would have afforded broader black suffrage after 1876. See
GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 24. Interestingly enough, Stevens later recognized that section
2 would do little to guarantee Republican success, and he proposed a fifteenth amendment
that better would secure that goal through universal black suffrage. See id at 34-35; see also
supra note 182 (discussing Stevens's recognition of the limitations of black suffrage).
184 There was some question whether Congress should enfranchise blacks by statute or by
constitutional amendment. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 24. The experience and
problems with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, however, mediated in favor of a constitutional
amendment that would not be subject to constitutional challenge and could not be repudiated
easily by a future Congress that might be hostile to black suffrage. See GILLETTE, supra note
162, at 50-53; MALTZ, supranote 137, at 146-47.
185 See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 41-42.
816 See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 40-45; GOLDMAN, supranote 178, at 5. In the 1868
elections, Democrats made gains in the House of Representatives and Ulysses S. Grant was
elected president with a plurality of only 300,000 votes. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 4041. Furthermore, the Republicans doubted they would be able to muster in the Forty-First
Congress the two-thirds majority required to pass a constitutional amendment, making it
imperative to pass the amendment during the third session of the "lame duck" Fortieth
Congress. See

GILLETTE, supra note

162, at 45-46;

MALTZ, supra note

137, at 142.
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in the face of widespread discrimination against southern blacks in the voting
process. 87 A. Caperton Braxton, writing with a distinctly southern view on the
issue,188 opined:

The principal agencies which contributed to [black suffrage] were: First,
gratitude to the negro soldiers who had served in the Federal armies-to
"save the Union," as it was said; second, apprehension lest the so-called
"rebel element" regain control of the Federal Government; and third, the
desire to perpetuate the Republican [P]arty in power. Thus we have, as
the inspiration for negro suffrage, gratitude, apprehension and
politics-these three; but the greatest of these was politics.189
John Mabry Mathews, who authored what was considered for the first half of this
century the seminal legislative history of the Fifteenth Amendment, also agreed that
politics and not principle was the dominant factor.'O William Gillette reached a
But see FONER, supranote 182, at 105, 108 (describing the core of Radical Republican
ideology as requiring that "a powerful national state must guarantee blacks equal political
standing and equal opportunity in a free-labor economy," and observing that "[f]or decades,
long before any conceivable political benefit derived from its advocacy, Stevens, Sumner,
and other Radicals had defended the unpopular cause of black suffrage and castigated the
idea that America was a 'white man's government'); LaWanda & John H. Cox, Negro
187

Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction

Historiography,33 J. S. HIST. 303, 317 (1967) ("In challenge to the dominant pattern of
interpretation from Braxton through Gillette, we should like to suggest that Republican
[P]arty leadership played a crucial role in committing this nation to equal suffrage for the
Negro not because of political expediency, but despite political risk."); Glenn M. Linden, A
Note on Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics,36 J.S.HIST. 411, 419 (1970) (providing

statistical evidence to support the Cox thesis that "many Republicans were genuinely
concerned with the principle of equal suffrage ...
and that these congressmen were not acting
solely for political purposes"). For a responsive analysis to these theses, see GOLDMAN,
supra note 178, at 8-9.
188 Braxton portrays the northern Republicans who supported black suffrage as a
"masterful coterie of political bigots and fanatics," Braxton, supra note 135, at 34, and
describes Charles Sumner of Massachusetts as "an impractical idealist... [whose] love for
the negro, and hatred of Southern white men, amounted almost to a mania." Id. at 20. In
addition, Braxton describes southerners as innocent, "helpless" victims of rampant radical
Republicanism gone mad. Id.
at 34, 50, 49-51. Furthermore, he characterizes Republican
attempts to enfranchise southern blacks as hypocritical in light of the fact that few northern
states allowed blacks the right to vote, and even suggests that northern Republicans were
motivated by the consideration that "the negro might be induced thereby to remain in the
South." Id.
at 27.
189 Id.at 7.
190 See MATHEWS, supra note 180, at 20-21. Mathews also placed those engaged in the

suffrage debate into four distinct categories:
The groups of men favoring a suffrage amendment of some kind were, therefore,
the politicians, who aimed at congressional control over Southern elections, the
nationalists, who desired a strong central government, and the universal
suffragists, or humanitarians, as they may be called, who were laboring to base
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similar, although more qualified, conclusion: "The Fifteenth Amendment had a
limited object-first, to enfranchise the northern Negro, and second, to protect the
Thus, some less than admirable
southern Negro against disfranchisement."''
intentions motivated the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Amendment
was passed by the House on February 25, 1869, 92' by the Senate on February 26,
1869,'9' and was ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures by March 30,
1870.194

The Fifteenth Amendment is deceptively elegant in its simplicity. Section 1
states "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous

the enjoyment of political rights upon no distinction less comprehensive than
humanity itself. Over against all three of these, and opposed to a suffrage
amendment of any kind, were the local autonomists, proud of local tradition and
jealous of national interference in local concerns.
Id. at 22. Gillette criticized these categories as an oversimplification of the dynamics which
led to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 77 n. 128.
'91 Id at 77; see also id at 50 ("[T]he primary objective was to make Negro voters in the
North; the secondary objective, to keep Negro voters in the South."); id. at 48-49, 89-90,
164-65 (describing the political undertones involved in framing the Fifteenth Amendment).
Republican Congressman George S. Boutwell, a leading sponsor of the Fifteenth
Amendment, estimated that it would enfranchise about 150,000 blacks in northern states. See
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell), reprintedin
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 337.
192 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563-64 (1869), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 410.
193 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
1641 (1869), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supranote 148, at 417.
'94 See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 81, 128; Proclamation of Ratification (Mar. 30,
1870), reprintedin RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 153, at 108-09. Ratification in the states

was simplified by the passage of legislation in early 1867 which granted black suffrage in the
District of Columbia and the federal territories, required black suffrage as a condition of
Nebraska's statehood, and mandated universal black suffrage in the secessionist southern
states as a precondition to their return to the Union. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 29-32;
MALTZ, supra note 137, at 124-31. By the time the Amendment: was sent to the states, 20 out
of 37 states permitted blacks to vote. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 80. Republicans also
controlled most of the state legislatures, and gained the support of President Grant in their
fight to secure ratification. See id. at 79. Ratification encountered few problems in the South,
New England, and much of the middle West, where blacks already had the right to vote, but
was obtained only with a great deal of difficulty in the middle Atlantic states and Indiana and
Ohio. See id at 159. The remaining states, particularly those in the West (with the exception
of Nevada), were firmly against ratification. See id. at 158. In many states, ratification was
secured by irregularities, such as passage with less than a quorum of total members present,
votes on the Amendment before it was certified to the state legislatures, and even ratification
of the wrong version of the Amendment (later corrected through a vote on the correct
version). See id. at 92-158 (examining state legislatures' reception of the Fifteenth
Amendment by region); Braxton, supra note 135, at 69-77.

1999]

TYRANNY OF THE JUDICIARY

condition of servitude."' 95 Unfortunately, the Amendment's simple elegance,
resulting from the bitter struggle to secure its passage, weakened it considerably.
First, the Amendment did not contain an affirmative grant of universal suffrage,' 96
but rather established "impartial" suffrage' 97 -that is, "a negative injunction that
voters could not be disbarred by race only."'98 As a result, there was nothing in the
Amendment that prevented states from adopting literacy or property qualifications,
as long as they applied the qualifications in a non-discriminatory manner. 99
amend. XV, § 1.
196 As one commentator noted at the time, the Fifteenth Amendment was "more
remarkable for what it does not do than for what it does contain." FONER, supra note 182,
at 192. In the western states, the Chinese were left disenfranchised. The most notable people
excluded from coverage under the Amendment were women, id at 192-93, who would not
secure the right to vote until 1920. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
1 GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 78.
198 Id. at 57 (emphasis added); see MALTZ, supra note 137, at 147-55. Congress was
concerned about allowing federal intrusion into the traditional state realm of setting voter
qualifications. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
'9

U.S. CONST.

19' See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 57-61, 74-75, 90; MALTZ, supranote 137, at 155-56.
In fact, proposals by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts and Representative Samuel
Shellabarger of Ohio to have the Amendment prohibit literacy tests and poll taxes were
considered and rejected by Congress. See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 49-50, 71; Braxton,
supra note 135, at 62-64. Shellabarger explained in an impassioned plea to Congress why it
was necessary to go beyond simply eliminating voter discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, or previous condition of slavery":
The consideration which I say seems to me almost fatal to [Massachusetts
Representative George S. Boutwell's] plan is, that it leaves still, substantially,
the great mischief unremedied which the exigencies upon us demand that we
shall correct; and that is, that it leaves to the States the power to make
discriminations as to who shall vote. These discriminations may be on the score
of either intelligence or want of property, or any other thing than the three things
enumerated in his proposition.
[H]is amefidment is one which.., will add to the mischiefs it aims at remedying
instead of relieving them. That happens in this way: he simply prohibits the
States from exercising the power of disfranchising for either of the three grounds
... thus by plain inference authorizing the States to disfranchise upon any other
grounds than these three.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 97-98 (1869) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 347.
Shellabarger's prescient point largely foreshadowed the South's skbsequent use of other
methods to deny suffrage to blacks, even though these methods frequently were applied in
a discriminatory fashion in apparent violation of the language of section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Nevertheless, as Gillette observes, "a refusal to ban these tests weakened the
[A]mendment was of course widely recognized in the South, but in the North it was precisely
this omission which would promote ratification and rally moderates." GILLETTE, supra note
162, at 71.
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Similarly, the Amendment failed to guarantee the right of blacks to run for and hold
office, after such a guarantee was removed from the Joint Committee's final report
because of fears it would jeopardize ratification.2' Nonetheless, Congress hoped that
the self-enforcing negative proscription contained in section 1 would be sufficient to
prevent subsequent efforts to disenfranchise blacks.20 '
At the same time, Congress recognized the need for future policing of the
Amendment by the federal government, and enacted an enforcement clause just as
it did with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 0 2 Unlike section 1, section
2 of the Amendment was an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate
suffrage. The intended scope ofthis power, however, is hard to gauge because of the
conspicuous absence of amplifying information in the legislative history.2 3
According to what Gillette calls an "artful dodge,"' Congress intentionally left the
reach of section 2 ambiguous, primarily leaving it up to subsequent congressional
legislation (and to a much lesser extent, the untrustworthy courts) to provide the
necessary clarification. 20 5 Nevertheless, one thing is clear about section 2: like
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it only would be as protective of black
consent as the various federal government actors allowed it to be. The overall
efficacy of the Fifteenth Amendment would rise or fall on acts of legislative grace,
the extent of the Court's reading of section 1 and deference to congressional exercise
of its section 2 enforcement powers, and the willingness of the executive branch
actually to enforce federal civil rights and voting laws.2"
See id.at 50, 62, 71; GILLETrE, supra note 162, at 60-61. See also CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1626 (1869) (statement of Sen. Edmunds), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 148, at 412 ("Some vague fear, I
suppose, fills the mind of some trembling convert to liberty that his people will not be
satisfied to give the negro the right to run against themselves for some office, but they are
willing to confer upon him the boon of voting for them."); MALTZ, supra note 137, at 154
(quoting Sen. Edmunds).
20 See GILLETTE, supranote 162, at 49-50.
200

203

See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
See GILLETTE, supra note 162, at 72.

204

Id.

205

See id.at 72-73 & n. 108. This ambiguity caused great concern to many members of

202

both parties during ratification because of fear that it would give the federal government a
blank check to intrude upon the traditional state arena of regulating voter qualifications. See
id at91.

The combined failure of all three branches of government in their respective tasks goes
far to explain the decades of overt and veiled discrimination which closely followed the
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and existed even after the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. For a more comprehensive treatment, see, for example, GOLDMAN, supra
206

note 178; CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL

JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973); J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First
Reconstruction-Lessonsfor the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supranote 19, at 2746; J.Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 135-64; STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK
BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976); UNITED STATES COMMISSION
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The result of "The Second American Constitutional Revolution,"27
accompanying the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, seemed to be the
completion of what the first American constitutional revolution had failed to do. It
recognized that slavery is inconsistent with a free democratic society. In addition, it
acknowledged that all blacks are citizens entitled to equal treatment and respect with
their white counterparts. Furthermore, it established the principle that blacks must
be given a fair and equal opportunity to give or withhold their consent to their
government. Each of these results is concordant not only with the constitutional
framework of consent originally established by the Framers, but actually repairs the
injury done to Madisonian democracy by the continued subordination of such a large
segment of the American population.
Having outlined the basic democratic theory embodied in the American
constitutional framework, this Article now will provide a closer look at how the
federal courts should perform their roles within that framework. The final section of
this Part will describe the judicial referee model, in which federal courts necessarily
make substantive decisions in the delicate balancing of majority rule with minority
consent. Part II will make it evident that, absent such judicial decision-making, the
Madisonian compromise is rendered little more than a unilateral recognition of one
principle (most likely majority rule) at the expense of the other (most likely
protection of minorities from the tyranny of majority rule). Under such conditions,
the only thing "compromised" under our Madisonian model is the right of all voters
to have a fair and equal opportunity to give or withhold their consent.
C. JudicialReferees and the Regulation of Consent
Today, it has become fashionable to criticize the so-called "judicial activism" of
courts when they intervene in the workings of the political process." 8 Detractors
MissisSippi (1965); XI WANG, BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1865-1891 (1996); Armand Derfier, Racial Discriminationand the Right to
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IN

Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973); WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL
BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH

(1972); D.

Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court,the Franchise,and the FifieenthAmendment: The
FirstSixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REV. 47 (1988). The remainder of this Section will focus on
the respective roles of Congress and the Court in the protection of consent.
207 KYVIG, supra note 137, at 154; see RICHARDS, supra note 137, at 108-48.
208 One definition of "judicial activism" is:
Judicial philosophy which motivates judges to depart from strict adherence to
judicial precedent in favor of progressive and new social policies which are not
always consistent with the restraint expected of appellate judges. It is commonly
marked by decisions calling for social engineering and occasionally these
decisions represent intrusions into legislative and executive matters.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990). This broad definition, and others like it,
leaves a lot of room for interpretation and makes the issue of what constitutes "judicial
activism" a moving target. No judge is immune from the label, whether conservative or
liberal. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION:
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decry the actions of unaccountable federal judges who overrule the will of the
majority. They steadfastly maintain that judges are in no position to make
substantive choices affecting the right to vote.2 ' 9 Critics rail against the propriety 2of
0
judges giving content to, much less formulating, matters of democratic theory. '
According to many commentators, judicial discretion must be hamstrung
whenever it is possible to do so in this area. 1 ' In fact, the Supreme Court has
adopted just such an approach to protect the right to vote. Specifically, the majority,
led by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, believe that the Court can occupy a
sacred neutral ground where the justices do not have to engage in any substantive
TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 3-5 (1990) (asserting that both conservative and liberal
judges have used judicial activism to advance their particular goals); Abner J. Mikva,

Statutory Interpretation:Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 979

(1989):
The "judicial activism" reflected by Marbury and so criticized by today's
conservatives (and yesterday's liberals) is really "judicial naturalism"--judges
doing what comes naturally .

. .

. It should not seem remarkable that a

"conservative" judge is just as likely to tease out different meanings from the
written word as are "liberal" judges.

See also Mark Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory, 59 TUL. L. REV. 910, 925

(1985) ("Conservatives have made criticism of liberal judges' judicial activism an important
part of their political ideology, but they have been unable to develop an alternative theory of
judicial review."). For a general discussion of judicial activism, see, for example,
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS
SECURITY? (1991); JUDICIAL ACTIVISM INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Kenneth M. Holland
ed., 1991); SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M.

Lamb eds., 1982); THE
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V.

(David F. Forte ed., 1972); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial

Activism: A "Liberal"or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539 (1981); Lino A.
Graglia, JudicialActivism: Even on the Right, It's Wrong, 95 PUB. INTEREST 57 (1989);

Alpheus Thomas Mason, JudicialActivism:Old andNew, 55 VA. L. REV. 385 (1969).
209

See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence andAccountability, 61 S. CAL.

L. REV. 1571, 1586 (1988) ("Whatever else one believes the [majoritarianism] concept
includes, there is surely general agreement that it does not normally include substantive
decisionmaking by officials who are deliberately shielded from any form of popular
control.").
210

See generallyRobert H. Bork, The Case Against PoliticalJudging,NAT'L REV., Dec.

8, 1989, at 25 ("The structure of government the Founders of this nation intended most
certainly did not give courts a political role."); see also infra notes 298, 575-83 and
accompanying text. But see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985)
("Law... is deeply and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the
broad sense of political theory.").
211

See generally

ROBERT

H.

BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL

LAW (1990) (contending that judges should respect majoritarianism and
accord deference to the will of elected officials by interpreting the Constitution according to
the original intent of the Framers); GARY L. MCDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER (1988) (arguing that judges should use
various means at their disposal to limit their scope of review over cases).
SEDUCTION OF THE
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decision-making.2 12 In reaching this conclusion, however, these justices have
engaged in the kind of "judicial activism" which must be avoided: disregarding
congressional and constitutional intent by judicially rewriting section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.21 3 In short, this Article argues that these criticisms largely are misplaced,
and constitute little more than a fatal misapprehension of the important role that
judges must play in regulating the political process under the consent model of
democracy. These critics have turned Madisonian democracy on its head.
Under the consent theory of democracy, it is up to the courts to strike an
appropriate balance between two polar opposites: absolute respect for majority rule
(at the expense of minority rights), and unfettered attempts to achieve the fairest or
best results for minority groups (at the expense of majority rule). History shows that
the Supreme Court has a mixed record in reaching a plausible middle ground.214 Yet,
that is no reason for the Court to give up on ensuring there is full protection for
equality of opportunity of all voters, including minority groups that are fenced out of
the democratic processes and outcomes by a powerful, self-interested majority:
"What is demanded is a way of allowing the Court to contribute to the process of
democratic rule in a manner that neither minimizes its potential contributions nor
gives the Court the right to rule against that democratic will which it was designed
to inform."2 5 The issue of how the Court strikes that balance remains.
The judicial referee analogy provides some guidance. Kathleen Sullivan has
pointed out that, under a republican system of government, citizens as "voters ... are,
collectively, the final referees or judges of political contests. 12 6 This statement is
accurate, to the extent it embodies the republican principles of consent of the
governed and majority rule. In this sense, then, the people are referees over who
serves in government. On the other hand, as John Ely observed, the judiciary also
acts as a referee, but in a different manner: Judges dispassionately oversee the
process of selecting the people's representatives, as well as the substantive outcomes
those representatives generate through a "representation-reinforcing approach"
envisioned by the Framers.217 The extent to which judges must intervene is dictated
212

See infranotes 591-712 and accompanying text. See also ANTONIN

SCALIA, A MATTER

23 (1997) (describing the view of
"textualism" in which "judges have no authority to pursue.., broader purposes or write...
new laws").
213 See infra notes 581-848 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 104; see also discussion infra notes 293-506 and accompanying text.
215 AGRESTO, supra note 26, at 38.
216 Kathleen M. Sullivan, PoliticalMoney andFreedomofSpeech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663,674(1997).
217 ELY, supra note 95, at 88; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No.
4434 v. Clements ("LULAC I"), 914 F.2d 620, 631 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that judicial
selection processes "determine the referees in our majoritarian political game"), rev 'd sub
nom. Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991). As discussed
infra notes 326-506 and accompanying text, however, Ely is wrong in concluding that the
judges can regulate the political process through a strictly process-based theory without
having to engage in substantive decision-making.
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
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by the play of the participants in the political process: the government administrators
who are responsible for conducting elections, those who serve as elected
representatives, as well as the people themselves. The more these participants depart
from the rules of the game-concern and respect for the equal opportunity of all
groups of voters to give their consent to government and receive fair treatment in
substantive outcomes-the more the courts, as referees, must intervene. Of course,
as a significant limitation on her power,28 a judicial referee cannot do so without a
case or controversy before her.2" 9 This restriction is akin to saying that judges cannot
interfere at all with the political process or its outcomes unless there is a game which
they have been designated to referee.
Assuming there is such a game, how does a judicial referee regulate consent in
a principled manner? Preliminarily, the court must determine what right is alleged
to have been violated: Has the claimant's right to ballot access been denied? Was
her ballot given less weight than someone else's? Were there systemic defects that
gave her group less opportunity than other groups of voters to elect the candidate of
its choice? Did the majority in the representative body discriminate against her group
by imposing unequal outcomes upon them? The source of authority for judicial
intervention turns on this inquiry. When ajudicial referee intervenes temporarily to
stop the play in the voting rights arena, she looks to two sources for her rules: the
Constitution and congressional enactments pursuant to the enforcement clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (especially the Voting Rights Act). The
particular source ofthe referee's rules is critical, because it fixes the nature and scope
of substantive decision-making in which the judicial referee can engage.
The Court has expansive powers in its interpretation of self-executing
constitutional provisions governing the right to vote (namely, the first section of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). Judges may establish both thefloor and the
ceiling (that is, the minimum and maximum extents) of rights secured under these
sections. There are certain limits on the Court in this area of judicial decisionmaking. First, other provisions of the Constitution implicitly or explicitly might
prevent a particular judicial interpretation.2 2 ° Second, the Court must interpret
faithfully the self-executing sections in a manner consistent with their subject matter
" ' Third, to the extent it is possible,222 the Court must
and constitutional purposes.22
This Article includes references to both "his" and "her." Unless the context of their use
indicates otherwise, these possessive pronouns should be read as gender neutral.
219 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
220 For example, a court could not interpret the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as requiring that noncitizens be allowed to run for president because of the
express language to the contrary included in Article II of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
218

art. II, cl. 5.
2 For example,

a court can find that discriminatorily denying a person the right to vote
on the basis of his race is a violation of section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, but it cannot
use that same provision as a basis for striking down a law which bars all blacks from
receiving government benefits. The latter example would be unconstitutional under section
I of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is some overlap between the Reconstruction
Amendments, with denial of the right to consent frequently falling within the language of
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abide by the principle of stare decisis 22 3-for if the Court will not respect its own
legal precedent, the other branches of government and the people at large will have
no reason to do so. Fourth, from a more practical perspective, if the Court's
constitutional interpretations depart too much from the will of the people, those
interpretations may be subject to modification by constitutional amendment.
Moreover, while neither the executive nor legislative branches can diminish the
power of the judiciary over the self-executing provisions, they might narrow the
efficacy of the Court's powers by refusing to fund or prosecute enforcement
actions.224 In this manner, the totality of these restrictions can circumscribe the Court
from engaging in overly expansive interpretations of the self-executing sections.225

both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court's decision in Gomillion v.
Lighfoot provides a good example of this overlap. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); infra notes 425-31 and accompanying text.
222 Stare decisis should not prevent the Court from overruling precedent that has been
decided in a manner which is inconsistent with the Constitution. For example, the Court did
not simply choose to overrule the doctrine of "separate but equal" established in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), when it decided Brown v. Boardof Education,347 U.S. 483

(1954)-the Constitution compelled it to do so. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991) ("[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned '[the]
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent."' (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 665 (1944))).
223 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) (defining stare decisis: "To abide

by, or adhere to, decided cases").
224 Unfortunately, the legislative and executive branches can undermine the Court's ability
to protect the consent of all voters, even when there is no question that an unconstitutional
exclusion of certain voters has occurred. This lack of enforcement is one reason why blacks
largely were denied the ability to cast ballots in elections even after the Reconstruction
Amendments were ratified. See generally Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903)
(The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting.... [R]elief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged,
by the people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them or by the
legislative and political department of the government of the United States.).
See also supra note 206. The 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act helped to reduce
the effects produced by the lack of official enforcement of voting rights. The amendments
included a fee-shifting provision to encourage individual citizens to act as "private attorneys
general" in the enforcement of claims brought under the Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
400, 404 (1975); S.REP. No. 94-295, at 40-43 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774,
806-10; see also Martha S. Davis, Attorney Fee Awards in Voting Rights Litigation, 34 S.D.

L. REv. 303 (1989) (elaborating on the private attorneys general concept).
225 As Emma Jordan pointed out in two separate articles published in 1985, however, there
is little danger that the Court will engage in an overly expansive definition of the right to vote
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court's narrow interpretation of the
Amendment has led to the opposite result. Jordan proposes that the courts should exercise
a more "direct role... in defining the nature of the protection afforded under the [F]ifteenth
[A]mendment," instead of leaving that task almost entirely to Congress. Emma C. Jordan,
The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 How. L. J. 541, 545 (1985); see also Emma
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Conversely, judges are much more limited in their interpretative powers over
congressional legislation passed under the enforcement sections of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.126 The legislative and judicial history of the
Reconstruction Amendments shows that the Court can set the floor but not the
ceiling of rights secured under these sections. 2 27 The enforcement sections of the
Reconstruction Amendments expressly provide for a continuing congressional role
in the protection of consent. 221 In one sense, then, they are no different than
congressional powers extant in the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution. 22 9 But in another more important sense, they recognize that the Court's

lengthy history-which at times has demonstrated the Court's reticence to assume
fully the mantle of protecting minorities from majority factionalism-requires a more
active congressional role. Reading the three Reconstruction Amendments together
demonstrates that the only way for Congress to fulfill its role is to have broad
enforcement powers.23 It is up to Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to

Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscoveringthe Fifteenth Amendment,

64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 390 (1985) ("[T]he conceptual failure of the United States Supreme
Court and commentators to fulfill the promise of fair and effective representation is due to
a persistent refusal to embrace fully the independent rights afforded by the [F]ifteenth
[A]mendment.").
126 See Mathews, supra note 180, at 97-126 (discussing judicial interpretation of
enforcement actions under the Fifteenth Amendment).
27
228
229

See supra notes 173, 202-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173, 202-06 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 18. As Madison observed: "Without the substance of this

power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note

46, at 284 (James Madison).
230 The Supreme Court recognized as much in affirming the constitutional validity of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), Chief
Justice Warren observed that section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment allowed Congress to "use
any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting." Id at 324. Consequently, the expansive test used for congressional enactments under
the Necessary and Proper Clause applied to legislation passed pursuant to the Fifteenth
Amendment: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [Clonstitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not
at
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id.
.326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)); see also
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (affirming the constitutionality of section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act and holding that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
similarly granted Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause").
In its five-to-four decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court struck
down provisions in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 that extended the right to
at 118, 124-31. The holding in Mitchell
vote to 18-year olds in state and local elections. Id.
clarified that the judiciary, not Congress, was responsible for defining the scope of the self-

executing section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Congress could not exercise
At least
unlimited enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
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one commentator has argued, in light of Mitchell, that the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments preclude Congress from defining substantive rights at all,
suggesting a retreat from the expansive language of Morgan. See Donald Francis Donovan,
Note, Toward Limits on Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Civil War
Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REV. 453 (1982). But see Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965
Term-Foreward: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966) (arguing that the holding in Mitchell does not restrict the broad
recognition of congressional powers under the enforcement sections provided by the decision
in Morgan). Such a limitation would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of the
Reconstruction Amendments. The judiciary clearly has the exclusive purview to determine
the scope of the self-executing, substantive sections, and Congress cannot narrow the rights
the Court has defined under these sections. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), in which the Court observed:
Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] does not grant Congress power to
exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to
dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize
that Congress' power under Section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce
the guarantees of the Amendment; Section 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict,abrogate,or dilute these guarantees.Thus, for example, an enactment
authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of education would
not be-as required by Section 5-a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection
Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.
Id. at 651-52 n. 10 (emphasis added). By the same token, however, the legislative history also
indicates that Congress can broaden the scope of substantive rights under the Amendments
pursuant to the enforcement sections. This conclusion is inescapable in the face of
congressional skepticism over the ability of the judiciary to enforce adequately the selfexecuting provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments at the time of their passage. See
supra notes 173, 205 and accompanying text. Of course, application of the McCulloch test
shows that congressional power under the enforcement sections is circumscribed further in
two respects. First, under its enforcement powers, Congress cannot enact legislation which
either explicitly or implicitly is inconsistent with another provision of the Constitution.
Second, the congressional enactment must be within the subject matter of the particular
amendment. See generally City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as exceeding congressional
enforcement powers). The Court in Floresobserved:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so,
what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense,
the "provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."
Id. at 2164. Therefore, it seems that one can reconcile Mitchell with Morgan simply by
concluding that extension of the franchise to 18-year olds in state and local elections was not
within the proper scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a conclusion certainly is
consistent with the legislative history of the Amendment, which does not contain an
affirmative grant of the right to vote. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. For an
interesting treatment of the congressional powers under Morgan, see generally Stephen L.
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effectuate consent as required by the presence of majority tyranny"' and the ebb and
flow of the Court's interpretations of the self-executing sections of the
Reconstruction Amendments. 32 When the Court fails to respect the scope of
congressionalprotectionunder the enforcement sections (something that the Framers
of the Amendments undoubtedly anticipated),"' Congress is empowered to expand
or retract that protection. That is precisely what happened when Congress passed the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act in response to the Supreme Court's
narrow interpretation of section 2 in Bolden.3
In determining whether or not the asserted right fits within a particular set of
rules, the judicial referee is forced to give content to those rules, subject to the
limitations just discussed. The reason for such judicial decision-making is quite
simple; the problem with these rules is that they are very general, and not selfapplying. What does it mean to say that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equalprotectionof the laws?" 3 When does a group of
voters "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in

Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the ForcedReconsiderationof ConstitutionalDecisions,

53 U. Ci. L. REv. 819, 824 (1986) ("The Morgan power... is best understood as a tool that
permits the Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legislation to engage the Court in a
dialogue about ourfundamental rights, thereby 'forcing' the Justices to take a fresh look at
their own judgments.").
23 Although Congress itself is one "majority," the majority referred to here is majority
tyranny in particular localities, especially the South. At the same time, it is clear that
Congress can (and often does) pass legislation that reflects tyranny of the majority over racial
and ethnic minority groups. The Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment recognized that
possibility when they chose to enact a constitutional amendment protecting the right to vote
in lieu of statutory protection that easily could be taken away by a subsequent Congress. See
supra note 184; see also supra note 179 and accompanying text (explaining that a
constitutional amendment also was passed because of fears that any statutory enactment
protecting the right to vote would be an unconstitutional infringement of state power to
determine voter qualifications).
232 For example, in Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959),
discussed infra notes 363-65 and accompanying text, the Court held that literacy tests which
are not discriminatory on their face or in their effect are constitutional under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Congress responded by enacting §4(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438, which created a per se ban on literacy tests in certain
jurisdictions "covered" under § 4(b) of the Act. In South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 334 (1966), the Court upheld this ban as a proper exercise of congressional power
pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The

Court reached the same conclusion when Congress extended the ban in the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
at 112. For an additional discussion of the use of congressional enforcement powers to
expand protection for voting rights, see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78
(1980).
233 See id.
234

235

See infra notes 551-59 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
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' Judicial referees
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice?"236
of necessity must make substantive decisions about when to apply these rules. It is
not possible (or even desirable) to use bright-line tests because the factual
circumstances of each case must be evaluated to discern whether majority rule has
subsumed the ability of a group of voters to give their consent. By analogy, when a
referee in a football game calls "defensive pass interference," he has not created the
rule that it is wrong for a defensive player to deter excessively the ability of the
intended receiver to catch the ball. At the same time, however, the referee must make
a substantive decision as to whether the defensive player has made a great play or has
acted too aggressively; this decision, and others like it, gives content to the rule. The
same holds true for judicial referees. There are many close calls and, sometimes, the
judicial referees make mistakes. Nevertheless, the key is for the judiciary properly
to assume its role as referee over the political process 2" without exercising unfettered
discretion "in construing the rules of the game" and, thereby, "acting as a referee
while out on the playing field. 238
In the case of voting rights, the judicial referee should give substantive meaning
to the governing rules consistent with the consent model of democracy. Because
courts cannot avoid substantive decision-making in defining and protecting the right
to vote, this Article urges courts to make their decisions in accordance with the
consent model, which always has been a fundamental basis of the United States'
democratic system."" But how does the judicial referee give content to the rules?
The referee does so by asking two related questions. First, has the consent of a
particular individual or group been denied? 2' This inquiry can be quite simple when

42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
Cf Stephen L. Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of ConstitutionalMeaning,
66 B.U. L. REV. 71, 73-74 (1986) ("Although judges and scholars sometimes forget the fact,
the courts take their authority from and act within that integrated structure [of checks and,
balances and the sharing of power] even as they interpret it, and therefore ought to be selfconsciously reserved about the tension between their dual roles as player and referee.").
238 Id.at 74; see also ELY, supra note 95, at 103 ("[T]he referee is to intervene only when
one team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the 'wrong' team has scored.").
239 See supranotes 61-506 and accompanying text.
240 There has been widespread disagreement about whether the right to vote is an
individual right, a group right, or both. CompareABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES
COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 7 (1987) ("In the American
constitutional tradition, it is often said, there are no group rights to representation."); James
U. Blackscher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The RedistrictingCases as Badges of Slavery,
39 How. L.J. 633, 681 & n.222 (1996) (declaring that voting is an individual right); James
U. Blackscher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden:
Have the White Suburbs Commandeeredthe Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1,48
(1982)
(It is, of course, true that the right of a person to vote on an equal basis with
other voters draws much of its significance from the political association that its
exercise reflects, but it is an altogether different matter to conclude that political
groups themselves have an independent constitutional claim to representation.);
236
237
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and Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 53-54 (asserting that voting is an individual
right, and "protection against vote dilution is an individual right with a group dimension, but
not a group right"), with Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (identifying justices who believe
that redistricting is a group right); GUINIER, supranote 16, at 125 & n.21 (stating that voting
is a group right); Abrams, supra note 56, at 453-54 (stating right to vote in context of vote
dilution is a group right); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting: DrawingConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 60001 (1993) (declaring that voting is a group right); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court
and Reapportionment,in REAPPORTIONMENT INTHE 1970S, at 57, 59 (Nelson W. Polsby ed.,
1971) ("We have, since Madison, realized that people tend to act politically not so much as
individuals as in groups."); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting:A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1589, 1599 & n.37 (1993) ("1
take the position that the right of the individual to participate politically is a right best
realized in association with other individuals, i.e., as a group."); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups
and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 884 (1995) ("[T]he right to effective voting is
incomprehensible without that conception of the group."); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized
Voting and the PoliticalProcess: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90
MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1856-59 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Polarized Voting] (stating that
voting is a group right), and with Bruce Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of
the Practitioner,Theorist, and Reformer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS
117, 130 (B. Grofman ed., 1990) [hereinafter GERRYMANDERING] (stating that representation
is both a group and an individual right, but voting rights protected under Voting Rights Act
embody a group rights/compensating position); Samuel Issacharoff, The Redistricting
Morass, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 214 ("Once the
conditions of equal weight and access to the ballot are satisfied, there is little in the way of
individual rights that concerns the electoral process. Attention must at this point shift to
group rights to differentiate a fair from an unfair system."); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the
Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 248-53 (1993)
(asserting that voting is a right of both the individual and the group); Karlan, supra note 51,
at 1709-20 (explaining that voting is a continuum, ranging from the individual right to case
a ballot, a group right to aggregate with other like-minded individuals to elect a candidate of
choice, and both an individual and a group right to practice decision-making through
representatives); Anthony A. Peacock, Voting Rights, Representation,and the Problem of
Equality, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 7 ("To the extent
that the VRA guarantees more than the right to cast a ballot, allowing claims for minority
vote dilution, it protects group rights."); Mark E. Rush, The Price of UnclearPrecedents:
Shaw v. Reno and the Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 37-38 (describing a "multifacted voting right," with
ballot and primary access an individual right, and vote dilution a group right). See generally
Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-BlindSociety?, in
CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 262-64 (observing that proponents
of proportional systems emphasize group rights, while proponents of majoritarian systems
view voting rights in the context of individuals). This Article affirms the beliefs of those who
conclude that voting rights are both an individual and a group right. Determination of which
one it is depends upon the particular factual circumstances. As Part II demonstrates, the
closer the asserted right approaches access to the ballot, the more likely it should be treated
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the case involves individual access to the ballot: whether the person in question has
been allowed to cast her ballot. In sharp contrast, the closer the inquiry moves to
election or legislative outcomes, the more difficult it is to establish whether consent
has been denied. Nevertheless, it is still possible for a judicial referee to discern
whether a violation of consent has occurred through an examination of circumstantial
evidence of its warning signs. For example, in vote dilution cases brought under
24
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (requiring examination of election outcomes), '
the Senate Report identified a number of factors to be considered, including the
extent of racial polarization in elections, whether particular features of the voting
system in question enhance the possibility of discrimination, the extent of electoral
success, and so forth.242 Similarly, legislative outcomes can be evaluated to
determine whether the legislature has meted out different treatment to a particular

as an individual right. See infra notes 281-580 and accompanying text. In contrast, group
rights exist the more the asserted right requires an inquiry into voting outcomes. For example,
in the context of vote dilution claims, which are rested upon an examination of election
outcomes, it only can make sense to talk of voting rights in the context of group rights. After
all, it is incongruous for an individual person to say, "My vote was diluted by the 300,000
people who voted for the other guy"; instead, it is more accurate for that person to say, "I am
a member of a group of 150,000 black voters that consistently is outvoted by a group of
300,000 white voters that does not worry about political accountability to us." As will be
discussed in further detail, Congress expressly adopted a group-rights focus when it outlawed
vote dilution in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. See infra notes 564-66 and
accompanying text.
141 The importance of identifying the source of protecting consent cannot
be
the
brought
under
the
self-executing
sections
of
overemphasized. Vote dilution challenges
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are subject to the much more rigid evidentiary
standard enunciated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976), which requires
proof of discriminatory purpose in the establishment or maintenance of the challenged
electoral system or feature.
242 See S. REP. NO.417, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.177, 206-07; see
also supra notes 549, 569-74 and accompanying text. In his Holder concurrence, Justice
Thomas contended that the White-Zimmer factors outlined in the Senate Report provide
nothing more than "a list of possible considerations that might be consulted by a court
attempting to develop a gestalt view of the political and racial climate in a jurisdiction, but
a list that cannot provide a rule for deciding a vote dilution claim." Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 938 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). He then went on to conclude that the only rule of
decision available to reviewing courts is a mathematical resort to proportionality. See id. at
939-45. Justice Thomas is in error. No mechanical rule of decision, whether it is
proportionality or something else, can be used adequately to evaluate whether consent has
been denied wrongfully. As will be shown in Part II, see infra notes 281-580 and
accompanying text, that is precisely why courts must engage in a functional approach, closely
looking at the specific facts of the challenged voting structure or mechanism and its effect
on consent, without undue reliance on any single factor. Lack of proportionality might be
indicative of a problem, but it is not sufficient by itself to prove a violation of section 2, See
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

group for irrational or unacceptable reasons. The line-drawing here is not an exact
science, but it still is possible.
Second, the judicial referee must ask whether the denial of consent is
permissible. This question forces an inquiry into what "consent" requires to ensure
the legitimacy of outcomes. In a very fundamental sense, actual consent must be
given.243 Actual consent, however, does not mean that a failure to cast a successful
vote (i.e., one in which the voter's chosen candidate or issue prevails) has denied a
person of her right to vote. 244 Absent unanimity, there always are going to be some
voters who are on the losing side in an election.245 Moreover, to the extent that
elections measure consent, they "do not establish it for long" because "[m]asses of
people do not make clear-cut, long-range decisions. '246 Instead, actual consent is
denied when the political system either precludes an individual from casting a ballot
(either completely or at the stage of the election when the decision actually is made),

243

See, e.g., HARRY BERAN, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 149

(1987); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 100 (1975).

Justice Thomas has suggested that this is the meaning of actual consent. See Holder,
512 U.S. at 899 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's approach in vote dilution
cases, in which "votes that do not control a representative are essentially wasted; those who
cast them go unrepresented and are just as surely disenfranchised as if they had been barred
from registering"). Justice Thomas's criticism echoes the Tories' attacks on actual consent.
See supra note 67. For a critique of actual consent, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
244

13, 337 (1971);

JULES

STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 120

(1978). See also BERAN,supranote 243, at 56-58 (summarizing and critically analyzing the
views of Hume, Rawls, and Steinberg).
245

Cf STEPHEN NATHANSON, SHOULD WE CONSENT TO BE GOVERNED? 114(1992) ("How

should we interpret the requirement that governments must be consented to in order to be
just? If we take this to mean that a government or law is legitimate only if every person under
its jurisdiction consents to it, then we are led to... anarchis[m]."); Georgette C. Poindexter,
Collective Individualism:Deconstructingthe Legal City, 145 U.PA. L. REv. 607, 653 n.213
(1997) ("[T]he presence of involuntary members is necessary for a 'public' organization.").
As Professor Samuel Issacharoff observed:
Nor can the problem of identifying individual voting rights be packaged as the
right to vote for a winning candidate. In any contested electoral system this
condition cannot be satisfied. Some voters will fail to have their electoral
preferences satisfied if elections are to have any meaning. Indeed, if the right to
vote for a winning candidate were a genuine condition for democratic rule, the
former Soviet Union would have the upper hand since all voters in a one-party
election system are guaranteed the ability to vote for the winning candidate-and
only the winning candidate.
Samuel

Issacharoff, The Redistricting Morass, in
supra note 7, at 214.

AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION

AND

REPRESENTATION,

supra note 243, at 16; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 137-38 (noting
Rousseau's criticism that consent in Great Britain-which was exercised only when the
people elected members of Parliament-was insufficiently democratic, and that this criticism
also could be made of consent in the United States).
246

BICKEL,
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or bars a sufficiently large and cohesive group of voters247 from having an equal voice
in or ability to affect the decision-making process.248 Such a systematic denial of
actual consent ultimately renders the government outcomes illegitimate.24 9
The need for actual consent raises a related question: Must a minority group be
required to give assent through its own representative, or can someone else represent
the group's interests in government? The answer depends upon the context of the
minority group's ability to participate in government. Clearly, there is no
requirement that a minority group have "descriptive representation," whereby the
representative is like the members of the group when he "stands for" them.25 ° In fact,
descriptive representation by itself can disserve minority groups whose
representatives need support from the majority in order to get preferred substantive
outcomes."' In many cases, therefore, it is possible for a minority group to be
represented by officials they either could not (because they lived in a different
district) or did not elect. In this sense, consent can be satisfied through virtual
' by
representation and not actual representation 25 2-"substantive representation"253
See generally Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (requiring section 2
plaintiffs to show they belong to a minority group which is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district, minority political
cohesiveness, and majority bloc voting). Limited protection, however, is afforded under the
consent democracy model even to groups that are too small to elect a representative or
influence policy decisions made in the legislature. Majority factionalism cannot deprive
members of that group of their constitutional right to receive nondiscriminatory outcomes.
See supranotes 460-62, 475-83 and accompanying text.
248 Obviously, actual consent also can be denied in other ways. For example, the Court has
recognized as a "fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint
of intimidation and fraud." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
249 See BICKEL, supra note 243, at 107-11; ELY, supra note 95, at 103 (describing
"malfunctions" in which the "the process is undeserving of trust" when it excludes or
disadvantages the political "outs"); supra note 115.
247

250

See HANNAH FENICHEL PiTKiN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967). John

Adams was a proponent of descriptive representation, arguing that a representative legislature
"should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel,
reason and act like them." Id. at 60 (quoting Letter from John Adams to John Penn (Jan.
1776), reprintedin 4 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 205 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co., 1865)). See also infra notes 255, 485, 554, 640 and accompanying text.
251

See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF

AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 189 (1993).

252 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (suggesting that virtual
representation is sufficient because "[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for
a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate
and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district");
see also GUINIER, supra note 16, at 130-32 (discussing virtual representation in the context

of redistricting); Samuel Issacharoff, The RedistrictingMorass, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 216 (discussing the assumptions of virtual representation

in the context of redistricting).
253 SWAIN, supra note 251, at 5 (describing substantive representation as "the
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someone "acting for" the interests of the minority group.254 By the same token,
however, fair representation is not enough. If members of a minority group are
denied an equal opportunity to participate in the process of selecting representatives
of their choice (all they have is virtual or descriptive representation), then all
government outcomes, regardless of how fair or unfair they may be, are
illegitimate. 55 Actual consent demands, therefore, that minority groups have an
equal opportunity to participate in the democratic process and an equal voice in
government decision-making, regardless of whether members of that group actually
have elected representatives.
Assuming that consent has been denied for impermissible reasons, the judicial
referee then must engage in her most difficult task under the Madisonian model:
Namely, she must balance protection of the minority group's right to consent against
the principle of respecting majority rule. This issue is the key point at which critics
rage the most against the temerity of the least representative branch engaging in
substantive decision-making. 6 But it is at this time, more than any other, that the
unique position of the judiciary in the United States' constitutional framework
demands more, not less,judicial decision-making. Madison recognized as much. 7
This process is not as open-ended as it sounds. The reviewing court is constrained
to stay within the bounds of authority delegated to it by the constitutional or statutory
source of its power.25 In addition, the factual record must be sufficient to persuade
the referee that a judicial intrusion into the political arena is necessary. 259 Finally,

correspondence between representatives' goals and those of their constituents").
254 See PITKIN, supra note 250, at 112-43.
255 See supranotes 114-15; see also supranotes 457-506, 507-80 and accompanying text.
For an example of descriptive representation that denies consent because it is not "actual
representation," see infranote 701. See also Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 865 F.2d
1566, 1581 (11 th Cir. 1988) (noting that a black candidate, "although black, may not have
been perceived as a black candidate"), vacated,873 F.2d 248 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (en banc), and
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991).
256 See, e.g., infra notes 591-629 (discussing Justice Thomas's Holder concurrence).
257 See supranotes 94-118.
258 See supra notes 167-74, 195-206, 220-234 and accompanying text.
259 In fact, at least two circuits (the Fifth and Eleventh) require district courts reviewing
vote dilution cases to make detailed findings of fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a). See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4552 v. Roscoe
Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 843, 846 (5th Cir. 1997); Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th
Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 704 F.2d (5th Cir. 1983); see also Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as precedent the
decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981). These detailed findings
facilitate appellate review by allowing the reviewing court to determine whether an "intensely
local appraisal" of the voting system or structure demonstrates a sufficient denial of consent,
when compared to the principle of respecting majority rule, to warrant a judicial intrusion
into the political arena. Thornburg v. Gingles held that appellate courts were to apply the
clearly erroneous standard when engaging in this inquiry. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 77-79 (1986) (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)).
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before the will of the majority can be set aside, a remedy must be available to
ameliorate the denial of consent.2" Nevertheless, even with these constraints, many
cases will not lend themselves to a ready solution between the opposing principles
of protecting minority consent and respect for majority rule. Under such
circumstances, a judicial referee must weigh the value of sustaining one principle
against the damage it will do to the political system or structure in question by ruling
against the other.26 ' There is no escaping substantive decision-making.262 The fact
that the decisions to be made are difficult and might have sweeping implications is
no reason for the judicial referee to avoid his constitutional duty.263 If a court fails
At the same time, however, a judicial referee must avoid giving so much deference to
the state or local government's interest in the electoral scheme that he or she appears
unwilling to allow any changes to that scheme. Reaching a different conclusion leads to the
260

extreme interpretations taken by the Supreme Court in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994),

and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which essentially have held that a vote dilution claim can
be defeated by showing the absence of a remedy within the confines of the existing electoral
structure. See infra notes 649-59, 811-35 and accompanying text.
261 Cf Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419,
426-27 (1991)
("[T]he State's interest in maintaining an electoral system ... is a legitimate factor to be
considered by courts among the 'totality of the circumstances' in determining whether a § 2
violation has occurred."). But see Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice:Applying the Voting
Rights Act to JudicialElections, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note

7, at 376 ("Balancing the state's interest in the challenged practice against evidence of racial
vote dilution is at odds with the express language of the [Voting Rights] Act, with the
legislative history of the 1982 amendment to [s]ection 2, and with prior judicial decisions.").
As the majority in LULAC H observed, weighing a state's interest in a particular voting
structure or mechanism in a vote dilution inquiry "is analogous to weighing the asserted state
interest in constitutional law contexts." League of Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v.
Clements ("LULAC II"), 999 F.2d 831, 871 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Nevertheless, an
important caveat on consideration of the state's interest is that it "does not automatically, and
in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote dilution," Houston Lawyers'Ass 'n, 501 U.S. at
427, a point apparently lost on the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See infra notes 811-834 and
accompanying text.
262 See infra note 333; cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 143-44 (1993)
("[D]emocracy is far from a self-defining idea .... Courts need a quite particular conception
of democracy in order to decide cases."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION 66 (1991) ("Constitutional value choices cannot be made...

without recourse to a system of values that is at least partly external to the constitutional
text."); Carter, supra note 237, at 82 ("Like it or not, meaning is created, not simply found,
when a judge interprets the Constitution; the interpreting judge engages in an act of
creation.").
263 The Court has held in the context of political gerrymanders that the difficulty of those
cases does not prevent their adjudication:
It is true that the type of claim that was presented in Baker v. Carr was
subsequently resolved in this Court by the formulation of the "one person, one
vote" rule. The mere fact, however, that we may not now similarly perceive a
likely arithmetic presumption in the instant context does not compel a conclusion

that the claims presented here are nonjusticiable. The one person, one vote
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to fulfill its responsibilities simply to avoid engaging in questions of democratic
theory, it undermines, rather than enhances, one the most basic principles of
Madisonian democracy-that the judiciary is to be the guardian of consent by ALL
THE GOVERNED.
Moreover, when a court declines to act at all in a particular instance, it also has
made a substantive decision." Ronald Dworkin refers to this decision as the
"majoritarian default" position in constitutional law, upon which judges rely "when
the going gets too tough."2 5 Dworkin argues that it is erroneous to say that a
reviewing court avoids adopting a particular democratic theory by respecting the
majoritarian position of the legislature. In fact, such a court is adopting a democratic
theory, one which says that the decision of the majority wins.2' 6 For many years, the
Court applied the majoritarian default to voting rights claims through its reliance on
the political question doctrine outlined in Colegrove v. Green.267 It soon became
evident, however, that the default position resulted in some extraordinarily unfair

principle had not yet been developed when Baker was decided. At that time, the
Court did not rely on the potential for such a rule in finding justiciability.
Instead... the Court contemplated simply that legislative line drawing in the
districting context would be susceptible of adjudication under the applicable
constitutional criteria.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986) (citations omitted).
264 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Foresightand the Law ofServitudes, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 956, 963 (1988) ("Failure to decide is itself a decision, and one that often can have
undesirable future impact."). A rather stark example of how such a nondecision is itself a
decision recently occurred when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States v.
Hatter, 117 S.Ct. 39 (1996). In Hatter, the Federal Circuit held that withholding social
security taxes from the salaries of federal judges who took office before those taxes were
imposed in 1983 diminished judicial salaries in violation of the Compensation Clause of the
United States Constitution. See Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 39 (1996). To the extent that their salaries had been diminished by the
taxes, the judges were entitled to reimbursement and interest on the amount of diminution
they had suffered. See Hatter v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 166 (1997) (holding on remand).
When the Supreme Court was presented with the issue in a petition for certiorari, four
justices who believed they might have a financial interest in the case disqualified themselves.
See Richard Carelli, Some US. Judges Won't be Required to Pay Routine Taxes-Supreme
Court Sees Conflictfor Members, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1996, at A3. The result was that

the Court lacked the quorum of six justices required to decide the case, mandating summary
affirmance pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2109 (1994). See
Hatter, 117 S.Ct. at 39. Consequently, this "non-decision" effectively enhanced the financial

interests of the justices who recused themselves, even though that was purportedly the very
reason that they had disqualified themselves from considering the petition in the first place.
265 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Must Judges Really Be Philosophers? (Nov. 10, 1997) (Owen
J.Roberts Memorial Lecture presented at the University of Pennsylvania) (transcript on file
with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review).
266 See id
267

328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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26 of the political
outcomes, leading to the Court's repudiation, in Baker v. Carr,
question doctrine in legislative reapportionment cases.269
Consequently, there are at least some occasions when the majority's position
to adopt what
should not prevail.270 It is in these particular cases that it is preferable
271
democracy":
of
conception
"constitutional
the
calls
Dworkin

Democracy means government subject to conditions-we might call these
the "democratic" conditions-of equal status for all citizens. When
majoritarian institutions provide and respect the democratic conditions,
then the verdicts of these institutions should be accepted by everyone for
that reason. But when they do not, or when their provision or respect is
defective, there can be no objection, in the name of democracy, to other
procedures that protect and respect them better.... Of course, it may be
controversial what the democratic conditions, in detail, really are, and
whether a particular law does offend them. But, according to the
constitutional conception, it would beg the question to object to a practice
assigning those controversial questions for final decision to a court, on the
ground that that practice is undemocratic, because that objection assumes
that the laws in question respect the democratic conditions, and that is the
very issue in controversy.272
Nonetheless, there are limits on a court's use of constitutional review. 273 It is
possible to agree with Dworkin that judicial review requires us to "accept that.the
' without
Supreme Court [and other courts] must make important political decisions"274

369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
See supra notes 293-325 and accompanying text.
270 For an interesting argument to the contrary, see RICHARD D. PARKER,"HERE, THE
PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 104, 112-15 (1994) (suggesting
that a "reinvigorated" majority of common people should establish rules governing the
political process, not an anti-populist judiciary). See also Book Note, A Constitutionfor the
People, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1196 (1995) (reviewing Parker's book).
268

269

271

RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 17

(1996).
272

Id.at 17-18; cf Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).

The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational'
classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this
basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming
constitutionality.
Id.For an additional discussion of constitutional democracy, see generally GUTMAN &
THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 33-39.
273 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
274 Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U.

L. REv. 469, 516 (1981). As

Justice Jackson observed, "all constitutional interpretations have political consequences."
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 56
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going a step further, as Dworkin does, to conclude that a judge's task is to interpret
constitutional law in a manner that makes it the best law possible.2 75 Taken to that
extreme, the judicial branch easily could destroy the republican principle of consent
at the same time it interprets the law in an attempt to preserve the voice of the
people.276 Instead, judicial referees must abide by the constitutional and practical
constraints on their power to regulate the political arena. 77
Robert Bork has argued that the will of the majority should be respected unless
it "clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution. 2 7' Bork
279
is correct, except as to his cramped interpretation of what the Constitution protects.

As discussed in the first two sections of this Part,28° the Framers of the Constitution
and the Reconstruction Amendments chose to give the judiciary broad powers to
protect minority consent from the tyranny of majority factionalism. At the same time,
this section has shown that judicial referees are forced to make difficult substantive
decisions about when to stop the play in the political arena and call a foul on one or
more of the players. Bright-line interpretations of constitutional principles are not
possible, and the judicial referee therefore gives content to these principles each time
she applies them. In this sense, the rules of the game require a judicially active
referee to translate the Madisonian compromise into political reality.
The next Part describes in detail how the Court has fared in its role as a referee
in the political arena. It is apparent that the Court has evinced a great deal of
confusion on how it is supposed to protect consent. On the one hand, the Court has
made the sweeping substantive decision that consent-as well as its corollary of
representation-requires equipopulous districts. The Court has seemed comfortable
with this conclusion because, once the initial substantive choice is made, it limits
judicial discretion to deciding simply whether a particular district complies with its
rigid, formulaic rule of decision. On the other hand, after such a rule is in place, the
Court has opted for a constrained approach: to protect consent only to the extent that
it can do so through application of a rule which, like the "one person, one vote"
standard, limits the ability of judges to make substantive choices. The resulting
"process democracy" continuum of consent protection, which operates between the
poles of access and outcome, marks a fundamental distortion of the constitutional
(195 5) (emphasis added).
275 See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 410-413 (1986) (summarizing Dworkin's
conception of what "law" is, and how Hercules, "[a] judge of superhuman intellectual power

-and patience who accepts law as integrity," id. at 239, discovers it).
276 See Clifford Orwin & James R. Stoner, Jr., Neoconstitutionalism? Rawls, Dworkin,
and Nozick, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 456. For an additional
critique of Dworkin's theory of judicial review, see, for example, JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 213-30 (William Rehg trans., 1996); SUNSTEIN, supra note
262, at 111-13, 145-46; TRIBE & DORF, supra note 262, at 17.
277 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
278 Robert Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.

1, 11 (1971).
279

See id.

280

See supra notes 61-207 and accompanying text.
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responsibilities of the judicial referee. Moreover, the discussion demonstrates how
judges still must make value selections, even when they say they are not doing so.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE GUARANTEE OF CONSENT

As demonstrated in Part I, the Framers believed "the right of suffrage" is "a
fundamental article of republican government, '281 that must be protected by active
judicial referees. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to view its role this broadly,
however, and has, at times, questioned whether voting even is protected under the
Constitution.282 The right to vote is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution.283

21
282

THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 46, at 326 (James Madison).
The Supreme Court has wrestled with this issue, often reaching contradictory

conclusions. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) ("Undeniably the
Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state
as well as in federal elections."), andExparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884) ("The
exercise of the right [to vote] ... is guaranteed by the Constitution, and should be kept free
and pure by Congressional enactments whenever that is necessary."), with San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) ("[T]he right to vote, per se, is
not a constitutionally protected right."), and Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 (1966) ("[T]he right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.").
283 The closest the Constitution comes to recognizing a right to vote is in Article I, section
2. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature."). Other constitutional provisions indirectly refer
to the right to vote. See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. I ("The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof .... ."), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof."
(emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... "),
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII (discussing the procedures used by the Electoral
College to select the President and Vice President), and by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1
(identifying the terms of the President and Vice President). Many commentators have said
the source of the right to vote should rest in Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the States a "republican form of government." See, e.g., ELY, supra note 95;
Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the GuaranteeClause Should Be Justiciable,65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 849 (1994); infra note 307; see also Philip P. Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting
Rights: The JudicialArtistas Scholar andPragmatist,60 TUL. L. REv. 276,298-99 (1985)
(discussing Judge Wisdom's position in Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1968)
(three judge panel) (Wisdom, J., concurring), affdmem., 393 U.S. 531 (1969) (per curiam));
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 241-44 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe right to vote is inherent
in the republican form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 . . . ."). The
Supreme Court thus far has rejected any reliance on the Guarantee Clause as a justiciable
source for the right to vote. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 556; Luther v. Borden,
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This ambiguity often has caused the Supreme Court's refusal to enter the "political
thicket" of voting on the ground that to do so would require judicial determination
of essentially "political questions."' ' The Court, however, has since recognized that
fundamental rights include those that are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
' As a result of its unique status in being "preservative of other basic
Constitution."285
civil and political rights,"286 the right to vote, if not an explicit right, necessarily is an
implicit constitutional right. It has been accorded this "extraordinary treatment
because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: A citizen cannot hope
to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an
'
inferior right to participate in the political process."287
If the right to vote is itself an implicit constitutional right, then that status would
seem to require the courts to strike down any infringements depriving voters of the
ability to enjoy full and equal participation in the political arena. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has been reticent to exercise its enforcement powers even when the
majority wrongfully has denied the consent of a minority. Instead, the Court has
engaged in stringent regulation of the judicial referees themselves. To accomplish
this end, the Court has designed to establish rigid, formulaic guidelines whenever
possible. What has resulted is a hierarchy of voting rights, with the degree of
protection for particular claims frequently turning on whether the violation of consent
can be viewed as a deprivation of individual access to the political process. The
closer a claim comes to the outright denial of the ballot, the more likely it will be
protected.
This Part will illustrate how the Court has viewed voting rights under a process
theory of democracy on a continuum between access and outcome. The first section
highlights how the Court analytically has treated the idea of "one person, one vote"
as akin to the most protected type of process democracy claim: a pure process or
structural process right of individual access to the political system. However, the
discussion of this line of cases also demonstrates that, notwithstanding the Court's
characterization of the type of consent claim at stake, it really includes elements of
every type of process and outcome democracy right. 8 The second section evaluates
the Court's protection for process democracy claims, which are based upon the
principle that a voter cannot be said to have a voice in government if the process is
unfair. It shows how the Court has accorded full protection for pure process
democracy claims,289 less protection for quasi-structural and geography process

48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-86
(1992) (suggesting the possibility of a justiciable claim under the Guarantee Clause).
284

Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556; see infra notes 295-300 and accompanying text

(discussing Colegrove).
285 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
26 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
287

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

288

See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.

289 See infra notes

347-84 and accompanying text.
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" ' At the other end of the
claims,2" and little protection for perverted process claims.29
continuum, parliamentary process rights are grounded in the view that a voter cannot
have a meaningful voice in government if her representative actually cannot influence
government decisions. Because parliamentary process democracy claims inherently
are group-oriented and come into direct conflict with the principle of majority rule,
the Court has left them unprotected except to the extent that legislative outcomes
generated by that process implicate a constitutional right independent of the right to
vote.292

A. Consent and "One Person, One Vote"
The Supreme Court has been most amenable to exercising its powers as judicial
referee by regulating reapportionment. 93 In doing so, the Court has reasoned that
consent is at the heart of this representative government, and judicial intervention is
necessary when consent of individual voters is weighted differently. In fact, the
Court's conclusions are neither dictated expressly by language in the Constitution nor
supported by the history of apportionment in this country. For almost 180 years of
this nation's existence, the exclusive domain of reapportionment remained largely in
the hands of the state legislatures.294 As a result, the Court's intrusion into this part
of the political arena was dictated primarily by substantive decisions that the Court
itself made: value choices to give some content to what "consent" means in this
democratic system.
The Court initially refrained from making such content-laden judgments. In
Colegrove v. Green, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate an Illinois congressional
reapportionment plan because it lacked compactness of territory and equality of
population.295 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the
suit for lack ofjurisdiction.2 " Justice Frankfurter, in a plurality opinion, found that
290

See infra notes 385-446 and accompanying text.

292

See infra notes 447-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 457-506 and accompanying text.

293

Reapportionment includes two separate elements: "apportionment," which "concerns

29

how many seats each state should have," and "redistricting," which "concerns how the
boundaries within each state should be drawn." DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN,
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE ANDTHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 17(1992);
see also discussion infra note 464 (providing an alternative definition of "redistricting").
294 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The most notable exception to exclusive state control over
reapportionment came in 1842, when Congress first enacted a law requiring that
representatives be "elected by districts of contiguous territory equal in number ... [to the
state's entitlement], no district electing more than one representative." BUTLER & CAIN,
supra note 293, at 24 (quoting Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491). The present
law is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1967).
295 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550-51 (1946). The population disparity
between the most populous and least populous congressional districts in Illinois was
approximately nine to one. See id. at 557, app. I.
296 See id. at 556.
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the Court lacked competence over the issue, which was "of a peculiarly political
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."297 The plurality based its
conclusion, in part, upon the reasoning of four justices in an earlier case,"' as well
as history demonstrating that "glaring disparities have prevailed as to the contours
and the population of districts."2 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that "[c]ourts ought
not to enter this political thicket," and noted the proper forum for the plaintiffs to
seek relief was through either their state legislature or Congress." By endorsing the
so-called "political question" doctrine, the Court in Colegrove, in fact, adopted the
majoritarian default position in order to "avoid" making a substantive choice.
The repudiation of the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr"1 marked a
significant recognition by the Court of its broad powers as a referee in the political
arena. In Baker, the plaintiffs challenged a Tennessee state apportionment statute
that had remained unchanged for over sixty years, effectively allowing a vote in one
county to be worth as many as twenty-three votes in another county.3"2 The Court
acknowledged that simply because a "suit seeks protection of a political right does
not mean it presents a political question."3 3 Instead, the question turned on whether
the Court's exercise of judicial power would violate the separation of powers.
Finding that it would not, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not
ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially
manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open
to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine,
if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy
but simply arbitrary and capricious action.3" 4
As a result, the Court held that reapportionment was a matter "amenable to judicial
correction," concluding that the alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed the case to be "lifted . . . 'into the conventional sphere of constitutional
litigation.""'30
Once the Court recognized it could entertain a reapportionment challenge, what
was its basis to sustain such a challenge? In Reynolds v. Sims, 3° the Court grounded
Id. at 552.
See id at 551-52. In Woody. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), the Court declined to overturn
a Mississippi reapportionment plan that created districts of unequal population. In a separate
opinion, four justices opined that the case should be "dismissed for want of equity." Id. at 8.
299 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 555.
300 Id. at 556.
301 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
302 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 293, at 29. While such population disparities are
shocking, at least four states included some districts with up to one hundred times the
population of other districts. See id. at 25.
'o' Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
304 Id. at 226.
305 Id. at 229-30 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
306 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
297
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judicial intervention on a broad-based need to protect consent. Preliminarily, the
Court recognized the fundamental value of consent to the Madisonian model:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are those
instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative
of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired
fashion is a bedrock of our political system." 7
Because consent is a cornerstone of government, the Court described the need to
ensure all voters have an equal voice in the selection of their representatives:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper
and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The
right to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted ....It also
includes the right to have the vote counted at full value without dilution
or discount."'
[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies....
Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government
requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature .... To the extent that a
citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." 9
Consequently, a state violated the consent of the governed when it provided that "the
votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or
[ten] times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State," thereby
"effectively dilut[ing]" the vote of those in the "disfavored areas."3 ' The fact that
the Court had to protect the right of all to give equal consent-particularly the
minority of voters whose votes had been diluted at the expense of majority rule-did
not preclude judicial intrusion into the political arena. T ' Under such circumstances,
the judicial referees had no choice but to call a constitutional foul.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the Court's reasoning in Reynolds does not match
up with what it was actually doing. The Court's language suggests that it was
307

Id. at 562.

Id at 555 n.29 (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
309 Id. at 565, 567.
30 Id.at 563.
.. See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S 713, 736 (1964). The court held: "An
individual'sconstitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied
(emphasis added). This statement
even by a vote of a majority of a State's electorate." Id.
highlights the Court's construction of "one person, one vote" as an individual right of access
to the political process-a pure process democracy right.
308
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treating reapportionment purely as a violation of an individual right: access to the
political process (a "pure process" right)." 2 As Justice Stewart aptly pointed out in
his dissent, however, no pure process claim could be stated under the facts: "[T]hese
cases... have nothing to do with the denial or impairment of any person's right to
vote. Nobody's right to vote has been denied. Nobody's right to vote has been
31 3
restricted. Nobody has been deprived of the right to have his vote counted." '
Rather, the case was one in which consent was denied to voters in a "disfavored
area," when compared to voters in a "favored area," because they would have less
ability to influence their representative, diminished opportunity to have their voices
heard in the legislative decision-making process, and would have to compete with
more people to attain the services of their representative. These results all suggest
that the denial of consent would not occur at the entry point to participation in th ;
political process, but rather at every other point beyond that-including outcomes
generated through the parliamentary process. The Court's reference to "dilution,"
an inherently group-oriented political right, supports this conclusion. Consequently,
if the Reynolds rhetoric is taken at face value, it is nothing less than a guarantee of
equal voting power,3" 4 something that the Framers arguably intended the judicial
referees to secure, even if the Court did not.
Instead, the Court sought to limit the judicial discretion of the referees on the
field by seizing upon what it believed to be a principled approach to political
reapportionment: the concept of "one person, one vote." ' 5 The Court held that its
authority to mandate equiipopulous districts was grounded in two constitutional

See infra notes 347-55 and accompanying text.
Lucas, 377 U.S. at 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Intuitively, most people probably would take the concept of "one person, one vote"
quite literally and view it as a promise of equal voting power. Judge Kozinski has adopted
such a view. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 782 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hat lies at the core of one
person one vote is the principle of electoral equality, not that of equality of representation."),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). Cf Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 640-41 ("Drawing on the
'one person, one vote' principle, this Court recognized that '[t]he right to vote can be
affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a
ballot."' (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969))). Participants
in the civil rights movement similarly believed that "one person, one vote" guaranteed equal
voting power. See Tucker, supra note 7, at Part II (describing how the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee ("SNCC") and other civil rights groups interpreted "one person, one
vote" to mean equal voting power). The Supreme Court, however, generally has used the
phrase "one person, one vote" solely in terms of equal representation-i.e., equipopulous
districts.
315 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The concept of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing--one person, one
vote.").
312
313
314
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sources. The Baker holding established, s" 6 and the Reynolds holding confirmed,317
that the Court possessed power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to adjudicate claims of malapportionment in state legislatures. In
Reynolds, the Court also laid down the rule that equal protection demands "no less
than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens."3 '
Conversely, in Wesberry v. Sanders,the Court ruled that it had power under Article I,
section 2 of the Constitution to adjudicate claims of congressional malapportionment,
relying on a more stringent mathematical standard.3 19 According to the Court, that
constitutional provision "means that as nearly as is practicableone man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."32 Similar standards
have been imposed upon other governmental bodies.' Without question, the Court
made a significant substantive decision to adopt a fixed, mechanical standard for

316

See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("We hold that, as a basic
constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.").
31
Id (emphasis added). In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Court confirmed
that this language gave states broader latitude in state legislative reapportionment than in
congressional reapportionment. Specifically, the states were given broader discretion when
necessary to further other rational state policies. See id at 320-25. In Mahan, the Court
sustained a state legislative districting plan in which the most overrepresented district
deviated from the ideal population district by 6.8%, while the most underrepresented
deviated by 9.6%. See id. at 318-19, 327. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973),
the Court held that states could make de minimis variations from the equal population
principle without providing any justification. The Court has struck down deviations of 16.5%
or more in state legislative districts. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
311 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
320 Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added). In Karcherv. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court
held that there are "no de minimis population variations, which could practicably be avoided,
but which would nonetheless meet the standard of Art. I, §2 without justification." Id at 731.
In Karcher, the Court rejected a congressional reapportionment plan with a maximum
deviation of only 0.6984%. Id. at 728.
32 See Board of Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (applying "one
person, one vote" to New York City's Board of Estimate, comprised of elected presidents
from the city's five boroughs, which had disparate populations, and three city officials
elected at-large); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying "one person,
one vote" to local government apportionment of administrative body); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying "one person, one vote" to local government
apportionment of legislative body).
317
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reapportionment cases-a standard which itself has been subject to widespread, and
323
32 2
sometimes caustic, criticism by some justices and many commentators.
Justices have criticized the "one person, one vote" cases because they reflect value
choices in matters of political theory. See generally Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
322

U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)

([lI]t is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines
popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others
to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by
reasonably minded people acting through the political process.);
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)
(But even if itwere thought that the rule announced today by the Court [adoption
of the "one person, one vote" standard in Reynolds] is, as a matter of political
theory, the most desirable general rule which can be devised as a basis for the
make-up of the representative assembly of a typical State, I could not join in the
fabrication of a constitutional mandate which imports and forever freezes one
theory of political thought into our Constitution ....
);
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("Whatever may be thought of this holding
as a piece of political ideology ...I think it demonstrable that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not impose this political tenet on the States or authorize this Court to do so."); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's 'judicial
power' not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially
political conflict of forces by which the relation between population and
representation has time out of mind been and now is determined.... The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such a feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements.).
Other justices have criticized the standard of equipopulous districts itself. See generally
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 750 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("I am convinced that
judicial preoccupation with the goal of perfect population equality is an inadequate method
ofjudging the constitutionality of an apportionment plan ....
Mere numerical equality is not
a sufficient guarantee of equal representation."); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with
'gerrymandering' of the worst sort.").
323

BERNARD GROFMAN, VOTING RIGHTS, VOTING WRONGS: THE LEGACY OF BAKER V.

CARR 33-34 (1990) [hereinafter GROFMAN, LEGACY]; see also Richard Briffault, Who Rules
at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 403-04

(1993) (examining effect of Court's "rigid adherence" to population equality in the context
of local government); Bernard Grofinan, Criteriafor Districting: A Social Science

Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 83 (1985) (referring to Court's "rigid insistence on
absolute population equality in congressional districting"); Paul L. Mckaskle, The Voting
Rights Act and the "ConscientiousRedistricter",30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 94 (1995) (evaluating

"the extremely rigid population equality standard embraced by the Court in Karcher v.
Daggett"); Mark Packman, Reapportionment: The Supreme Court Searchesfor Standards,
21 URB. LAW. 925, 937 (1989) ("The Court has been too rigid in its demand for precise
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In summary, the Court's intervention into reapportionment clearly is justifiable
under the consent theory of democracy. Malapportionment of districts can lead to
two antithetical results, both ofwhich violate the equal right of consent of a particular
group of voters. In one case, it can result in majority tyranny, whereby a majority
group gives itself disproportionate voting power in both the general election and the
legislative body at the expense of a minority group. In the other case, a perverse
result occurs which even Madison had not contemplated: minority tyranny, whereby
a minority group has disproportionate voting power-sometimes as high as one
hundred times the voting power of other voters-allowing the minority group to elect
a majority of representatives in the general election and to control the legislature.324
Although the two extremes of majority and minority tyranny provide a reason for the
Court to enter the political arena, they do not necessarily dictate the mechanical "one
person, one vote" standard. In fact, "one person, one vote" highlights the danger of
the courts adopting inflexible standards. It actually can exaggerate majority
factionalism, leading to majority tyranny in another form: the equipopulous
gerrymander.325 As the next section illustrates, such tyranny can result in violations
of process democracy rights.
B. Consent and Process Democracy

As discussed in Part I(A), the Founding Fathers adopted a republican form of
government as an answer to a British political process that denied the Colonials a
right to actual representation in Parliament.326 Not only had Britain violated the
republican principle of consent, but it had directed adverse legislative outcomes at
the American Colonies as a result of this violation.327 Consequently, the Madisonian

mathematical equality among congressional districts."); Stephen J. Thomas, Note, The Lack
of JudicialDirection in Political Gerrymandering:An Invitation to Chaos Following the
1990 Census, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1077 (1989) (discussing Court's "'inflexible
insistence' on population equality"); cf Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymanderingin a
Complex World: A Reply to Judge Sentelle, 45 CATH.U. L. REV. 1257, 1264 (1996) (noting

that "once districts are of equal population, there is no clear individual component to
districting decisions," leaving the courts without a standard).
324 In this manner, Madison's "republican principle" of allowing the majority to defeat
minority factionalism would be circumvented. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See generally Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in
7, at 67 (arguing that it was "the
conjunction of the 'one person, one vote' rule with the requirement to create black majority
districts wherever possible that demanded the abandonment of traditional redistricting
325

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote

criteria," leading to pursuit of other goals such as "partisan advantage and incumbent
protection").
326 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
327

See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In addition to the Stamp Act, Britain had

imposed on the Colonists other revenue and coercive acts, including the Townshend Duties,
the Sugar Act of 1764, the Tea Act of 1773, the Boston Port Act, the Massachusetts
Government Act, the Quebec Act, the Quartering Act, rigorous enforcement of the
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solution aimed toward broadening the franchise and toward being vigilant for
factions seeking to exclude a minority of citizens from the political process.32
Without question, this approach requires judicial referees policing the political
process itself, as well as scrutinizing substantive outcomes that might reveal a lack
of protection of minority interests.329 This section will focus on "process
democracy": the extent to which the Court, consistent with republican principles,
should ensure the political process is operating fairly, and should protect the rights
of individuals or groups of individuals to have a voice in government and receive fair
outcomes.
John Hart Ely is the current leading proponent of a process approach to
representation.33 According to Ely, judicial review under open-ended provisions of

Navigation Laws, and a number of other measures. See BAILYN, supra note 65, at 94-143.
328
329

See supranotes 71-118 and accompanying text.
See ELY, supranote 95, at 73-104; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND

THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 60-128 (1980) (discussing the judicial role in protecting

individual rights).
330 See ELY, supranote 95, at 73-104; cf HABERMAS, supra note 276 (proposing a process
approach to democracy, arguing that it is the government's responsibility to ensure that
avenues of communication are left open so that citizens can have a voice in governmental
decision-making). See also GUTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 28 (discussing
"procedural democracy" in which "the results of majority rule are legitimate because the
procedure is fair, not because the results are right"). Ely was not the first to discuss a political
process approach. See generally Richard A. Givens, The ImpartialConstitutionalPrinciples
Supporting Brown v. Board of Education, 6 How. L.J. 179, 181 (1960) (emphasizing the
importance ofjudicial restraint, and observing that such restraint was unnecessary "where the
'processes of democratic government' themselves were threatened"); Louis Lusky, Minority
Rights and the Public Interest,52 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1942) ("[P]olitical activity should not be
interfered with unless it seeks to by-pass, or threatens the existence of, the regular corrective
processes."). A political process approach also was alluded to in Justice Stone's famous
CaroleneProducts footnote 4:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation .... Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious .... or national,
...or racial minorities ...; whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Ely interprets the themes
of the CaroleneProducts footnote as
ask[ing] us to focus not on whether this or that substantive value is unusually
important or fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and

1999]

TYRANNY OF THE JUDICIARY

the Constitution, such as the right to vote,"' can be accomplished "by insisting that
it can appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with
' Ely has been subjected
the substantive merits ofthe political choice under attack."332
to widespread criticism on this point.33 This criticism is validly taken because the
nature of voting "rights" dictate that reviewing courts will have to make certain
substantive choices about how much access groups of voters are entitled to. 3 4 If
accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been
unduly constricted.
ELY, supranote 95, at 77.
331 Ely argues that the Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims rests on both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the open texture of the Guarantee
Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. See id at 122-25. The Guarantee Clause provides,
in pertinent part: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4. According to Ely, the Court was willing to
address the problem of malapportionment notwithstanding the open texture of the Guarantee
Clause because "one person, one vote" (equipopulous districts) provided a workable standard
for reviewing courts. See ELY, supra note 95, at 124.
332 Id.at 181.
333 See, e.g., HABERMAS,

supranote 276, at 265-66; SUNSTEIN, supra note 262, at 104-05;
Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal ProtectionTheories: A MetatheoreticalTaxonomy and
Critique,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 44-51 (1981); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO

ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Dworkin, supranote 274, at 500-16; Samuel Estreicher, Review Essay,
Platonic Guardiansof Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the

Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, 563-67 (1981); Daniel R. Ortiz,
Pursuinga Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failureof Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721
(1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-72 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:
The ContributionsofJohn HartEly to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-48

(1980). Edwin Baker interprets Ely's theory on representation as process-based because
judicial intervention corrects defects in how the legislature counts preferences of citizens. See
C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretationsof Equal

Protection, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1029, 1039-49 (1980). For a further discussion of Baker's
interpretation of Ely's process theory, see Alexander, supra, at 48-50.
134

See generallyALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

35 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining that the issue of voting rights is "the distribution of access and

power among various groups, and the answer requires normative choices and prophetic
judgments"); Ortiz, supra note 333, at 728
(The proper degree of influence to give an individual or group relative to others,
however, does not fall from the heavens. It varies according to how one thinks
society should be organized, whether citizens do or should fall into classes, and
whether communities of various sorts deserve a special status. All of these
questions are substantive through and through.).
See also Tribe, supra note 333, at 1069

(Deciding what kind of participation the Constitution demands requires analysis
not only of the efficacy of alternative processes but also of the character and
importance of the interest at stake ....That analysis, in turn, requires a theory
of values and rights as plainly substantive as, and seemingly of a piece with, the
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these substantive choices are left out of an analysis of what voting means, the risk is
that the values being represented will be limited to those of an interest-driven
majority, the very group that Madison said had to be regulated in order to protect the
vulnerable minority.33 Such a result should be unsurprising under a process
approach supposedly blinded to substantive outcomes. For a "process theorist must
... be concerned with the decision[-]making process for its own sake, not because
' 336
of the reactions people might have to it.
The allure of strictly process-based approaches is that they allow courts to
function under the principle of judicial restraint.'
With regard to representation,
judicial restraint also permits courts to respect majority rnle, while at the same time
avoiding the "reductio ad absurdum: 'whichever group happens to lose the political
struggle .or fails to command the attention of the legislature ... is-by that fact
alone-a discrete and insular minority' subject to protection.338 The seductiveness
of judicial restraint under a process theory and the negative aspects of its
altemative-judicial decision-making on matters of democratic theory-goes far to
explain why the Supreme Court has resisted regulating representation and its
attendant outcomes.339
However, the courts' failure to address questions of representation not easily
resolved under either a pure process approach 4 ' or an approach protecting
substantive values through "uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application of

theories of values and rights that underlie the Constitution's provisions
addressing religion, slavery, and property.).
...For a discussion of how a simple political process approach benefits those in the
majority, see generally Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and
ConstitutionalLaw, 82 CAL. L. REv. 93 5 (1994) (arguing that process theory is "transparently
white," perpetuating the substantive values of those in the white majority).
336 Alexander, supra note 333, at 42-43.
131 James B. Thayer was an early proponent ofjudicial restraint. Thayer observed:
The ultimate arbiter of what is rational and permissible is indeed always the
courts, so far as litigated cases bring the question before them. This leaves to our
courts a great and stately jurisdiction. It will only imperil the whole of it if it is
sought to give them more. They must not step into the shoes of the law-maker,
or be unmindful of the hint that is found in the sagacious remark of an English
bishop nearly two centuries ago, quoted lately from Mr. Justice
Holmes:--"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and
not the person who first wrote or spoke them."
James B. Thayer, The Origin andScope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7
HARV. L. REv. 129, 152 (1893) (citation omitted).
338 Tribe, supra note 333, at 1073 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreward:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1979)).
339
340

See infra notes 591-712 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 719-60 and accompanying text.
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' is contrary
sixth-grade arithmetic," 341
to Madisonian democracy. Judicial inaction in
addressing majority violations of consent-premised on the reasoning that to do so
involves making substantive choices and adopting a particular democratic
theory-imposes a democratic theory which is inconsistent with republican
principles: respecting the tyrannical choices of majority factionalism.342 American
democratic theory explicitly requires judicial intervention when the republican
principle of consent is violated by the exclusion of a minority of voters from the
political process.343 Undoubtedly, such intervention requires some substantive linedrawing by the courts to determine how much representation is required.344 In this
sense, Madison envisioned courts would be judicially active in vigorously protecting
the right of all citizens to have a voice in government.345 Courts, however, can make
substantive decisions using a process-based approach to secure one core republican
principle-protection ofconsent from majority factionalism-without destroying the
other core republican principle of majority rule.346
The remainder of this section will examine how the Court has addressed different
types of process democracy claims. The discussion will show that the Court is
willing to protect minorities from majority factionalism when principled methods of
examining claims involving representation and voting are present. Conversely, the
more these claims depart from principled methods and require the Court to make
substantive decisions on how much access to the political system is appropriate, the
less amenable the Court will be to providing a remedy. Nevertheless, it will become
apparent that even in the stages of the political process that lend themselves to the
creation of straightforward rules to guide the judicial referee in protecting consent,
the Court by necessity still must engage in substantive decision-making on matters
of democratic theory.

34'
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)
(referring to the equipopulous "one person, one vote" standard).
342 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
343 See BICKEL, supra note 243, at 192-97.
344Cf Barber, supra note 103, at 874 ("A court cannot address questions of power
...
without forming judgments about ends.").
341See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
346 See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 782 (1991)
(A political process theory of judicial review is grounded on a reasonably
uncontroversial vision of democracy by which majorities rule through elected
representatives, though they are free to precommit themselves not to oppress
minorities. Judicial review can, consonant with this paradigm, enforce such
precommitments, but only upon the same generation that undertook them, and
only when the phraseology is sufficiently determinate that judicial enforcement
will not amount simply to uncabined second guessing of legislative policy
decisions.).
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1. "Structural Process" or "Pure Process" Claims
"Structural process" or "pure process ' '347 claims contend that a state-created
mechanism or structure such as a voter registration law,348 literacy test, poll tax, or
use of multiple ballot boxes actually denies a voter any voice in the political
process.349 Although pure process claims might affect a group of voters, they
inherently focus on .individual voting rights because they only look at election access
(an individual right), and not election outcome (a group right).350 Moreover, the
baseline for examining what the right to vote means under a pure process approach
anal tically is very simple: Is the voter prevented from casting a ballot? No judicial
inquiry is required into how much weight a particular ballot should be given.

34'The

term "pure process" is used here to recognize claims in which elections laws
regulating the voting process itself prevent certain voters from having a voice in the political
process.
348 Voter registration laws have been criticized as one of the primary barriers to those who
otherwise might be eligible and want to exercise their voice in the political process. See, e.g.,
supra note 62; F. PIvEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE (1988). Most registration laws, however, have been upheld. See
BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION AND VOTING, supra note 62, at 115-35; see also Association of
Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., popularly known as
the "motor voter" law). Registration laws generally only have been constitutionally suspect
when they have been applied in a discriminatory fashion. See generally Williams v. Wallace,
240 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ala. 1965) (discussing the impediments black voters faced in
registering to vote in Alabama). A further discussion of the discriminatory purpose and
effects of registration laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION AND VOTING,

14'

For a discussion of the use of these types of structural devices to deny minorities the

right to vote, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Underminingof the FirstReconstruction-Lessons
for the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 27-46; J. Morgan Kousser,
The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING, supra note 9, at 135-64.
350 Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)

("Reynolds makes plain that the one person one vote principle safeguards the individual's
right to vote, not the interests of political groups." (emphasis added)); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (holding that an election law, "whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the
voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual'sright to
vote and his right to associate with others for political ends." (emphasis added)); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78 (1980) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause protects "the right of each voter to 'have his vote weighted equally with
those of all other citizens"' (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) (emphasis
added))). Jonathan Still labels this type of claim for political equality as "Universal Equal
Suffrage," requiring that "[elveryone is allowed to vote, and everyone gets the same number
of votes--'one person, one vote' in a literal sense." Jonathan W. Still, PoliticalEquality and
Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375, 378 (1981) (highlighting the individual nature of a pure
process claim (emphasis added)).
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Because of the ease of evaluating pure process claims without apparently having to
make attendant substantive choices,35' pure process claims traditionally have been
protected the most by the Court. Even dogmatic skeptics of judicial intrusions into
the political arena, such as Abigail Thernstrom,352 Justices Thomas and Scalia,353 and
Senators Orrin Hatch354 and John East,355 would protect pure process claims.
Before describing cases found by the Court to state a pure process claim, it is
worth noting those cases that in fact have not done so. The Founding Fathers
acknowledged that some discrimination in voter qualifications was not only
acceptable, but desirable.356 Consonant with the Framers' deference to the states on

Except, of course, that this is a situation in which appearances can be deceiving. Courts
must make substantive decisions in determining which types of restrictions on the right to
351

vote are permissible. See Estreicher, supra note 333, at 565-66.

See THERNSTROM, supra note 240, at 3-5 (referring to the right to vote, as protected
under the Voting Rights Act, as "simply the right to enter a polling booth and pull the lever"
and asserting that the sole purpose of the Act was to enfranchise blacks); Abigail Thernstrom,
352

More Notes from a PoliticalThicket, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra
note 7, at 117 (criticizing the idea that "[flrom the outset the Voting Rights did clearly
promise more than simple access to the polling booth; the architects of the statute believed
black ballots would mean black power").
"' See generally Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 945 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring);
discussion of Holder infra notes 591-629 and accompanying text; see also Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1031-32 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reiterating his view in
Holder that the "standard, practice, or procedure" referred to in section 2 only extends to
state enactments that regulate ballot access or the right to have a ballot counted).
114 See generally S. REP. No. 417, at 94-105 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
267-78 (additional views of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that the Voting Rights Act only protects
a right to individual access and not a group right to equal outcomes and adopting the views
stated in the Report of the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution); id. at 185, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 356 (Report of the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution) (stating that
the objective of the Voting Rights Act is "equal access to the ballot-box" and not "equal
results in the electoral process").
311 In his minority views on the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Senator East
opined that only individual voter access was protected under the Act:
[T]he right to vote means that every citizen has a right to come forward and
engage in the physical act of voting-that is, marking a ballot and having it
counted. It means that no one shall be denied access to the polling booth merely
because of race or color, and that all citizens shall have an equal opportunity to
participate in the electoral process .... [Section 2] addresses the problem of
voter access to the polling booth prior to and including the final act of
voting ....

Neither the [Fifteenth Amendment] nor [s]ection 2 of the Act

explicitly or impliedly asserts that the voter has any additional rights or
privileges after his vote has been taken, or that the outcome or result of the
election with respect to the success or failure of minority candidates bears any
relation to an individual's right to vote.
Id. at 221-22, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 391-92 (minority views of Sen. East).
356 See supranotes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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the issue of who could exercise the franchise, the Court similarly has acknowledged
the right of states to impose legitimate voter restrictions. Early on, the Court
recognized that a state or local government could take into consideration factors such
as residence, age, and prior criminal records in determining who could exercise the
right to vote. 5 7 Since then, the Court repeatedly has allowed imposition of voter
qualifications discriminating against non-citizens,35 minors,' 5 insane persons, 3 nonresidents,36 1 and convicted felons.3 62 Literacy requirements posed a much closer
question for the Court. In Lassiterv. Northampton County Board ofElections,363 the
Court upheld a state literacy test, finding that "[t]he ability to read and write has some
relation to standards designed to promote the intelligent use of the ballot."'3" The
Court did not rule out the possibility that literacy tests could be used as racially
discriminatory devices, but found insufficient evidence to support such a claim in the
facts before it.365 In light of all of the foregoing restrictions on the right to vote, it is
evident that, even under a pure process approach, there are acceptable reasons to
exclude certain groups of voters.366
The most obvious examples of unacceptable voter qualifications are race 367 and
gender.368 Other illegitimate qualifications include those based upon duration of

311See

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1890) (declaring that the state of Idaho
could withhold the right to vote from a known polygamist), overruled on other grounds,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
3.8 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.10 (1952).
319See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
360 See id. at 214 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36! See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
362 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), cert. deniedsub nom. Class of County
Clerks and Registrars of Voters of Ca. v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 904 (1974). But see Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 222 (1985) (striking down state law denying voting rights to
individuals convicted of crimes "involving moral turpitude" because it had the purpose and
effect of disproportionately disenfranchising black voters).
363 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
31 Id.at 51; see also supra note 199 (noting that the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment
specifically refused to include a ban on literacy tests in order to secure its passage). Frank
Michelman has argued that enfranchisement based upon competence can be reconciled with
a "deliberative-politics premise," in which "one's franchise is one's badge of inclusion in a
constitutive political dialogue" extolling "the interest of all in the 'intelligent' participation
of each." Michelman, supra note 53, at 480-85. For a response to Michelman, see C. Edwin
Baker, Republican Liberalism: LiberalRights and Republican Politics,41 FLA. L. REV. 491,

504-07 (1989).
365 See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53-54. Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act suspended the
use of literacy tests in covered jurisdictions, and was extended to all states in the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314-15 (1970).
...Cf Still, supra note 350, at 378 ("Universal suffrage has never been truly universal,
and no one has ever seriously suggested that it ought to be.").
367 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
368 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1.
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residency,36 9 primary interest,37 ° property ownership,3 7' military service,372 literacy
tests with either a discriminatory purpose or effect,373 and poll taxes.374 In addition,
the Court has struck down procedural barriers to registration,375 improper challenges
to voters who have registered,376 racial barriers to candidate qualification for office,"7
and grandfather clauses37 as pure process barriers to voting.
The line separating permissible pure process restrictions on voting from
impermissible restrictions is based upon the Court's substantive determination that
the illegitimate restrictions do not bear a sufficiently supportable relationship to the
purpose of the franchise. In other words, improper structural restrictions have no
rightful connection to the republican principle of consent. It is easy to see why
citizens do not want to have minors or insane persons voting-these are the very
people the law recognizes as being incapable of giving consent, quite literally as "the
'
lowest and most ignorant of mankind."379
Similarly, convicted felons, presumably
including those released from prison who have not yet had their civil rights restored,
have taken themselves out of society by their own actions and made their consent

See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973) (per curiam) (upholding Arizona's durational residency requirements under the
specific facts of the case).
370 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). But see Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355 (1981) (upholding primary interest qualification for electors in water reclamation
district); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
(upholding primary interest qualification for electors in water storage district). In Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), the Court reconciled the Kramer and Salyer decisions by finding
that primary interest was a legitimate voting qualification only so long as the functions of the
elected body in question were highly specialized. Because the school district election in
Kramerwas not highly specialized like the water storage district election in Salyer, the Court
concluded the former's limitation on primary interest was improper. See Hill, 421 U.S. at
297.
' See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969).
372 See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
311 See Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); United States v. Lousiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), affd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872
(S.D. Ala.), affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
3 See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37 See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17 (1960) (holding that a complaint alleging use of racially discriminatory devices as barriers
to registration stated a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which the Court determined
to be constitutional under Fifteenth Amendment).
376 See United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd in part sub
nom. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
371 See Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969).
311 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915).
319See supranote 75.
369
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unnecessary."' Additionally, non-citizens and non-residents can be excluded from
the franchise because they have not yet become a part of the community with
sufficient ties to warrant having the government obtain their consent.3"' On the other
hand, it is a completely different matter to say that pure process restrictions based
upon race, gender, property ownership, ability or willingness to pay a poll tax, and
so forth, sufficiently justify denying the ability to consent to members of the
community who might otherwise possess the same (or possibly more) intelligence
and interest in governmental affairs as those individuals outside of their group who
are allowed to cast a ballot.3" 2

380

For a different view on disenfranchisement of felons and ex-felons, see, for example,

Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisementand Its Influence on the Black
Vote: The Needfor a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1145 (1994); Andrew L. Shapiro,
Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons:
Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300

(1989).
31' For a different view on disenfranchisement of non-citizens, see Gerald L. Neuman,
"We are the People": Alien Suffrage in German andAmerican Perspective, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B: Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional,and TheoreticalMeanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391 (1993);
Paul Tiao, Non-Citizen Suffrage: An Argument Based on the Voting Rights Act and Related

Law, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 171 (1993); see also Rodolofo 0. de la Garza & Louis
DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral
ParticipationAfter Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1479,

1523 (1993) ("[W]e advocate a limited form of noncitizenship voting. This noncitizen voting,
though, is a means to an end-to promote the transition from immigrant to citizen.").
382

See generally ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 29 (1995) ("[Political

equality] has become particularly definitive in the development of modem democracy, for,
while the roughly equal capacity for reason is more a matter of faith than of empirical
confirmation, it translates into what Dahl calls a 'roughly equal qualification' for
government."). It is not impossible, however, for many of these illegitimate pure process
restrictions to be tied sufficiently to consent. In Lassiter,a compelling argument was made
based upon consent: Literacy bore a relation to the intelligent exercise of the ballot in a
"society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate
campaign issues." Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
If a person was incapable of being informed fully about a particular issue or candidate, it is
unlikely that the person could give any meaningful consent. See also discussion supra note
364. Similarly, a colorable (though losing) argument could be made in Dunn that a durational
residency requirement would enhance the ability of a voter to give his consent by giving the
voter a reasonable time to become a member of the community, develop common interests
with other voters, and become better apprised of local issues. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 354-60 (1972). Conversely, in each of the cases in which pure process restrictions
were struck down, it likewise was true that, even if a person is incapable of reading and
writing, is new to town, does not own property, or lacks the funds to pay a poll tax, it does
not necessarily follow that such a person cannot otherwise become informed about candidates
or issues and intelligently give (or withhold) her consent.
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This discussion has shown that the Court substantively must decide who gets to
consent to government actions, even in the "easiest" case of evaluating pure process
claims. In this sense, then, the Court is defining the scope of the right to vote.
Nevertheless, the Court is not creating a democratic theory when it makes this
definition. Instead, the Court is acting in its role as a referee of the political process
to protect the republican principle of consent from majority factionalism. If the Court
were not allowed to make substantive decisions concerning pure process claims, one
of two results would occur. First, all people could have the right to vote because
majorities in the states would be prohibited from fencing anyone out of the political
process. Alternatively, the states could have unfettered discretion (subject, of course,
to certain constitutional restrictions such as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentysixth Amendments)383 to define the right to vote according to whom the majority
wanted to be allowed to give their consent. Neither result is particularly desirable.
Consequently, the judiciary makes substantive decisions on the scope of
consent-i.e., who gets to vote-in a pure process environment in fulfillment of its
republican role of protecting the right to suffrage. 4 The Court thereby promotes,
rather than undermines, Madisonian democracy.
"Quasi-Structural Process" Claims

2.

"Quasi-structural process" claims assert that state-created mechanisms, such as
majority vote requirements3"5 and anti-single shot provisions,3"6 or state-sanctioned
mechanisms, such as primary elections for candidates of political parties387 and
candidate slating,3"8 do not bar a voter from casting her ballot but, instead, ensure she
cannot have a meaningful voice in the political process. As a result, this type of
claim differs from a pure process claim because the voter is allowed to cast a ballot.
A quasi-structural impediment, however, has the same effect as a pure process
barrier-the voter is denied the ability to have a voice at the stage of the elections
process at which the representative is actually selected.
Quasi-structural process claims have both an individual and group rights focus
to voting. State-sanctioned quasi-structural mechanisms, like pure process claims,
are individual-oriented because they prevent voters from participating in a particular
stage of the election. In other words, they directly affect election access. On the
other hand, most state-created quasi-structural mechanisms are group-oriented
If the Court, however, was precluded from making any substantive decisions in
protecting the right to vote, the protections offered by these Constitutional Amendments
would be minimal, at best. Only limited statutory protection would preclude the passage of
a literacy test, residency requirement, or even a standard that a person be of good moral
character in order to qualify to vote.
383

384
385

See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 407, 409-13 and accompanying text.

386
387
388

See infra notes 408, 414 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 389-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 399-405 and accompanying text.
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because they allow individual participation at all stages, but nevertheless prevent
members of a group from having the ability to cast a decisive ballot. These
impediments more clearly are seen through election outcomes, which must be
examined to determine the impediment's effect on the ability of groups of voters to
cast meaningful ballots. Consequently, the analytical method of examining quasistructural process claims is slightly more difficult than for pure process claims: A
reviewing court must ask whether the voter is prevented from casting a ballot at the
stage of the election process at which the decision is made, and frequently needs to
inquire into the motivations of voters or local elections officials. Because statesanctioned quasi-structural claims closely resemble pure process claims in that they
focus on election access (an individual right), the Court has been more willing to
protect them.38 9 Conversely, in evaluating state-created quasi-structural claims,
which focus on election outcome (a group right), the Court generally has required
more direct evidence of how the challenged impediment has interacted with other
features of the voting system to deny voters a meaningful voice in the political
process.
The White Primary Cases are paradigm examples of how access to primary
elections can be protected as quasi-structural process claims.3' 9 This series of cases
There are limits, however, to how far certain justices are willing to go to protect even
these easier cases. In FlaggBrothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the Court stated
that the rationale of the White Primary Cases, discussed infra notes 390-401 and
accompanying text, "does not reach to all forms of private political activity, but encompasses
only state regulated elections or elections conducted by organizations which in practice
produce 'the uncontested choice of public officials."' FlaggBros., 436 U.S. at 158 (quoting
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring)). Relying on this language,
Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia refused to extend constitutional protection to
deprivations of the right to vote by private individuals when no state actors made such
political choices--even when the public elections system itself endorses the private
discrimination. See generally Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 272, 274
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
([Clonvening the members of apolitical association in order to select the person
who can best represent and advance the group's goals is not, and historically
never has been, the province of the State--much less its exclusive province ....
389

Even if,as might be said here, "the government erects the platform" upon which
aprivate group acts, the government "does not thereby become responsible for
all that occurs upon it."
(quoting Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor,
J.,dissenting))). Cf Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,493,494 (1953) (Minton, J., dissenting)
("I do not understand that concerted action of individuals which is successful somehow
becomes state action .... Far from the activities of these groups being properly labeled as

state action, under either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment, they are to be
considered as attempts to influence or obtain state action.").
390 For a more detailed accounting of the factual underpinnings and history of the White
PrimaryCases, see CONRAD BRYSON, DR. LAWRENCE A. NIXON AND THE WHITE PRIMARY
(1974); DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE
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began with a black voter's challenge to a Texas statute that denied blacks the right
to vote in Democratic Party primary elections, a state-created quasi-structural
claim. 9 ' The Court unanimously struck down the law as a violation of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.392 In Nixon v. Condon, the Court
invalidated voter qualifications established by the State Executive Committee of the
Democratic Party that denied blacks the right to vote in party primaries.9 3 The Court
reasoned that the State had sanctioned the private group's actions by delegating to
it, by statute, the power to set voter qualifications. 94 The Court reached a similar
conclusion in Smith v. Allwright, in which the Democratic Party itself prevented
blacks from voting in party primaries.9 5 In striking down the party's action,396 the
Court articulated how state-sanctioned quasi-structural process claims can be
repugnant to the Constitution:
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants
to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials
without restriction by any state because of race. This grant to the people
of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a state through
casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization
to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights
would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.397
Finally, in Terry v. Adams, the Court recognized that private political organizations
(separate from political parties whose candidates are selected through state-run
elections) also can unconstitutionally deny voters the ability to cast a vote at the
decision-making stage of the election process.398 Terry presents a good bridge to

PRIMARY IN TEXAS (1979).

"' See Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1927). The challenge also could be
viewed as a pure process claim in the sense that the Texas statute absolutely barred black
participation in the Democratic primaries. This Article, however, refers to it as a state-created
quasi-structural claim because individual black voters still could participate in the general
election, even though the actual selection of the elected official already had been made in the
Democratic primary.
392

See id. at 540-41.

286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
'94 See id at 85-89. The case contained elements of both state-created and state-sanctioned
quasi-structural process claims. It was state-created in the sense that the state enacted a
statute giving power to the party executive committees to set voter qualifications. It was statesanctioned in the sense that the party placed a restriction on black voters that was endorsed
by the State.
39' 321 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1944).
396 See id at 665-66.
397 Id. at 664.
393

398 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,469-70 (1953) (plurality opinion). The Court explained

why the state-sanctioned quasi-structural process claim was unlawful:

The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years
has been that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. The
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another type of state-sanctioned quasi-procedural process claim: The Jaybird
primaries that excluded black voters also may be viewed as a form of candidateslating.3 The challenged primaries in Terry were used as a mechanism to create a
slate of candidates that would be endorsed by the organization. A majority of white
voters then generally would support the candidates on the slate when they voted in
Democratic Party primaries."' As already discussed, the Court found this type of
candidate-slating to be unconstitutional because the election decision was made when
the slate was put together, and blacks were excluded from participating in this
decision.40 '
Another example of candidate-slating is found in Graves v. Barnes,"2 a
challenge to legislative reapportionment in two Texas counties. In Graves, the court
found that the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government, a private organization
like the Jaybirds, virtually could ensure election of its slate.40 3 The organization
allowed blacks to participate in the recruitment process for candidates who would be
included on the slate, but made its decisions without the participation of black
voters.4" The Court concluded:
[T]he plaintiffs have shown that Negroes in Dallas County are permitted
to enter the political process in any meaningful manner only through the
benevolence of the dominant white majority. If participation is to be
labeled "effective" then it certainly must be a matter of right, and not a
function of grace.4 "5
The lesson of Terry and Graves is instructive. When a state-sanctioned quasistructural process impedes the ability of individual voters to participate at the

Democratic primary and the general election have become no more than the
perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections
from which Negroes have been excluded.... The effect of the whole procedure,
Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus general election, is to do precisely
that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids-strip Negroes of every vestige of
influence in selecting matters that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens.
Id.
...
See Chandler Davidson & Luis Ricardo Fraga, NonpartisanSlating Groups in an AtLarge Setting, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 119 ("A nonpartisan slating
group is defimed as an organization whose purpose is to recruit candidates, nominate them,
and campaign for their election to office in a nonpartisan election system."). Candidateslating allows local citizen groups to combine their support for a "slate" of candidates for
various offices, effectively making a nonpartisan slating group the "gatekeeper to public
office." Id. at 120. For additional examples of candidate-slating, see id. at 119-43.
400 See Terry, 345 U.S. at 463-65.
401 See id.at 467,
402 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (three judge panel), affd in part,rev'd in part sub
nom. White v. Regester, 421 U.S. 755 (1973).
403 See Graves, 343 F. Supp. at 726.
41
405

See id.
Id
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decision-making stage of the election process, then their right to vote has been taken
away in just as effective a manner as if a pure process restriction barring all access
to the political process had been implemented.
Quasi-structural process claims that are state-created may be contrasted with
those that are state-sanctioned because their very nature typically makes them less
protected.0 6 For example, majority vote requirements4 7 or anti-single shot
provisions,"S by themselves, are not necessarily discriminatory either in their purpose
or their effect.40 9 As a plurality of the Court observed in Bolden, a majority vote
406 Obviously, there are exceptions to this more limited protection. See supra notes 391-92
and accompanying text.
407

A majority vote requirement mandates that 'icandidate receive a majority of the vote

in order to be elected. If no candidate receives a majority of the vote, then a runoff election
is held. A majority vote requirement can work against minority candidates who might be able
to muster a plurality of the vote, only to lose in the runoff election to a candidate supported
by the group in the majority. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution-An Overview,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 6; accordBeer v. United States, 425 U.S.

130, 160 n.22 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). As a result, majority vote requirements can
preclude minority voters from having a voice in the political process at the stage of the
election at which the candidate is selected.
40' The Court has described bullet (single-shot) voting
as follows:
Consider [a] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election to
choose four council members. Each voter is able to cast four votes. Suppose
there are eight white candidates, with the votes of the whites split among them
approximately equally, and one black candidate, with all the blacks voting for
him and no one else. The result is that each white candidate receives about 300
votes and the black candidate receives 400 votes. The black has probably won
a seat. This technique is called single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a
minority group to win some at-large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a
limited number of candidates and if the vote of the majority is divided among a
number of candidates.
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980) (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 206-07 (1975)). A number of

anti-single shot devices exist. Full-slate laws do not count ballots in which the voter has not
selected choices for every open office. Numbered-place laws require candidates to select a
particular place on the ballot (such as "Commissioner 1" or "Commissioner 2") and then
limit voters to casting one vote for each place on the ballot. Staggered terms limit the number
of offices in any given election, frustrating single-shot voting by either eliminating (when
there is only one position) or decreasing a voter's ability to withhold votes for other
positions. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution-An Overview, in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 6-7; Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief
History, in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 25 n.63; U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 207-08.
409 In fact, a majority vote requirement actually is consistent with the republican principle
of majority rule. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court has held that
under a winner-take-all system, the mere fact that one party loses year after year does not
mean that members of that party have been denied a right to vote. See Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986)
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requirement "is the same basic electoral system that is followed by literally thousands
of municipalities and other local governmental units throughout the Nation. '"t" Some
other feature of the election system in question must interact with the majority-vote
requirement or anti-single shot provision to state a cognizable quasi-structural
process claim. Furthermore, a reviewing court must examine election outcomes (a
group right) in assessing such claims. For example, in City ofPortArthur v. United
States,4 1' the Court upheld the lower court's decision to condition preclearance under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on the requirement that the majority-vote
requirement be eliminated for at-large non-mayoral candidates for municipal office." 2
The Court reached its decision, not on the basis that there was anything inherently
wrong with a majority-vote requirement, but because of the impact the requirement
had on black voters when combined with an at-large election system and widespread
racially polarized voting by white voters.413 Similarly, in City of Rome v. United
States, the Court upheld the lower court's conclusion that the mere presence of
certain anti-single shot provisions alone did not allow the black plaintiffs to state a
quasi-structural process claim, because the provisions "would not have the effect of
forcing head-to-head contests between Negroes and whites and depriving Negroes
of the opportunity to elect a candidate by single-shot voting. '41 4
It should now be evident that when the Court evaluates quasi-structural process
claims, it also must make certain substantive choices. These choices are less
problematic for the Court the closer the facts of the case approximate those raised in
a pure process claim. In other words, the Court prefers a case in which there is a
denial of electoral access (an individual right) which the Court believes can be
protected in a principled fashion. As a result, when a state-created feature (such as

([T]he power to influence the political process is not limited to winning
elections. An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing
candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning
candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other
voters in the district.).
410 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the
use of majority vote requirements in conjunction with at-large elections).
41 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
412 See id. at 166-68.
413 See id. at 167-68. The Court also reasoned that eliminating the majority-vote
requirement was a "reasonable hedge" against the possibility that the new election plan was
designed with a discriminatory purpose, in light of two previous plans that had such a
purpose. Id. at 168.
414 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 185. For additional consideration of anti-single shot voting
provisions as the basis for quasi-structural process claims, see City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 134-36 (1983) (holding that continued use of numbered-post and
staggered terms in an election system did not violate section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
because, although the anti-single shot provisions could "have a discriminatory effect under
some circumstances," there was no retrogressive effect). Cf Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
520 U.S. 471,479-80 (1997) (implying that a different result is possible under section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, which looks at discriminatory effects of voting features).
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the state law in Nixon v. Herndon"5) or a state-sanctioned practice (such as the
candidate-slating in Terry v. Adams and Graves v. Barnes4" 6) actually precludes voter
access in a critical stage of the election process, the Court can treat the challenged
feature or practice like an illegitimate restraint on the republican principle of
consent.4" 7 Conversely, state-created mechanisms that do not deny voter access
completely raise harder questions, because the Court must determine how much of
an effect those mechanisms have on the weight of ballots measured under election
outcomes (a group right) and balance those effects with the right of majority rule.
Nevertheless, when the challenged mechanisms interact with other features of the
voting system to allow majority factionalism to deny a group of voters oftheir ability
to consent at a key stage of the electoral process, Madisonian democracy similarly
requires the Court to invalidate those mechanisms." 8 Like all types of voting rights
claims, substantive decisions are an inevitable part of evaluating quasi-structural
claims. The key is for the Court, as judicial referee, to strike an appropriate balance
between protecting the consent of the minority and the principle of majority rule.
3. "Geography Process" Claims
"Geography process" claims allege that election districts have been devised in
a manner which prevents a group4 19 of voters from voting or having a meaningful say
in the selection of those representatives who would be amenable to representing those
voters' interests.42 These claims encompass annexations,4 2' deannexations that

4 See supra notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
416 See supra notes 398-405 and accompanying text.
417 See supra notes 367-82 and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. To hold otherwise would allow a
cohesive majority factiofn to circumvent pure process limitations simply by adopting a quasistructural process impediment to a minority group's participation. Such impediments can
disenfranchise minority voters just as effectively as the outright denial of the ballot. See
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A BriefHistory, in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY
VOTING, supra note 9, at 21-24.
...Cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(In adopting districting plans ... States do not treat people as individuals.
Apportionment schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in groups. States
do not assign voters to districts based on merit or achievement, standards States
might use in hiring employees or engaging contractors [i.e., individuals]. Rather,
legislators classify voters in groups-by economic, geographical, political, or
social characteristics-and then "reconcile the competing claims of [these]
groups." (emphasis added) (citation omitted));
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In districting... the mere
placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit
provided to others .... 'Dilution' . . .refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an
individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of the group."
(emphasis added)). But see sources cited supra note 240.
420 Geographical process claims, as discussed in this context, are distinguishable from a
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exclude voters from the political process,"' assertions that the size of a political
subdivision has the effect of excluding a voter from the political process regardless
of whether or not it was intended to do so,423 and gerrymandering.424 A geography
"one person, one vote" claim in which "absolute population equality [is] the paramount
objective." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983); see also Still, supranote 350, at
378-80 (labeling the "one person, one vote" mandate as "equal shares," which states that
"[e]ach voter has the same 'share' in the election, defined as what that voter voted on divided
by the number of voters who voted on it"); see generally BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 293,
at 26-33 (describing the legal development of "one person, one vote"); GROFMAN, LEGACY,
supra note 323, at 1-4, 7-8. Unlike equal population challenges, these claims require an
examination of how the votes cast relate to election outcomes. In this sense, they can
implicate two additional criteria for fair election systems described by Jonathon Still:
"[e]qual [p]robabilities," the idea that "[e]ach voter has the same statistical probability of
casting a vote which decides the election (under certain assumptions);" and "[a]nonymity,"
which holds that "[t]he result of the election is the same under all possible distributions of
voters among the positions in the structure of the election system." Still, supra note 350, at
380-83; GROFMAN, LEGACY, supra note 323, at 40 n.65 ("[G'errymandering exists when
votes are not accorded the same weight"); cf DAHL, supra note 71, at 65 ("The condition of
political equality evidently requires 'interchangeability,' i.e., the interchange of an equal
number of individuals from one side to another would not affect the outcome of the
decision."). Consequently, geographical process claims move
beyond the equal right to the franchise [a pure process claim] and the right to an
equally weighted vote [one person, one vote] to a third political right-the right
to a meaningful or undiluted vote. This line of reasoning holds that, even if an
individual has the right to vote, and even if that vote is equally weighted, the
districting arrangement [whether single or multi-member] can still be unequal
and hence unfair.
BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 293, at 33-34.
421 See generally City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975)
(holding that annexations driven by the purpose of depriving blacks of the right to vote "have
no credentials whatsoever").
422

See discussion of Gomillion v. Lightfoot infra notes 425-31 and accompanying text.

For a more detailed discussion of geographical process claims based upon size through
the use of at-large districts, see generally Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large
423

Elections and Minority Group Representation-A Reexamination of Historical and
ContemporaryEvidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 65-81 (describing
the "effects of at-large or multimember-district elections on the opportunities of ethnic
minority groups to participate effectively in the political process").
424 "Gerrymandering covers any redistricting practice which maximizes the political
advantage or votes of one group, and minimizes the political advantage or votes of another."
Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment,in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 85; see also Michael McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom,
DetectingGerrymandering,in GERRYMANDERING, supra note 240, at 178 ("Gerrymandering
is the drawing of electoral district lines so as to assign unequal voting weights to cognizable
political groups."). In another sense, gerrymandering represents the ultimate perversion of
the political process, when it is used to protect incumbents and candidates of the dominant
political party: "[T]he final result seems not one in which the people select their
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process claim resembles most state-created quasi-structural process claims because
it is group-oriented, allows individual participation at all stages of the election
process (although not necessarily within a particular political division), but still
denies members of the group the ability to decide elections. Reviewing courts
usually must engage in a complex inquiry of examining election outcomes,
motivations of the officials who drew the district, as well as other features of the
voting system, with the particular evidence required to state a claim depending on the
specific facts of the case. The difficulty in devising a principled method for engaging
in this type of factual inquiry and its tension with second-guessing the inherently
political choices embodied in the election system explains why the Court has
accorded less protection for geographical process claims than pure process and quasistructural process claims.
On the other hand, it is evident that the closer such a claim approximates
complete exclusion of a particular group of voters, the more likely the Court will find
that claim cognizable. Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 5 is perhaps the best example of a
geography process claim in which a districting scheme had been designed to exclude
a group of voters completely.426 The city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama initially
formed the shape of a square. In 1957, the Alabama legislature passed a local act that
altered the city limits to form "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," removing from
the city all but four or five black voters and no white voters or residents.427 The black
plaintiffs challenged the act under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment and as a denial of the right to vote in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.428 The Court concluded the plaintiffs' claim was justiciable,
because if their allegations were proven, it would be "tantamount . . . to a
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating
white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them
of their pre-existing municipal vote."429 Basing its decision solely on the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Court reasoned that "[l]egislative control of municipalities, no less
than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant, limitations imposed by the
representatives, but in which the representatives have selected the people." Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 963 (1996) (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1994));
accord Samuel Issacharoff, The Redistricting Morass, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 201 ("In a democratic society, the purpose of voting is to
allow the electors to select their governors. Once a decade,'however, that process is inverted
and the governors and their political agents are permitted to select their electors."). For a
more detailed discussion of geographical process claims based upon gerrymandering, see
generally Parker, supra, at 85-117 (describing the history and techniques of gerrymandering,
as well as judicial enforcement of racial gerrymandering protections).
425 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
426 Other cases which the Court has treated like Gomillion include Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993), and its progeny, and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). See infra notes
660-94 and accompanying text.
427 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
428 See id. at 340.
429 Id. at 341.
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United States Constitution.""43 Consequently, the Court recognized that, when a
majority deliberately removes a minority group from a political division in order to
reduce or take away the group's ability to consent to government in that division, the
majority has deprived the members of that group of their right to vote. 431
A somewhat more difficult situation arises when a plaintiff alleges a geographical
process claim based upon the size of a political division where a group of voters is
not excluded entirely, as in Gomillion. As the Supreme Court recently noted, the size
and location of counties and voting districts do not necessarily have anything to do
with their impact on particular groups of voters. 432 Nonetheless, an unusually large
election district can be used as effectively as state-created quasi-structural
mechanisms such as majority vote requirements and anti-single shot provisions to
"enhance the opportunity for discrimination against [a] minority group. 43 3 Typically,

430

Id.at 344-45; see also id. at 347 ("When a State exercises power wholly within the

domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not
carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally
protected right."). Justice Whittaker concurred in the judgment, but found that the decision
should have been based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It seems to me that the "right ...to vote" that is guaranteed by the Fifteenth

Amendment is but the same right to vote as is enjoyed by all others within the
same election precinct, ward, or other political division. . . . But it does seem
clear to me that accomplishment of a State's purpose ... of "fencing Negro

citizens out of' Division A and into Division B is an unlawful segregation of
races of citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment....
Id.
at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring).
"4'But see Mark E. Rush, The Price of Unclear Precedents: Shaw v. Reno and the
Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION,

supra note 7, at 37 (discussing how the Court in Shaw v. Reno recast the issue in Gomillion
as an individualright to equal protection from discriminatory gerrymandering); MARK RUSH,
DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE?: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL

post-Gomillion
cases, "the Court came to interpret the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments together as
creating an implicit group right to representation as a function of the explicit individual right
to vote").
432 See generally Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S.Ct. 2186, 2195 (1997) ("Since
districting can be difficult, after all, just because racial composition varies from place to
place, and counties and voting districts do not depend on common principles of size and
location, facts about the one do not as such necessarily entail conclusions about the other.").
131 S. REP. NO. 417, at 29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206; see also
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (noting that vote
dilution can be demonstrated, in part, "by a showing of the existence of large districts"), affd
on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
The size of an election district can have a discriminatory effect on minority voters in a
number of ways. First, inaccessible voter registration and polling sites-for example, where
there is only one such site located in a town far removed from rural voters---can preclude or
discourage those voters from taking part in the electoral process. In addition, a large district
BEHAVIOR 22 (1993) [hereinafter RUSH, REDISTRICTING] (observing that in
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this type of geographical process claim is raised in challenges to at-large districts,
'
which the Court has concluded are "not unconstitutional per se."434
Instead, like
435
state-created quasi-structural process claims, a reviewing court must examine the
manner in which the at-large district interacts with other features of the voting system
to deny voters a meaningful voice in the selection of representatives.436 The judicial
referee may not avoid the issue merely because it is a difficult one.
Gerrymandering presents the most difficult, and correspondingly the least
protected, type of geographical process claim. Unlike redistricting,437 gerrymandering
is problematic "because definitions are frequently unclear regarding (1) who the
injured parties are, (2) what it means to be represented, and (3) what it means to be
denied a fair opportunity to be represented.""3B Quite simply, "nothing comparable
to the mathematical yardstick used in apportionment ["one person, one vote"] cases
is available to identify the difference between permissible and impermissible adverse
impacts on the voting strength of political groups.""' Nevertheless, a majority of the
Court has concluded that "[t]he mere fact.., that we may not now similarly perceive
a likely arithmetic presumption in the [gerrymandering] context does not compel a
conclusion that [such] claims.., are nonjusticiable.""' Rather, some members of
the Court have focused on whether a gerrymander violates basic principles of
electoral fairness: "[A] finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence
often restricts the ability of less well-financed minority candidates to run effective campaigns
because they lack the resources to get their message out to widely dispersed pockets of
potential voters. See BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION AND VOTING, supranote 62, at 53-114.
434City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion).
431See supra notes 406-14 and accompanying text.
436 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-27 (1982); White v. Regester,
412 U.S.
755, 765-70 (1973).
437"Redistricting" is "a benign form of altering constituency boundary lines ...whereby
legislative districts are redrawn, usually to equalize the population of each district." RUSH,
REDISTRICTING, supranote 431, at 2.
438 Id.See also RUSH, REDISTRICTING, supranote 431, at 37-3 8 (discussing the problems

the Court and political scientists have had in trying to bridge the gap between individual and
group voting behavior to come up with "a manageable and usable standard of fair group
representation").
43'Bolden, 446 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
440 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986) (holding that partisan gerrymanders
were justiciable). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist, concluded that
political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable because "[v]ote dilution analysis is far
less manageable when extended to political parties than if confined to racial minority
groups." Id.at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In an extensive study of political
gerrymandering in Connecticut and Massachusetts, Mark Rush concluded that Justice
O'Connor's concerns "about the mutability of partisanship" were supported by his analysis.
RUSH, REDISTRICTING, supra note 431, at 134. For an additional discussion of Davis v.
Bandemer and its import for voting rights claims, see, for example, GERRYMANDERING,
supra note 240; GROFMAN, LEGACY, supra note 323, at 11-15, 18-19, 29-34; RUSH,
REDISTRICTING, supra note 406, at 10-39; RICHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF DISTRICTING 29-49 (1997).
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of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to
a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process."44'
With the exception of cases in which there is nearly complete exclusion of a
group, geography process claims require reviewing courts to make a number of
difficult substantive choices in one of the most highly politicized areas of
representation. The judiciary thereby faces a double dilemma. On the one hand,
history has shown that the courts cannot ignore the harder geographical process
claims because of the intentional use and manipulation of at-large elections,
gerrymandering, and boundary changes to discriminate against cohesive groups of
minority voters." 2 On the other hand, courts are forced to determine in such cases
how much representation for a group is enough to make it "fair," without the benefit
of any principled standards to guide them in drawing that baseline-and in direct
contravention to the will of the people as expressed through the political body
responsible for districting. As illustrated in the discussion of Shaw v. Reno in Part
III,"' the Court has complicated this problem further by holding that race may be
considered in districting, but cannot predominate over traditional districting

441

Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (plurality decision of four justices). Justice Stevens, who wrote

the majority opinion in Davis, previously had outlined the essential elements he believed
were necessary to state a political gerrymandering claim:
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs must show that they are members of an
identifiable political group whose voting strength has been diluted. They must
first prove that they belong to a politically salient class, one whose geographical
distribution is sufficiently ascertainable that it could have been taken into
account in drawing district boundaries. Second, they must prove that in the
relevant district or districts or in the State as a whole, their proportionate voting
influence has been adversely affected by the challenged scheme. Third, plaintiffs
must make a prima facie showing that raises a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.
Karcher v. Doggett, 462 U.S. 725, 754-55 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and
footnotes omitted); cf Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (requiring proof of
geographical compactness, political cohesiveness, and racially polarized voting to state a
racial gerrymandering claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). For additional
discussion of current theories and methods of analyzing gerrymanders, see RUSH,
REDISTRICTING, supra note 431, at 57-72.
442 See generallyPerkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 (1971) (discussing findings of
the United States Civil Rights Commission on the use of discriminatory geographical
process mechanisms to circumvent the Voting Rights Act); Chandler Davidson, Minority
Vote Dilution-An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supranote 19, at 5, 8-9; Frank
R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment,in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION, supra note 19, at 85-117; J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First
Reconstruction-Lessonsfor the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 19, at 3137.
441 See infra notes 581-848 and accompanying text.
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factors." These restrictions make it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile political
fairness with fairness to racial or ethnic groups."'
It would seem that if the majority is prevented from denying the consent of a
minority directly, through either a pure process or quasi-structural process
impediment, then under a Madisonian model, it also would be prevented from
denying the consent of a minority indirectly through manipulation of geographical
boundaries. That is not the case, however, when a court is forced to make
substantive decisions with little or no guidance in assessing a geographical process
claim. Many members of the Court have expressed misgivings about making
decisions in what they view as political theory, not adjudication, and would leave
most geographical claims unprotected." 6 But in this sense, geographical process
claims really are no different from pure process or quasi-structural process claims:
The Court is not compelled to create a political theory in these cases, but to enforce
one (protection of minority consent from the tyranny of majority factionalism), albeit
with more difficult substantive decisions to make in evaluating the fairness of
political districting systems. If the courts fail to maintain their role as referees over
geographical process claims, history has shown that it is but a simple matter for the
majority to render meaningless the formal right of any minority group to vote.
4. "Submersion Process" or "Perverted Process" Claims
"Submersion process" or "perverted process" claims aver that a voter's voice is
drowned out or diluted by sustained bloc voting of another group or groups of voters.
In other words, this category identifies those claims in which there is no identifiable
pure process impediment-that is, there is no state-created or state-used electoral
device which bars a voter from actually casting his ballot (no denial of election
access)-but the process nevertheless is perverted by precluding the voter and his
group from having a meaningful voice in the political process." 7 Vote dilution
44 See generallyMiller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903-05, 920 (1995) (holding that strict
scrutiny applies when race predominates over traditional districting criteria). Traditional
districting criteria include compactness, contiguity, preservation of communities of interest,
respect for political boundaries and topographical features, and protection of incumbents. See
BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 293, at 66-90; SCHER ET AL., supranote 440, at 149-65; Timothy
G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND

supranote 7.
...See SCHER ET AL., supra note 440, at 144-47; Samuel Issacharoff, The Redistricting
Morass, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 201-20.
446 See supra note 322; infra notes 595-98, 617.
417 As Judge Tjoflat observed in his plurality opinion in Nipper v. Smith, "[c]ases alleging
a distortion of group.voting power of this type have been termed 'qualitative' (as opposed
to quantitative) reapportionment cases because they focus 'not on population-based
apportionment but on the quality of representation."' Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1510
(11 th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (quoting
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971) (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1083 (1995).
REPRESENTATION,
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claims brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act fall squarely within this
category. Proof of perverted process claims typically requires showing evidence of
quasi-structural process or geography process barriers,4 48 and how the presence of
those impediments has interacted with majority bloc voting to give members of a
minority group "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.""' 9 Consequently,
perverted process claims have all of the attendant difficulties of the other process
democracy claims, in addition to some of their own and, hence, are less protected.
Although perverted process claims can include both individual and group
characteristics (particularly when there is evidence of state-sanctioned quasistructural impediments45 ), their focus on election outcomes makes them inherently
group-based.4"' The central place of electoral outcomes in proving perverted process
claims452 creates what detractors of section 2 find to be the principal reason to deny
them any protection at all: Like geography process claims, there is no baseline for a
court to determine how much voting strength a group must receive in order to have
fair and equal access to the political process.453 Also weighing very heavily against
judicial intrusion into this area is the fact that it requires the courts to engage in the
seemingly antidemocratic action of second-guessing the will of the majority, one of
the foundations of republican government.454 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the
Court has been willing to provide limited protection for some perverted process
claims. The Court has denied protection to cases, however, in which it has
determined that it has been unable to discern a benchmark to which it may compare
the challenged structure or mechanism.455

See S. REP. NO. 417, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
450 See supranotes 389-413 and accompanying text.
451 See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups:
groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not."); cf sources cited supra note
221 (summarizing commentary on whether the right to vote is an individual or a group right).
452 The results test of section 2 mandates an examination of election outcomes
as part of
the analysis in determining whether a group of voters has been denied equal access to the
political process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994); see also infra notes 507-80 and
accompanying text.
...For Justice Thomas's discussion of this problem in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994), see infratext accompanying note 617; see also Abigail Themstrom, More Notesfrom
a PoliticalThicket, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 112
("Unequal electoral opportunity was inevitably an elusive concept . . . .As Justice
Frankfurter observed (dissenting in Baker v. Carr), we can only know if voters are
improperly represented if we know what it means to be properly represented. And yet we lack
a theoretical framework to decide." (footnote omitted)).
4 See supranote 25.
...See infra notes 649-59 and accompanying text.
448

49
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The last two Parts of this Article will discuss in greater detail the problems of
judicial regulation of perverted process claims.456 This Article will show how it is
possible to place principled limits on the courts to protect the consent of minorities
from perversions in the political process. At the same time, the courts will not have
to sacrifice the basic axiom of majority rule or impose their own democratic theory
on other branches of government. Indeed, it will become evident that, unless the
judiciary is willing to fulfill its constitutional role of overseeing the political process,
there is little preventing majority factionalism from rendering the Madisonian
equation of consent of the governed to nothing more than an empty plebiscite to
endorse the majority's predetermined choices.
5. "Parliamentary Process" Claims and Legislative Outcomes
45 claims lie on the opposite
"Parliamentary process""
end of the continuum from
pure process claims. This type of claim maintains that a voter cannot have a
meaningful voice in government unless her representative actually is able to influence
government decisions-thereby securing "fair and effective" representation for the
voter.45 In this sense, parliamentary process democracy adopts a submersion process
or perverted process claim and applies it to the legislative body in question. Thus,
if a representative's voice is drowned out or diluted by sustained bloc voting of other
legislators, then it is said that the voter lacks a voice in the political process.5 9 In
addition, parliamentary process democracy also encompasses specific instances in
which a voter's voice in government either is not present or not loud enough to
prevent the legislative body in question from passing a law which discriminates

See infra notes 581-851 and accompanying text.
...The term "parliamentary process" is used here to refer to claims based upon
parliamentary law and its outcomes. "Parliamentary law" is defined as "[t]he general body
of enacted rules (e.g., Roberts Rules of Order) and recognized usages which governs the
procedure of legislative assemblies and other deliberative bodies . . . ." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1116 (6th ed. 1990).
458 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964). On the other hand, it is absurd to
suggest that the voter herself must be allowed to participate directly in government decisions
in order for outcomes to be legitimate. The Court has rejected such an argument expressly.
See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1984).
419 Cf GUINIER, supra note 16, at 8 (describing bloc voting as a
"third generation" voting
rights problem requiring the policing of "the legislative voting rules whereby a majority
consistently rigs the process to exclude a minority").
[I]nterest representation does not end with electoral reforms. Rather, it looks into
the legislative body itself to make sure the discrete and insular minority problem
is not replicated there through seemingly neutral rules that have disparate effects
on minority representatives. It is important to bear in mind that in its evaluation
of the internal legislative processes, interest representation focuses not on
guaranteeing that minorities achieve the substantive results desired, but on
adopting voting procedures that enhance the quality of the deliberative process.
456

Id. at 117-18.
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against that voter and her group. The Court has treated outcomes resulting from the
parliamentary process like other process democracy claims: The closer legislative
outcomes approximate harm to individuals by classifying benefits or burdens in a
discriminatory manner, the more likely they will be protected.
The Founding Fathers were sympathetic to parliamentary process claims and
protection from some of the attendant outcomes. Hamilton described how the
"firmness of the judicial magistracy... not only serves to moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those [unjust laws] which may have been passed, but it operates as a
check upon the legislative body passing them.'" In the same vein, Jefferson spoke
of the "sacred principle, that although the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their
equal rights, which equal laws must protect and to violate which would be
oppression."' Madison similarly recognized that the causes of majority factionalism
which denied the consent of a particular segment of the governed could be controlled
only through the "effects" of that factionalism. 2 In other words, consent itself would
become an empty, formalized exercise if a majority was allowed consistently and
systematically to deny fair outcomes to a minority, even where that minority had
some members in the elected body.463 Moreover, to the extent the majority denies
others the opportunity to have any voice at the stage of the process when government
decisions are
actually made, the outcomes themselves would be rendered
illegitimate. 4"'
Nevertheless, the Court has rejected parliamentary process claims, even when a
legislative body has adopted measures that indirectly affect the value of the right to
vote. In Presley v. Etowah County Commission,46 Etowah County, Alabama had
been governed by a five member county commission, elected at-large and comprised
of four members elected from districts in which the member had to reside and a
chairman who was not subject to the residency requirement. The commissioners
" THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton); see also supra
notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
461 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1985).
462 'THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 46, at 80 (James Madison).
463 Cf ELY, supra note 95, at 84 ("[C]ertain groups that are technically enfranchised have
found themselves for long stretches in a state of persistent inability to protect themselves
from pervasive forms of discriminatory treatment. Such groups might just as well be
disenfranchised.").
" See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text. In his dissent in Bolden, Justice
Marshall anticipated the danger of permitting unfettered majority discrimination against a
particular group: in the absence of legal redress, the victims of that discrimination would
have no incentive "to respect political channels." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
465 502 U.S. 491 (1992). The Court also considered a claim against Russell County,
Alabama. See id at 498-99, 506-08. For purposes of clarity and because of the similarities
between the effect of the changes made in the two county commissions, however, this
discussion will be limited to Etowah County.
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from each of the four residency districts controlled the use of funds allocated to their
own district by the commission for a road shop, crew, and equipment used in road
construction and repairs.' In 1986, a consent decree restructured the commission
and established six residency districts. One of the two new residency districts elected
a black commissioner.4"7 In 1987, the commission passed a resolution that allowed
the four holdover commissioners to continue individual management of the road shop
in each of their districts and to oversee jointly the construction and maintenance of
all the roads in the county. The two new commissioners, who voted against the
resolution, were given other responsibilities. 4 68 In addition, the commission passed
a "common fund" resolution that took away the power of individual commissioners
to determine how road funds were spent in his or her district and transferred that
power to the commission as a whole.469
When confronted with a challenge to the common fund resolution under section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court held that no parliamentary process claim could
be stated.47 The majority applied a narrow reading of section 5, and found that the
resolution had "no connection to votingprocedures,"but instead only concerned "the
internal operations of an elected body" and the "power of elected officials."4 7 The
majority especially was troubled by the inability to draw "lines between those
governmental decisions that involve voting and those that do not," and found the
absence of a "workable standard" to be a compelling basis to reject the plaintiffs'
claim.4 72 The majority seemed unconcerned with the fact that the reallocation of
See id at 495-96.
See id.
468 See id.
at 496-97. Presley, the black commissioner and plaintiff in the case, was
assigned oversight for maintenance of the county courthouse, while Williams, a white
commissioner, was assigned oversight of the county engineering department. See id at 497.
469 See id.
470 See id.
at 503. Prior to Presley, other lower courts permitted outcome democracy
claims to be stated when there was a reallocation of the power of elected officials. See, e.g.,
Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (three judge panel); Horry County v.
United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978) (three judge panel). But see Rojas v. Victoria
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.V-87-16, 1988 WL 92053 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1988) (rejecting
outcome democracy claim when school board policy changed to require approval of two
board members to place an item on the school board's meeting agenda), afftd, 490 U.S. 1001
(1989).
47' Etowah, 502 U.S. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
472 Id. at 504; cf Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994) (rejecting a challenge to
the
size of an elected body because "where there is no objective and workable standard for
choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it
follows that the voting practice cannot be challenged as dilutive under § 2" of the Voting
Rights Act). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun in dissent, contended
a workable standard was possible:
At the very least, I would hold that the reallocation of decision-making authority
of an elective office that is taken (1) after the victory of a black candidate, and
(2) after the entry of a consent decree designed to give black voters an
opportunity to have representation on an elective body, is covered by § 5.
466
467
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power in the commission (a parliamentary process claim) could be an indirect means
of undermining a minority group's equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice (a perverted process claim).473 Instead, in Etowah, the Court rejected the
parliamentary process claim to avoid the slippery slope of determining a stopping
point for the "all but limitless minor changes in the allocation of power among
officials and the constant adjustments required for the efficient governance of every
...State" covered under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.4 74 Thus, when the only
process democracy violation is in the parliamentary process, courts generally will
reject that claim.
Conversely, the Court actually has afforded greater protection to claims based
upon unequal outcomes than to the discriminatory parliamentary process which
generated them. The accepted contemporary view of outcomes holds that, under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "individuals [must] be
treated in a manner similar to others ....in all governmental actions which classify
' Intuitively, this type
individuals for different benefits or burdens under the law."475
ofjudicial protection makes sense. If courts were precluded from intervening in such
Etowah, 502 U.S. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
...The right to cast a ballot has more than just symbolic value-it also is a means to have
a voice in the allocation of government outcomes. See infra note 491. If a majority simply
can abrogate the newly acquired political power of a minority group by ensuring the
minority's representatives have no say in government outcomes, then process democracy
rights are rendered nothing more than a symbolic act. The minority group might just as well
not elect any representatives because the result is the same. Majority factionalism has denied
the minority group of their ability to have any say-i.e., consent-at the critical decisionmaking stage of government. Cf The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106
HARV.

L. REV. 367, 372 (1992)

(The counties' actions ... did something more than redistribute power: they

transferred the decision-making authority of a black official elected from a
predominately black district to a body or individual controlled by the majority
of voters, rendering a vote for county commissioner by a resident of that district
virtually meaningless. Under the Court's prior interpretations, this is the very
result section 5 was meant to eliminate.).
The Etowah decision has been criticized widely on this point. See, e.g., GUINIER, supranote
16, at 179-81; Grofman & Handley, supra note 20, at 235-37; Karlan, supra note 51, at
1723-26.
414Etowah, 502 U.S. at 506. To avoid the slippery slope, in Etowah, the Court went on
to hold that section 5 typically only applies to four types of voting changes: (1) "the manner
of voting"; (2) "candidacy requirements and qualifications"; (3) "the composition of the
electorate that may vote for candidates" of a particular office; and (4) "affecting the creation
or abolition of an elective office." Id at 502-03. On remand, the Etowah plaintiffs argued the
challenged resolution fit within the third and fourth categories of cases. See Mack v. Russell
County Comm'n, 840 F. Supp. 869, 873-74 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (three judge panel) (per
curiam). The lower court disagreed, finding the plaintiffs' arguments rested upon the
assumption that "a shift in authority among elected officials is a change in voting that
requires preclearance," a view which the Supreme Court expressly had rejected. Id.at 874.
471 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568 (4th ed. 1991).
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cases, there would be little to prevent a well-disciplined majority faction from
trampling on the rights of those in the minority. These legislative outcome cases
invoke well-established constitutional standards that seem to require little in the way
of substantive judicial decisions.476
As a result, in easier cases appearing to fit neatly within standard equal protection
doctrine, the courts are willing to protect minorities from adverse legislative
outcomes. In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi,477 for example, evidence
showed extensive disparities between municipal services provided to whites and
blacks. Nearly ninety-eight percent of all homes that fronted on unpaved streets were
owned by blacks. 478 Similarly, ninety-seven percent of all homes not served by
municipal sanitary sewers were owned by blacks. 479 Black residential areas also had
less powerful street lights, less adequate surface water drains, and fewer water mains,
fire hydrants, and traffic control signs than white residential areas. 4"0 The Fifth
Circuit in Hawkins recognized that it was adjudicating a legislative outcome claim
with a simple solution. It had a "most reliable yardstick-namely, the quality and
quantity of municipal services provided in the white area of town" which made
comparing the black and white areas "hardly an insuperable judicial task. '48 ' In
addition, the court stated its opinion squarely in Madisonian terms. Citing The
FederalistNo. 48, the Fifth Circuit reasoned its judicial intervention was acceptable
under the system of checks and balances to preserve the integrity of the local
government in question. 2 Other courts have reached similar conclusions under
comparable circumstances.

Of course, such cases do require reviewing courts to make substantive decisions about
what types of classifications are constitutional. Discussion of judicial decision-making in
these types of outcome democracy cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
477437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affdon reh'gen banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam).
478 See Hawkins, 437 F.2d at
1288.
479See id.
480 See id
481 Id. at 1292.
482 See id On rehearing, the en banc panel held that it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs
to prove that the municipal officials had discriminatory motive, intent, or purpose. See
Hawkins, 461 F.2d at 1172. The Supreme Court subsequently disagreed with that conclusion.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 & n.12 (1976).
483 See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, Florida, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Johnson
v.
City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978); see also Florida Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613, 631-32 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases of unpaved roads, denial of
government employment, and segregated schools as examples of outcome democracy claims
that "[n]o one could legitimately question"); Greene v. City of Memphis, 535 F.2d 976 (6th
Cir. 1976) (holding that an outcome democracy claim stated against the mayor and city
476

council chairman, where benefit of street closings to create greater privacy and quiet, was

conferred on white but not black residential areas), appeal after remand, 610 F.2d 395 (6th
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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When there is no impediment to ballot access, and without these simpler types
of equal protection problems, however, courts rarely are sympathetic to claims
focusing on disparate legislative outcomes. The judiciary has been unequivocal in
its stand that "the right to an 'effective' vote refers to the citizen's right to make his
voice heard in the electoral process, and not to the ability to command results in the
public office." '84 Similarly, no process democracy claim can be stated for a failure
to achieve proportional representation.48 In addition, there certainly is no basic
constitutional entitlement of an individual or group to allocations of government
benefits8 6 so long as those benefits are not distributed "on an unconstitutional
basis. 48 7 The Court's discomfort with examining legislative outcomes arises from
its general rejection of a substantive due process approach to constitutional
analysis. " From a more fundamental standpoint, protection of substantive outcomes

""'Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1983); accord Kardules v. City of
Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1358 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., concurring).
485 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (stating that nothing in section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act "establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population."); Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
84-86, 94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[U]nder § 2... we... know that Congress
did not intend to create a right to proportional representation for minority voters." Id. at 84.);
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation
as an imperative of political organization."); id. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (holding that the Constitution does not
protect any group from defeat at the polls). While there is no right to "descriptive"
proportional representation exists, nothing can prevent a governmental body from attempting
to achieve "functional" proportional representation so long as it acts within tolerable
constitutional limits. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973); see also supra
notes 250-51, 255 and accompanying text; infra notes 554, 639-40 and accompanying text
(describing descriptive representation and and proportionate descriptive representation).
486 See, e.g., Danbridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
487 ELY, supranote 95, at 145.
488 Early on, the Court summarily rejected the idea of substantive due process in the

Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). However, substantive due process
later was revived by and enjoyed its clearest expression in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). The Court abandoned the doctrine in 1937, see
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and, except for Justice Stone's famous
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
substantive due process largely has remained discredited. The Court's present position is
"only to actively guard fundamental constitutional values and . . . should allow other

branches of government great latitude in dealing with issues of 'economics and social
welfare' which do not touch upon these values." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 475, at
379. For an additional discussion of substantive due process, see, for example, John
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the ConstitutionalText, 83 VA. L. REV. 493 (1997);
G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Processand Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 87, 107-28 (1997).
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is much less principled than ensuring purely procedural access. A focus on outcomes
quickly can become a slippery slope, on which the Court is forced to engage in the
type of substantive decision-making for which it is certainly less qualified than a duly
elected legislative body. Besides, such judicial interference would seem to be the
quintessential violation of basic democratic standards.
As a result, when there is no ready application of equal protection standards to
discriminatory classifications, few scholars would support an outcome-oriented claim
seeking equal distribution of government benefits. Professor Kenneth Karst suggests
that there is an illusory distinction "between equalizing opportunity and equalizing
result." ' 9 Similarly, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that "[j]udicial scrutiny of
the legislative process might take the form of a more serious inquiry into both process
and outcome ... to ensure that what emerges is genuinely public rather than a
'
In the context of voting, what
reflection of existing relations of private power."49
good is it to have an "equal opportunity" to vote if that right merely shifts the place
of exclusion from the ballot box to the legislature? The result is the same.49 ' Out of
fairness to Karst and Sunstein, however, their comments should not be viewed as
mandating formal equality to be taken so far as to require equal outcomes under all
circumstances. Rather, it is perhaps more accurate to say that they would examine
legislative outcomes as a means of determining whether the consent of a particular
group of citizens has been denied in the parliamentary process. In this sense, their
statements implying equality of outcomes are consistent with what others have said
on the subject. 92
supra note 51, at 39; see also id at 135 ("To speak of equal citizenship as a
status goal ... is to identify an objective that includes a measure of substantive equality along
with formal equality before the law."); id at 213 ("The concerns of full citizenship go beyond
formal equality and encompass a measure of substantive justice.").
490 Sunstein, supra note 56, at 86.
491 It is fair to say that most people expect that the exercise of the franchise is more than
just a symbolic act, but should be tied to having some voice in the distribution of government
benefits and burdens. See generally Karen I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges
to Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851; 901
(1982) ("Although the right to vote may have inherent symbolic value, for the individual the
practical value comes from the ability to join a vote with those of others to influence election
outcomes and ultimately the legislative process."); Frickey, supra note 283, at 308 (observing
that the "realistic focus [of Judge Wisdom's voting rights decisions] upon actual political
outcomes is more of a pragmatic recognition that the true goal is fair representation, not the
vote in and of itself'); Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan
Era, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393,434 (1989) ("To keep the faith, blacks expect political
fairness. At this moment in history, political fairness for blacks means a fair opportunity to
choose their representatives, a fair shake in administrative enforcement that protects minority
voting rights, and a fair share of substantive, legislative policy outcomes.").
492 Cf DAHL, supra note 71, at 145
([Being heard] at some crucial stage in the process of decision .... does not
mean that every group has equal control over the outcome .... [but that] it
makes a noise .... [and] that one or more officials are not only ready to listen
489
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Other commentators have refrained from drawing any connection between the
right to vote and substantive outcomes. Professor John Hart Ely, who built his entire
constitutional construct for protecting minority rights as a purely procedural model,493
emphasized that "[o]ur government cannot fairly be said to be 'malfunctioning'
simply because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree." ' Abigail
Themstrom is even more direct in her conclusion that "[d]emocracies guarantee a
'
fair political process, but no particular results. Opportunity, not outcome."4 95
Thernstrom's pure process approach, in which only individual access to the political
process is protected, is shared by other critics of minority voting rights:
Most critics of minority rights' litigation insist on a strictly procedural
interpretation of political equality, arguing that equality should be tested
against input (are all individuals equally enfranchised?) and not against
output as well. Political equality is then conceived only as a matter of
establishing equality between individuals, and any additional
preoccupation with balancing the relative power of different groups is
viewed as an illegitimate intrusion on the democratic agenda.496
The judiciary often has expressed the same skepticism as these commentators.
Outside of the context of easy equal protection cases, courts generally are less
receptive to voting rights claims that are framed in terms of legislative outcomes.497
to the noise, but to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the
group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members);
GUINIER, supra note 16, at 14
(Outcomes are indeed relevant, but not because I seek to advance particular
ends... Rather, I look to outcomes as evidence of whether all the [members of
the community] ... feel that their choice is represented and considered. The

purpose is not to guarantee 'equal legislative outcomes'; equal opportunity to
influence legislative outcomes regardless of race is more like it.);
id at 249 n.64 ("Outcomes are considered, but only in a procedural justice sense to measure
degrees of participation by eligible voters in the decision-making process."); Abrams, supra
note 56, at 475,489 (noting that enhancing minority participation is "a dialogue about goals,"
which requires "apply[ing] a wider lens to the political process ...[by] describ[ing] the

activity that legitimized governmental power not as a single electoral event, but as a process
that began with reflection on, and discussion of, preferences and concluded with the
enactment of substantive policies.").
411 See supranotes 330-36 and accompanying text.
494 ELY,

supra note 95, at 103.

4" Abigail Themstrom, MoreNotesfrom a Political Thicket, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 99.
496 PHILLIPS, supra note 382, at 92; cf S. REP. NO. 417, at 94 (1982),
reprintedin 1982
U.S.C.A.A.N. 177, 267 (additional views of Senator Hatch) (expressing concern that the
1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, adopting a results test, "would
substitute a totally alien principle of equal results").
497 Cf.Issacharoff, PolarizedVoting, supra note 240, at 1869 ("The lesson of the past
decade is that voting rights claims gather force to the extent that process-based claims can
relieve a conservative judiciary of any obligation to police the substantive distributional
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Consequently, it is not surprising that the judicial referees are reticent to recognize
parliamentary process claims, which rely on outcomes as circumstantial evidence that
the consent of a particular group ofvoters has been denied at the legislative decisionmaking stage of the political process.
In sharp contrast, courts have made it clear that the inability to point to unfair
outcomes, because the aggrieved party is receiving fair and effective representation,
is an insufficient basis on which to defeat a claim based upon a denial of access to
the political process. One of the reasons for this distinction comes from the
incorporation of a results test in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Outcomes,
measured by the responsiveness of elected officials, are evidence of discriminatory
intent that has little relevance to assessing discriminatory impact of an election
system on a group of voters.498 Consequently, "evidence that officials meet the
functional needs of minority citizens does not overcome evidence that the minorities
are excluded from political participation. 499
This disparate weight given to process claims, based upon access over those
based upon outcome, is very evident in Johnson v. Mortham, °° an equal protection
challenge to Florida's Third Congressional District (a geography process claim). The
evidence showed that black Congresswoman Corrine Brown provided all of her
constituents, including the white plaintiffs, with fair and equal representation."0 The
majority found the district was drawn for predominately race-based reasons,"0 2 and
stated a process democracy claim had been proven because the redistricting plan was
not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.0 3 In a strongly worded
dissent, Circuit Judge Hatchett disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a
process democracy claim had been proven, making his point in unequivocal terms of
legislative outcome:
[I]t is important to assess the representation that constituents living in
District 3 have received as a result of the development of this district.
Although I do not suggest that the successful representation obtained in
this district predominates over constitutional considerations, it is
important to recognize that this district has accomplished what the De
Grandy court [the court which originally drew the challenged district] set
out to achieve: remedying the past exclusion that African-American
voters endured in Florida's political process and creatinga districtthat
works for all of its constituents. Moreover, this discussion exposes the
absurdity of the majority's finding that District 3 will inevitably be
overburdensome to "innocent" white residents in District 3. District 3 not
outcomes of the policy decisions of elected political bodies.").
498 See NAACP v. Gadsden County Sch. Bd., 691 F.2d 978, 983 (11th Cir. 1982).
'99 United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1572 (11th Cir.), appeal
dismissedand cert. denied,469 U.S. 976 (1984).
o 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (three judge panel) (per curiam).
5or See id. at 1492; see id. at 1498-502 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
502 Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1552-53 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
503 See Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 1481, 1492-93.
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only complies with constitutional and statutory mandates, it works....
The evidence in this case shows that District3 works, and it works for
everyone."s°
Nonetheless, the other two judges gave the evidence of fair outcomes short shrift in
the face of what they concluded was a cognizable geographical process democracy
claim. The Johnson majority reasoned that "[t]he fact that innocent third parties
receive a fair result cannot ameliorate the deprivation of those parties' fundamental
rightto equallyparticipatein the politicalprocess."5 °5 Hence, it is apparent that fair
outcomes alone cannot defeat process democracy claims.
This section has demonstrated how the courts have failed to give protection to
parliamentary process claims except to the extent that outcomes resulting from that
process implicate a constitutional right independent of the right to vote. When there
is a clear-cut equal protection violation, discriminatory outcomes will be viewed akin
to a pure process (individual access) claim: The reviewing court might have to make
substantive decisions, but it can do so in a principled manner by pointing to the
unacceptable correlation between the benefit or burden and legitimate government
purposes."° On the other hand, when all voters have been given an equal opportunity
to elect the representatives oftheir choice, but an unfair outcome has resulted--either
because of defects in the legislative decision-making process (such as the majority
refusing to give minority representatives any voice in the decision) or reallocations
of power of the elected officials (as in Etowah)--the judiciary will be unwilling to
enforce the parliamentary process democracy claim. In this sense, the parliamentary
process claim is treated like an unprotected perverted process (group access) claim:
The absence of a clear baseline or benchmark for a court precludes a determination
of how many benefits or burdens a group should receive, in the face of the seemingly
easy decision of sustaining the legislative decision out of respect for majority rule in
a democratically elected body. The reluctance of courts to afford protection against
such impediments to the democratic process, seriously undermines the ability of a
minority group to consent to the actions of the government. In this sense, there is
little doubt that fair and effective representation has not been provided.
C. Redefining the Boundariesfor JudicialProtection of Consent
The foregoing discussion has illustrated how the courts have protected consent
along a continuum of process democracy rights, between the two poles of access and
outcome. Viewing this continuum in the context of the constitutional role that
judicial referees are supposed to play in ensuring fair and equal consent of all voters
and to preserve "democratic legitimacy,"5" 7 this Article suggests that the courts have
Id. at 1498, 1502 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
...
Id. at 1492 (emphasis added).
506 In this sense, a court is engaging in the same type of substantive decision-making that
has allowed the Supreme Court to separate acceptable limitations on the right to vote from
unacceptable ones. See supra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
504

507

See infra note 579 and accompanying text.
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not gone far enough. Protection for consent should not be limited to the entry point
of individual access to the political process, but instead is extended better to every
stage of the process in which cognizable discrimination deprives any individual or
group of voters of the equal opportunity to consent.
Congress recognized as much in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,508 and adopted
the Act pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. °9 As
originally enacted, the purpose of the Act was to "banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting"' 0 by focusing primarily on pure process claims-barriers
such as poll taxes, voter registration procedures, and literacy tests that precluded
individual access to the polls and the right to have a ballot counted. 5" The "heart of
the Voting Rights Act,"5" 2 sections 4 through 9, were temporary measures mainly
limited to seven southern states that had engaged in extensive discrimination against
blacks attempting to register to vote or cast a ballot.5t 3 Among other things, these
provisions suspended the use of literacy tests in certain states, required federal
supervision over changes in voting laws and practices, and provided for federal
14
voting examiners and poll watchers to oversee voter registration and voting.'
Sections 11 and 12 of the Act also were intended to guarantee pure process rights to
vote by prohibiting voter intimidation and electoral fraud. 55 The legislative history
of the original Act leaves no question that Congress had the principal goal of
...Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973
to 1973aa-6 (1994)).
509 The Act was "designed primarily to enforce the 15th [A]mendment," and, secondarily,
"to enforce the 14th [A]mendment and [A]rticle I, section 4." H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437. Congress rested the sweeping scope of the Act
on the broad powers it possessed under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See id,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2448-49; S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprinted in 1965

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2554-55 (outlining the joint views of 12 members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee relating to the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
510 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). In 1975, Congress expanded
the Act's coverage to include language minorities under sections 2 and 5. See Pub. L. No. 9473, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401-02 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994)).
Congress made this change after determining that "voting discrimination against citizens of
language minorities is pervasive and national in scope." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1994).
"I For a summary of the provisions of the original Act, see Chandler Davidson, The
Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 8,
at 17-21.
note 408, at 5.
Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
Rights
Voting
5" See Chandler Davidson, The
INMINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 18-20. Congress intended these temporary provisions
initially were to be in effect for five years. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). In
1970, Congress extended them for an additional five years. See Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat.
314 (1970). In 1975, Congress extended them for an additional seven years. See Pub. L. No.
94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975). In 1982, Congress extended the provisions for an additional
twenty-five years-they will expire in 2007. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
114 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-g (1994).
"' See id. §§ 1973i-j.
512

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
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removing barriers preventing individual exercise of the right to vote.516 Indeed, in
what many scholars have described as "first generation" voting rights claims under
the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, minorities mainly focused on ballot
517
access.
Yet, Congress did not intend to limit the scope of the Voting Rights Act solely
to protecting pure process voting claims. Preliminarily, Congress broadly defined the
terms "vote" and "voting" as including "all action necessary to make a vote effective
in any primary, special, or general election, including,but not limited to, registration,
...casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly ....
,,.Therefore, as
a number of Republican sponsors of the legislation made clear, the right to vote
protected under the Act went beyond individual access:
The right to vote is of particular importance and value to minoritygroups
in generalbut to our Negro citizens in particular who suffer deprivations
of rights other than access to the ballot. If these other deprivations are
to be rectified and the present imbalance cured at the level of government
contemplated by the Constitution as custodian of the welfare of individual
citizens, that level of government must be maintained responsive to the
needs of all its people. Federal authority lies to correct the gross
imbalance of today, to bring back to a constitutional standard the
responsive character of State and local governments where lies the final
assurance and vindication of these rights. Neither in the streets nor in the
courts, nor in the Federal Congress but in the politicalprocess offree and
responsive operationof local government lies the final goal of equality

See H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2439-44,
2451-54 (discussing discrimination against blacks in voter qualifications, voter registration,
and the voting process); S. REP. No.89-162 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508,
2541-54 (providing the joint views of 12 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee relating
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965); id., reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2570-73
(additional views of 10 Senators in support of S.1564) (discussing the discriminatory
purpose and impact of poll taxes on blacks); see also S. REP. NO. 417, at 5-6 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182-83 ("The initial effort to implement the Voting
Rights Act focused on registration [through the elimination of] violence, . . .harassment,
and... the use of literacy tests or other screening methods.").
517 See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 16, at 7; Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 240,
at 1839; Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations,Racial
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 138-50 (1992). This focus is
unsurprising because the widespread use of barriers to registration and voting made any
contemplation by minority groups of electing candidates of their choice and having effective
representation in legislative bodies premature at best. See generally 1982 S.REP., supra note
6, at 5, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182 ("Traditionally, black Americans were
denied the franchise throughout the South. After statutory bars to voting by blacks were
lifted, the main device was denial of voter registration-by violence, by harassment, and by
the use of literacy tests or other screening methods.").
"1 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
516
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in all civil rights. The vote is indispensable-it cannot longer be
denied.519
Republican Representative John Lindsay further elaborated on the "voting right
problem" by pointing out that "it still must be viewed as part of the broad problem
of achieving equality of opportunity, not only in the political process but also in such
areas as jobs, schools, and housing." 2 ' Senator Jacob Javits expressed a similar
view, stating that the purpose of the Act was "not only to correct an active history of
discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right to register and vote, but also to
deal with the accumulation of discrimination ....The bill would attempt to do
something about accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs."52' Thus,
protection of individual access to the ballot box could not be viewed in isolation from
the underlying purpose of safeguarding the right to vote. As Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach testified, the Act was intended "to enlarge representative
'
government. It is to solicit the consent of all the governed."522
To do so, Congress recognized it would have to be flexible in dealing with
changes in "methods" of discrimination, 23 by "legislat[ing] not only for the
'
immediacy of today's problems but for the requirements of the future as well."524
The legislative history of the Act documents the extensive and persistent ability of
many jurisdictions to exploit the limitations of the judicial process in seeking "new
ways and means of discriminating" against blacks and other racial and ethnic
minorities.525 Hence, the "new, strong legislation to protect voting rights" '26 had to
"9 H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2465-66

(providing the Republican views of Rep. McCulloch and others) (emphasis added).
520

Id., reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2484 (providing additional views of Rep.

Lindsay).
521

111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965); see also S. REP. No. 417, at 5 (1982), reprintedin 1982

U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182 (quoting Sen. Javits as well).
522 Hearingson H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. 21 (1965) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2482 (providing the Republican views of Rep. McCulloch and

others) ("The injustices and deprivations this legislation must be designed to alleviate are
clear. It requires no recapitulation of the evidence to emphasize the urgency of this task, to
free those of our citizens who now endure the near-tyranny of nonrepresentation.").
523
524

H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441.
Id, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2468 (Republican views of Rep. McCulloch

et al.); see also id at 2484 (providing additional views of Rep. Lindsay discussing civil rights
legislation). Representative Lindsay observed that "[tiogether with the redress of voting

rights grievances, they should do much to give all of our citizens the fair break to which they

are entitled. However, if more is needed, then more will be done." Id
525 H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441; see also
sources cited supra note 206 (discussing the continued prevalence of discrimination
following passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and continuing after the enactment of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
526 S.
REP. NO. 89-162 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2540 (providing the
joint views of 12 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee relating to the Voting Rights
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anticipate the use of means other than pure process barriers to deny the consent of
those in the minority. While section 2 of the Act received little attention in the
legislative history,5 27 Congress undoubtedly meant it to play a role in protecting
denial of consent extending past barriers to individuals registering to vote and casting
a ballot.5 2 Attorney General Katzenbach stated that section 2 would prohibit "any

kind ofpractice... if its purpose or effect was to deny or abridge the right to vote
on account of race or color. 5 29 Consequently, the Voting Rights Act was designed
to provide broad protection across the spectrum of the political process "to create a
set of mechanisms for dealing with continuing
voting discrimination, not step by step,
530
but comprehensively andfinally.

Act of 1965).
527 As originally enacted, section 2 provided:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1973(a) (1994)). The few times that section 2 is mentioned in the Senate and House reports
accompanying the Voting Rights Act are little more than a restatement of the statutory
language. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2454; S.
REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2557 (providing the joint
views of 12 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee relating to the Voting Rights Act

of 1965).
52 The legislative history of the Act does not address specifically vote dilution claims
under section 2. In its discussion of the use of poll taxes as barriers to voter registration,
however, the House Report alludes to vote dilution claims encompassed by the Act:
If the Supreme Court's rule of "one man, one vote" as enunciated in Reynolds
v. Sims is to be meaningful, Congress must act to protect the right of those with
the lowest incomes to cast their votes. As the Supreme Court has stated:
"Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the 14th amendment just as much as invidious
discrimination based on factors such as race ...or economic status ....
"

H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437,2453 (quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). In one important sense, section 2 was broader in scope
than section 5 and the other temporary provisions of the Act: unlike those sections, "Section
2-the Act's general prohibition against voting discrimination-applies to every state and
county" and "could be used effectively to challenge voting discrimination anywhere that it
might be proved to occur." S. REP. NO. 417, at 15 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 192.
529 Hearings on & 1564 Before Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 191 (1965)
(emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 417, at 17 & n.50 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 194-95 & n.50 (quoting Katzenbach).
530 S.REP. NO. 417, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182 (emphasis
added).
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In Allen v. State Board of Elections,'3 ' the Court recognized the Voting Rights
Act's sweeping protection of minority consent. The Court confronted the issue of
whether a number of voting changes, including a switch from single-member to atlarge districts, were subject to administrative preclearance under section 5 of the
Act.'3 2 The defendant-appellees contended that section 5 only pertained to voter
registration and the casting of a ballot.'33 Rejecting the appellees' "narrow
construction," the Court described the expansive protection available under the
Voting Rights Act:
The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious,
state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to
vote because of their race. Moreover, compatible with the decisions of
this Court, the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote,
recognizing that voting includes "all action necessary to make a vote
effective."... The legislative history on the whole supports the view that
Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election
law of a covered state in even a minor way. 34
The Court went on to find that all of the proposed voting changes were subject
to section 5 preclearance. 3' The Court observed that a change to a countywide atlarge voting system might lead to a perverted process claim whereby the consent of
a minority group was denied just as effectively as it would be if a pure process
impediment was present:536
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as
by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. Voters who are members
of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a
decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could
therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as
would prohibiting some of them from voting. 37

393 U.S. 544 (1969).
See id at 550. The other voting changes addressed by the Court included a shift from
an elected to an appointed office, imposition of new restrictions on independent candidacies,
and modifications of a provision for write-in ballots. See id. at 550-51.
131 See id. at 564.
534 Id. at 565-66 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1994)) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
13' See id. at 569-70, 572.
536 The Court anticipated its discussion of vote dilution in Allen in a number of its earlier
decisions. See generally notes 306-14 and accompanying text (discussing Bums v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 87 (1966) (suggesting the possibility of a vote dilution claim);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1965) (noting that a multimember scheme would
minimize or cancel out minority voting strength); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
'37 Allen, 393 U.S. at 569. In Perkins v. Matthews, the Court reached a similar conclusion
as to changes in municipal boundaries. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89
(1971). In addition to boundary changes, the Court in Perkins held that changes in locations
531

532
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Allen's significance lies in the Court's acknowledgement that even seemingly
innocent features of the political process can interact in a manner which denies the
consent of racial and ethnic minority groups. 3 Moreover, the case also demonstrates
the Court's early respect for congressional attempts to use the Voting Rights Act to
effectuate the consent of all voters at every stage of the political process. 39
Elaborating on the holding in Allen, the Court outlined, in two Fourteenth
Amendment vote dilution cases, the standards to be used by judicial referees in
determining whether minority consent has been denied wrongfully by a perversion
of the political process. The Court first held in Whitcomb v. Chavis that "political

of polling places and changes from ward to at-large election of city aldermen were subject
to preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See id.
at 394-95.
538

See generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in

CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 27-30 (discussing the impact of the
Allen holding on section 5 and vote dilution cases). The Allen decision marks one of the
beginning points of what have been termed "second" and "third" generation voting rights
claims, which have focused on bringing minorities into the body politic and policing
legislative rules to protect minority representatives, respectively. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra

note 16, at 7-8; Issacharoff, PolarizedVoting, supra note 240, at 1839-42; Pamela S. Karlan,
Democracy andDis-Appointment,93 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1995) (reviewing GUINIER,
supra note 16). These later generation voting rights claims necessarily focus on group rights
because "groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not." Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"9 Some commentators have criticized Allen as expanding section 5 beyond its intended
purpose. See generally THERNSTROM, supra note 240, at 22-27 (arguing that in Allen the
Court "began the process by which the Voting Rights Act was reshaped into an instrument
for affirmative action in the electoral sphere"); Timothy G. O'Rourke, The 1982 Amendments
and the Voting Rights Paradox,in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY VOTING, supranote 9, at
90 ("Allen substantially enlarged the scope of section 5, shifting the focus of the act beyond
suffrage to include representation."). Their criticism is belied, however, by the fact that
"Congress was fully aware of the broad sweep which the Supreme Court had given the Act's
prohibitions in Allen v. State Boardof Elections." Matthew M. Farley, Comment, Crashing
the Party-TheSupreme Court Subjects PoliticalPartiesto PreclearanceUnder Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 191,219 (1997); accordHolder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 959-60 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting);
Scott Gluck, CongressionalReaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 363-71 (1996) (discussing the
legislative history of the 1970 extension of section 5); Laughlin McDonald, Holder v. Hall:
Blinking at Minority Voting Rights, 3 D.C. L. REV. 61,78-79 (1995); Heather K. Way, Note,
A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument for the
Incorporationof Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1439, 1471 (1996). For a more direct reply to
the critics of an expanded definition of section 5, see Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the
Role of the Justice Department,in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at
54-61; Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary, Without Fearand Without Research: Abigail
Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POL. 751, 752-54, 758-59, 774 (1988)
(reviewing THERNSTROM, supra note 240); J.Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and
the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 165-73.
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defeat at the polls" was insufficient by itself to prove a violation of consent by
dilution.540 On the contrary, such an outcome was an unsurprising product of
" ' As a result, when the evidence
majority rule and the "winner-take-all" system.54
merely showed that the candidate chosen by members of one political party was
defeated by supporters of another political party, no consent claim could be stated.542
Similarly, lack of proportional representation also was not enough.543 Instead, the
proper focus of the judicial inquiry was whether an individual or group of voters was
denied consent through evidence such as the inability to register or vote, participate
in a political party, or take part in an informal candidate slating process.'"
In White v. Regester,545 the Court reaffirmed the Whitcomb holding, couched in
language that supported not only a right to individual access, but also to group
participation extending beyond the ballot box:
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the
political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participatein the
politicalprocesses and to elect legislatorsof their choice.546
At the same time, the Court in White recognized the absence of a simple formula for
evaluating deprivations of consent by vote dilution. Rather, judicial referees needed
to base their examination on "the totality of the circumstances,"54' 7 looking at
evidence showing a "blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design
and impact [ofthe challenged structure or mechanism] in the light of past and present
reality, political and otherwise."' ' In White, the Court outlined several factors that
it considered relevant under this "results" test, focusing on whether any individual
or group of voters was wrongfully denied access to any stage of the political process,
without requiring a showing of intentional discrimination. 49 Thus, under the White
403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
141 Id. at 149; cf supranote 245 and accompanying text (describing the need for
voters
who fail to elect a winning candidate under a "winner-take-all" system).
542 See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 150-55.
543 See id.at 149, 153.
144 See id.
at 149-50.
545412 U.S. 755 (1973).
546 Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 769.
541 Id. at 769-70.
549These factors included: the history of official racial discrimination in the state and local
community; the use of majority vote requirements and numbered place systems in primaries;
the use of candidate slating; past electoral success of minority groups; lack of responsiveness
by elected officials to minority groups; the use of overt racial tactics to defeat a minority
group's candidate of choice; the presence of socio-economic or other barriers leading to
depressed political participation by members of minority groups; and the use of pure process
barriers such as poll taxes and restrictive voter registration procedures. See id at 766-69; see
also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (elaborating on
540
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standard, a particular voting feature such as at-large elections might be perfectly
permissible in one jurisdiction but impermissible in another. According to White, the
sine qua non of a violation of consent must be weighed under a flexible totality of the
circumstances inquiry because no single standard would allow a judicial referee to
account for all the combinations of historical, political, sociological, and structural
elements that can prevent fair and effective minority participation in the political
process.
In 1982, Congress further clarified the scope of the Voting Rights Act's
protection of minority consent from majority tyranny. Congress acted in part because
the Act's temporary provisions were scheduled to expire,550 but largely because it was
driven to respond to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of
section 2 protection in City of Mobile v. Bolden.55 ' The change in the statutory
language of section 2 was one of the key elements of the 1982 amendments to the
Act.552 Congress retained the basic language of section 2,"' but added a new

additional objective factors to be considered), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
550

See supra note 513.

551

446 U.S. 55 (1980). Without expressly overruling Allen, Whitcomb, or White, a

plurality of the Court in Bolden held that section 2 was to be interpreted in the same manner
as the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 60-61. The plurality therefore adopted the "intent.
test" which applied to constitutional vote dilution claims, finding "racially discriminatory
motivation ... a necessary ingredient" of a section 2 claim. Id at 60-62. In addition, the
Court found that voting was only an individual right, stating:
It is,of course, true that the right of a person to vote on an equal basis with other
voters draws much of its significance from the political associations that its
exercise reflects, but it is an altogether different matter to conclude that political
groups themselves have an independent constitutional claim to representation.
And the Court's decisions hold squarely that they do not.
Id. at 78-79. Finally, the Bolden plurality concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment itself only
encompassed the right to ballot access, and did not extend to group vote dilution. See id at
77-79. According to the Senate Report, a "fair reading" of the plurality opinion revealed "a
marked departure from earlier Supreme Court and lower court vote dilution cases." S. REP.
No. 417, at 26 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 203. In the aftermath of the
Bolden decision, "litigators virtually stopped filing new voting dilution cases." Id.
552 In addition, the amendments extended the temporary coverage of sections 4 through
8 for an additional 25 years, amended section 4(a) to broaden the ability of certain covered
jurisdictions to bailout from coverage under sections 4 through 8, extended languageassistance provisions of the Act until 1992, and added a new section providing for voting
assistance to voters who are blind, disabled, or illiterate. See S. REP. No. 417, at 2 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 178.
...Compare the language of section 2 as originally enacted, see supranote 527, with the
language of section 2(a), as amended:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, in contravention of the
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subsection (b) which codified the White "results" test and the Court's disclaimer, in
Whitcomb, of a right to proportional representation: 54
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent
to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided,That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.555
In the Senate Report accompanying the amendments, Congress emphasized that
"the issue to be decided under the results test is whether the politicalprocesses are
' The key inquiry for vote dilution claims was on
equally open to minority voters."556
the discriminatory effects of electoral structures and mechanisms, without any
required showing of discriminatory intent or "invidious discrimination."55' 7
guarantees set forth in section 1373b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)).
114 For a discussion of proportionate descriptive representation, see supranotes
250-51,
255 and accompanying text. As Justice Souter observed in his majority opinion in Johnson
v. De Grandy:
"Proportionality" as the term is used [in discussing the facts of De Grandy] links
the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members' share of
the relevant population. This concept is distinct from the subject of the
proportionalrepresentationclause of§ 2 ... [The § 2] proviso speaks to the
success of minority candidates,as distinctfrom the politicalor electoralpower
of minority voters.... And the proviso also confirms what is otherwise clear
from the text of the statute, namely that the ultimate right of § 2 is equality of
opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred
candidates of whatever race.
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
...42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
556 S. REP. No. 417, at 2 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179 (emphasis
added).
...Senator Dole made this perfectly clear in his discussion of the 1982 amendments to
section 2:
It should be reemphasized that the "results" test contained in the substitute
amendment in no way includes an element of discriminatory purpose. I am aware
that some have sought to characterize the White holding as including an ultimate
purpose requirement or a so-called "objective design" element. The implication
of this characterization is that because the substitute amendment codifies the

556
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Consequently, the amended section 2 was a critical part of congressional efforts
undertaken through a proper exercise of its enforcement powers"' "to achievefull
participationfor all Americans in our demociacy." 5 9
Congress recognized that individual access was only a starting point for full
participation in the political process, just as the Court had held in Allen.5" Drawing

White standard, the amendment also includes some requirement of
discriminatory purpose. But in presenting my compromise before the Committee,
I explicitly stated that "the supporters of this compromise believe that a voting
practice or procedure which is discriminatory in result, should not be allowed to
stand, regardless of whether there exists a discriminatory purpose.... Section
2 should only require plaintiffs to establish discriminatory "results" and [I reject]
the notion that any element of purpose should be incorporated into the standard.
Id.at 194-95, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 365 (additional views of Sen. Dole).
558 Congress indicated it was not overturning the Court's Bolden decision-an action
which would have violated the separation of powers-but instead was engaging in "a proper
statutory exercise of [its] enforcement power" under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Id. at 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 219. But see id.at 101, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 274 (additional views of Sen. Hatch) (stating that Congress was attempting
to engage in the unconstitutional action of statutorily overturning Bolden); id.
at 124, 169-70,
182-83, 184, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 295, 342, 354, 356 (Report of the Senate
Subcommittee on the Constitution); id.at 188, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 358-59
(additional views of Sen. Laxalt); id.at 224, 239, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 394,
410 (minority views of Sen. East). Drawing from the Court's decision in South Carolinav.
Katzenbach, discussed supra note 230, Congress observed that it had the power to set the
ceiling on the scope of voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment pursuant to its
enforcement powers:
[T]he Court has long held that Congres[s] need not limit itself to legislation
coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment, if there is a basis for the
Congressional determination that the legislation furthers enforcement of the
amendment. The Voting Rights Act is the best example of Congress' power to
enact implementing legislation that goes beyond the direct prohibitions of the
Constitution itself....
Congress may enact measures going beyond the direct requirements of the
Fifteenth Amendment, if such measures are appropriate and reasonably adapted
to protect citizens against the risk that the right to vote will be denied in violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment. That point, clearly established in South Carolina,
has not been seriously challenged in subsequent years.
1982 S.REP., supra note 6, at 39-40, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 217-18; see also
id.
at 61-62, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 239-40 (discussing the use of enforcement
powers in enactment of bailout provisions). For different interpretations of congressional
enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments, see id.
at 101, reprintedin 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 274 (providing additional views of Sen. Hatch); id at 169-73, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 342-46 (Report of the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution).
"9 Id.
at 4, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 181 (emphasis added).
560 See generally id at 6, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183 ("But registration is only
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language from White and a number of other cases,56' Congress concluded that the
right to vote could be both an individual and a group right, with the proper focus on
whether consent was wrongfully denied:
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, discriminatory election
systems or practices which operate, designedly or otherwise,562 to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness of
minority groups, are an impermissible denial of the right to have one's
vote fully counted, just as much as outright denial of [individual] access
to the ballot box.563
Therefore, Congress evinced a desire to afford sweeping protection for individual and
group participation in the political process not only under section 2, but under section
5 as well."6 Recognition of the individual and group nature of the right to vote led
Congress to provide an expansive definition of consent which protected "equal

the first hurdle to full effective participationin the political process." (emphasis added)). The
Senate Report goes on to note that, although many electoral practices are "tactics used
traditionally by the 'ins' against the 'outs,"' such tactics "are clearly the latest in a direct line
of repeated efforts to perpetuate the results of past voting discrimination and to undermine

the gains won under other sections of the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 12, reprintedin 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 189.
561
562

See id. at 19-24, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 196-201.
This "designedly or otherwise" language reaffirms the conclusion of Congress that

consent can be denied either intentionally or unintentionally. In addition, Congress made it
explicit that the "on account of' language contained in section 2 was not to be read as
requiring a showing of purpose or intent, but merely as requiring that the violation of consent
correlate with the minority group's race or language. See id, at 27-28 n. 109, reprintedin
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205-06 n. 109. Similarly, Congress pointed out that it was improper
for courts to rely upon a Title VII-like framework when discriminatory results were used to
create an inference of discrimination. See id. at 28 n. 112, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 206 n. 112. Rather than "ask[ing] the wrong question" about why a particular electoral
structure or feature was adopted (the Bolden intent test), under the test codified in the
amended section 2, the proper focus is on whether the structure or feature results in a
deprivation of consent-no purpose or inference of purpose is necessary. See id. at 36,

reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214. The Committee Report also indicates that Congress
rejected the Bolden intent test as "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of
racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities," and it made it too difficult

to prove a section 2 violation resulting from evidentiary problems such as legislative
immunity and false trails of evidence used by legislators to disguise their true motives. Id.
at 36-37, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214-15.
563

Id. at 28, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 (emphasis added) (discussing section

2 of the Act).
564

As Congress observed in its discussion of the continuing need for the temporary

preclearance mechanisms under section 5, consent had to be protected beyond the ballot box
because many "covered jurisdictions . . . substantially moved from direct, over[t]

impediments to the right to vote to more sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting
strength." Id. at 10, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 187.
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'
access to anyphase of the electoralprocessfor minority group members."565
There
is no question that this protection would encompass not only pure process claims, but
quasi-structural process, geography process, and perverted process claims as well,
whenever minority consent has been denied wrongfully.566
As the plain language of the amended section 2 demonstrates, Congress
determined whether consent was "wrongfully denied" by relying upon the flexible
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in White567 and the Fifth Circuit in
Zimmer:568 "To establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a variety of factors,
'
depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or procedure called into question."569
The

Id at 30, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 (emphasis added). The Senate Report
indicates that this broad definition of consent also applies to section 5 preclearance. In order
for covered jurisdictions to bail out of section 5 coverage, they would have to show not only
the absence of pure process barriers, but also would have to "expand opportunities for
minority participation," eliminate impediments "which inhibit or dilute equal access to the
electoral process," and would even have to "make constructive efforts to eliminate the
continued effects of many years of discrimination"-suggesting a need for ameliorative
outcomes, and not just fair process. Id at 53, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 231-32; see
also id.
at 54, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 233 ("It is an essential aspect of any
jurisdiction's fim commitment to ensure the full opportunity for minority participation in the
political process." (emphasis added)); id at 72-73, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 251-52
(explaining that under section 4 of the Act, covered methods of election "include all aspects
of the electoral process," with evidence of outcomes relevant to the inquiry (emphasis
added)).
566 See generallyid.
at 30 n. 120, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208 n. 120 ("[W]ithout
question [section 2] is aimed at discrimination which takes the form of dilution, as well as
outright denial of the right to register or to vote."). It would not be inconsistent with the
Senate Report's language to interpret "dilution" as extending to parliamentary process
claims, particularly where the parliamentary process is altered in the wake of minority
electoral success. See generally notes 465-74 and accompanying text (discussing Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992)). Indeed, Congress intended the Act to be
forward looking and adaptive to subtle violations of consent, see supra notes 523-24 and
accompanying text, particularly in light of the congressional admonition that jurisdictions
frequently use "more sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting strength," S. REP. NO.
417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 187, to deprive minority voters of
any meaningful access they might have obtained. See supra note 525 and accompanying text.
If parliamentary process claims are not protected, then it is but a simple matter to shift the
location of exclusion to the legislative body, rendering the right to "full and effective
participation in the political process" to nothing more than a symbolic facade. See supra
notes 457-506 and accompanying text.
561 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
568 Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
569 S.REP. No.417, at 28 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206. The "Senate
factors" largely mirror those described in White and Zimmer. Compare the factors listed in
note 549, supra,with factors described in S. REP. NO. 417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07. In addition to the factors outlined in note 549, the Senate
Report also suggests consideration of the extent to which voting in elections is racially
polarized, and whether the policy underlying the challenged electoral structure or mechanism
565
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"functional view of 'political process""'57 adopted by the Voting Rights Act requires
judicial referees to engage in a "searching practical evaluation of the 'past and
present reality' of minority participation.57 ' As a result, in evaluating liability under
section 2, courts must "not use a mechanical 'factor counting' approach," rather, "the
factors [must be] considered as part of the total circumstances and in light of the
ultimate issue to be decided, i.e., whether the political processes [are] equally
'
open."572
Similarly, in fashioning relief for a section 2 violation, a judicial referee
should avoid "mechanistic rules for formulating remedies in cases which necessarily
'
depend upon widely varied proof and local circumstances."573
Instead, relief should
be fashioned that "completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength
and fully provides equal opportunity for minority voters to participate and to elect
candidates of their choice.""57 Many detractors have criticized Congress' failure to
adopt a more mechanical, formulaic standard in section 2."' Nevertheless, the 1982
amendments evince recognition by Congress that there simply is no escaping
substantive decision-making by the courts in order to afford full protection for the
consent of all Americans.
Obviously, there are some "easy" voting cases in which the exercise ofjudicial
discretion can be kept to a minimum. Denial of pure process or even quasi-structural
process democracy rights present clear baselines for judicial review: the need for
inclusion of the subject voters in a system in which they are completely excluded.
Similarly, malapportioned districts provide courts with a simplistic numerical
standard-one person, one vote--with the degree of acceptable variation depending
on whether congressional or legislative districts are at stake.576 Legislative outcomes

is tenuous. See supranotes 525-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the type of
evidence which may be used for each of the Senate factors, see generally Bernard Grofian,
Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES
INMINORITY VOTING, supra note 9, at 200-08.
570 S. REP. No. 417, at 30 n. 120 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208 n. 119.
171 Id. at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 769-70 (1973)).
572 Id at 34-35, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 212-13. The Senate further observes
in its Report:
The courts ordinarily have not used these factors, nor does the Committee intend
them to be used, as a mechanical "point counting" device. The failure of plaintiff
to establish any particular factor is not rebuttal evidence of non-dilution. Rather,
the provision requires the court's overall judgment, based on the totality of the
circumstances and guided by those relevant factors in the particular case, of
whether the voting strength of minority voters is, in the language of Fortson and
Burns, "minimized or canceled out."
Id. at 20 n. 118, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n.118.
171 Id. at 31, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208.
574 Id.
See infra notes 614-22 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Thomas's
criticism).
576 See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying text.
171
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that deprive a person of a constitutional right independent of the right to vote
typically can be analyzed under accepted equal protection analysis.577 But what about
those process democracy claims that do not fit neatly within these prescribed
formulae? Should they be denied on the basis that a court has to make substantive
decisions on how effective a minority group's votes must be? Surely that cannot be
an acceptable reason to reject these "harder" cases, for as already witnessed, even the
"easier" cases require making certain substantive decisions or theoretical
presuppositions. Indeed, the difficult cases are the very ones that demand more, not
less, judicial decision-making. 78
Therefore, this Article suggests that, in its enactment of the Voting Rights Act,
Congress recognized the need for judicial referees who would be flexible in applying
a functional analysis to each case to ensure there is an appropriate balance between
majority rule and protection of minority groups from any tyranny of that majority rule
which might be present. None of the process democracy claims should be eliminated
from the scope of this judicial protection, regardless of where they fall on the present
continuum, because the touchstone should remain whether the consent of a particular
group of voters has been denied wrongfully by those in the minority (in the case of
certain one person, one vote cases) or those in the majority. As Justice Marshall
explained in his Bolden dissent:
The American approach to government is premised on the theory that,
when citizens have the unfettered right to vote, public officials will make
decisions by the democratic accommodation of competing beliefs, not by
deference to the mandates of the powerful. The American approach to
civil rights is premised on the complementary theory that the unfettered
right to vote is preservative of all other rights. The theoretical
foundations for these approaches are shattered where... the right to vote
is granted in form but denied in substance.579
Thus, in the case of perverted process claims, the absence of a specific
benchmark of comparison for a challenged electoral feature might make it more
difficult to prove a violation of consent, but it is not a sufficient basis, by itself, to
deny protection. A similar conclusion applies to parliamentary process claims, in
which legislative processes can be used to undermine the value of consent at the very
stage of the political process in which substantive outcomes are generated. Of
course, the totality of the circumstances approach adopted by Congress in section 2
requires that judicial referees still engage in a balancing process to evaluate whether
they should provide relief to the aggrieved group of voters.8 0
When the judicial referees protect the rights of all qualified voters to have a voice
in government, they are abiding faithfully by the core republican principle of consent

See supranotes 475-83 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 256-63 and accompanying text.
"9 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 140 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
580 See supranotes 241-42, 569-75 and accompanying text.
511
578
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that underlies the democratic system in the United States. Political discourse is more
meaningful. The government is more legitimate. Everyone is enriched as a result.
III. CONSENT DENIED: THE END OF THE "SECOND RECONSTRUCTION"
The end of the First Reconstruction rested, in large part, on the Supreme Court's
refusal to recognize broad congressional powers under the Enforcement Clauses of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the Court's narrow definition
of the right to vote under the self-executing sections of those two amendments.5 "
The end of the "Second Reconstruction ' has resulted from similar judicial
intransigence. In a series of decisions, the Court has chiseled away at protection for
minority rights," 3 while at the same time it has redefined its constitutional role as
judicial referee over the political process.
As Part II illustrated, the Court has deigned to establish rigid regulations for the
judicial referees themselves, instead of abiding by a more flexible approach which
would provide the greatest protection for consent of all the governed.'" In doing so,
the Court willfully has disregarded the Framers' idea of what voting means in the
United States government. Instead, the Court has advanced its own democratic
58
582

See sources cited supra note 206.
Historian C. Vann Woodward is credited with coining this term in 1965. See C. Vann

Woodward, From the First Reconstruction to the Second, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1965, at
127. The "Second Reconstruction" is used to describe the civil rights reforms which began

with Brown v. Board ofEducation, and later included passage of the Civil Rights Acts of
1957 and 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. See C.
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974). The first phase of
the Second Reconstruction was marked by reforms initiated by the federal judicial and
executive branches, while the second phase was defined by southern resistance which
"aroused popular support and stirred Congress into unprecedented and effective action." Id

at 135.
583 The Court has not limited itself to narrowing protection for minority voting rights, but
also has embraced restrictions on the scope of affirmative action, employment discrimination,
and set-asides. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(holding that all racial classifications imposed by any governmental actor, including set
asides for disadvantaged minority business enterprises, are subject to strict scrutiny); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that race-conscious relief is only
lawful when it is narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of identifiable past
discrimination); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 applies only to the formation of employment contracts, and not to
discriminatory conduct which occurs after the parties have entered into such contracts),

overruled by The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that layoffs of nonminority

teachers solely on the basis of their race in order to maintain a racially integrated faculty
violated the Equal Protection Clause). Each of these cases has distanced the Court further
from the benign use of racial classifications allowed under Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
584 See supranotes 281-580 and accompanying text.
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theory protecting the right to vote to the extent it requires regular elections open to
all qualified voters (a pure process right), districts of equal population (one person,
one vote), and the absence of race as a primary governmental consideration (an equal
protection right to "color-blind" elections). The end result of the Court's misguided
activism is just as devastating as the majoritarian default position advanced in
Colegrove:585 the sacrifice of "fair and effective representation"5" 6 and the "equal
access" to the political process secured by Congress in section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.587
This Part examines the devastating effects that the Court's theory has had on
perverted process (vote dilution) claims brought under section 2. The first section
will explore the theoretical underpinnings of the Court's misguided approach, and
contrast it with the democratic theory that Congress adopted when it passed and
subsequently amended section 2.58 That discussion will lead to the second section,
which focuses on the application of this judicial approach by the federal courts.5" 9
A review of some illustrative lower court opinions will show how the willingness of
the federal courts to "explain away" violations of section 2 has resulted in the
dilution of consent and rendered the Madisonian Compromise an empty shell of
majority rule. Through this analysis, it will become evident that the Court's "refusal"
to enter into the political arena out of respect for democratic principles, itself has
violated the most fundamental democratic principle of all: that government must
59 not just from
derive its "just powers from the consent of the governed,""
those in
the majority.
A. Supreme Blunder: LegislatingDemocraticTheory from the Judicial Thicket
In the last two decades, a number of justices on the Supreme Court have
questioned the Court's role in enforcing voting rights legislation, particularly section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. None of these justices, however, has been a more
outspoken critic of broad judicial protection for fair and equal access to the political
arena than Justice Clarence Thomas. In Holder v. Hall,59 ' Justice Thomas purported
to eschew matters of democratic theory and substantive decision-making by the
courts in favor of a pure process approach to protection of voting rights. He
advanced a constrained definition of what the right to "consent" means, and a
correspondingly limited view of the courts in securing fair and equal consent. In
doing so, Thomas articulated a democratic theory--one that is antithetical to the
constitutional foundations of consent that would, if adopted, destroy the very basis
585
586
587
58
589

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
S. REP. NO. 417, at 36 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.
See supra notes 591-712 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 713-848 and accompanying text.

590

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

"9 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joined Justice
Thomas in his opinion. See id.
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of the Madisonian Compromise. Because Justice Thomas's opinion contained many
of the same miscues that have caused the Court to misinterpret the scope of section
2 and the constitutional role of judicial referees in protecting consent, it is fitting to
begin this discussion with his Holder concurrence.
Preliminarily, Justice Thomas planted the seeds for dismantling Madisonian
democracy by his limited Vision of what "consent" means. In a word, he found that
"consent" only refers to participation, nothing more.592 If a qualified voter is allowed
to register to vote and has the formal opportunity to cast a ballot that is tabulated,
then, according to Justice Thomas, that voter has had full participation in the political
process. It is irrelevant whether any voters actually have cast ballots, as long as there
are no structural barriers to their ability to do so. Thomas explained:
[S]ince the ballot provides the formal mechanism for obtaining access to
the political process and for electing representatives, it would seem that
one who has had the same chance as others to register and to cast his
ballot has had an equal opportunity to participate and to elect, whether or
not any of the candidates he chooses is ultimately successful.59
He refused to sanction judicial protection for consent based upon notions of political
power.594 As a result, Thomas reasoned that consent only protects pure process
claims of individual access and, to a very limited extent, quasi-structural impediments
to political participation.595 Most quasi-structural process and all geography
process, 596 perverted process, and parliamentary process claims would be
See generally id at 900-01 (describing the "formal value of the vote as a mechanism
for participationin the electoral process") (emphasis added). Other commentators have
shared Justice Thomas's limited definition of consent. See supra notes 352-55 and
accompanying text.
593 Holder, 512 U.S. at 925.
5' See generally id. at 924 ("[Section 2] does not extend by its terms to electoral
mechanisms that might have a dilutive effect on group voting power.").
'9' Thomas's dissenting opinion in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186,
252-53 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting), however, makes it evident that Thomas would not
permit such claims to extend to private actions endorsed by state mechanisms. See discussion
supra note 389.
596 According to Justice Thomas, "a given set of district lines has nothing to do with the
basic process of allowing a citizen to vote-that is, the process of registering, casting a
ballot, and having it counted." Holder, 512 U.S. at 915-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the quintessential geography process claim, see
supra notes 425-31 and accompanying text, appears to be inapposite to Thomas's reasoning.
Nevertheless, Thomas characterized Gomillion as involving not a geography process claim,
but a pure process claim. Thomas opined that "[t]he Gomillion plaintiffs' claims centered
precisely on access: Their complaint was not that the weight of their votes had been
diminished in some way, but that the boundaries of a city had been drawn to prevent blacks
from voting in municipal elections altogether." Holder, 512 U.S. at 920 n.20. Thomas
reached a similar conclusion in the Shaw v. Reno line of decisions pertaining to racial
gerrymanders. See infra notes 670-94 and accompanying text. Consequently, it is fair to
conclude that Justice Thomas would not protect geography process claims as violations of
592
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unprotected. 97 Taken to its logical conclusion, Thomas's pure process approach also
would abrogate the one person, one vote cases because pure process claims do not
protect a right to equal representation. 98 After all, protection of only the right to cast
a ballot says nothing about a right for that ballot to have the same weight as ballots
cast in other districts. Also, its exclusive focus on access and not outcome ignores
both equal legislative policies as well as the right to have the same access to elected
officials that voters in other districts enjoy. To summarize, Justice Thomas found
that "[d]istricting systems and electoral mechanisms that may affect the 'weight'
given to a ballot duly cast and counted are simply beyond the purview of the [Voting
Rights] Act" '99 and, presumably, the Constitution as well.600
As discussed in Part 11(B), 6' 1 process democracy claims view voting as an
individual right to the extent that ballot access is affected, and as a group right to the
extent that electoral and parliamentary outcomes are affected. Therefore, in light of
Justice Thomas's myopic vision that consent is limited to individual ballot access, it
is not surprising that he viewed voting as strictly an individual right: "Giving the
terms 'standard, practice, or procedure' an expansive interpretation to reach
potentially dilutive practices, however, would distort that focus on the individual,for
a vote dilution claim necessarily depends on the assertion of a group right."6 2
consent.
...
See generally Holder, 512 U.S. at 922-23 (Thomas, J., concurring)
([Section 2] does not cover ... the choice of a multimember over a singlemember districting system or the selection of one set of districting lines over
another, or any other such electoral mechanism or method of election that might
reduce the weight or influence a ballot may have in controlling the outcome of
an election.).
See also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (Thomas, J., joining the
majority opinion) (holding that the parliamentary process claim was not cognizable);
discussion supra notes 463-74 and accompanying text.
598 See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
599 Holder, 512 U.S. at 914 (Thomas, J., concurring).
60 Justice Thomas made it clear that he would reaffirm Bolden to the extent that the
Court's opinions in that case can be read as a rejection of protection for vote dilution under
the self-executing section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 920-22. Moreover, to the
extent that any constitutional vote dilution claim could be stated, there is little question that
Thomas effectively would render it a nullity by requiring imposition of the rigorous "intent"
test elaborated by the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), even when a
voting structure or mechanism actually deprives a group of voters of their right to consent.
601 See supra notes 326-506 and accompanying text.
602 Holder, 512 U.S. at 918 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thomas reached
a similar conclusion by comparing section 2 with section 5:
As in § 2, the specific terms in the list of regulated state actions describe only
laws that would limit access to the ballot. Moreover, § 5 makes the focus on the
individualvoter and access to the voting booth even more apparent as the section
goes on to state that 'no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure .... As is the case with § 2, § 5's description of the terms
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Indeed, he went to great lengths to criticize the notion "that the group asserting
dilution is not merely a racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political
interests as well." 3 According to Thomas, the absence of political interests means
that, when courts use racial groups to create political districts, they destroy "any need
for voters or candidates to build bridges between racial groups or to form voting
coalitions." 6" Of course, he rested his conclusion on the assumption that voters and
candidates of majority groups are willing to build such bridges, which is a view that
frequently does not square with the political realities of widespread, sustained,
racially polarized voting.6" 5 Moreover, building bridges itself is inconsistent with
Thomas's notion that voting is nothing more than a formal, symbolic right because
it anticipates unobstructed efforts by voters to secure fair and equal legislative
outcomes. Thomas, however, found such efforts to be outside the legitimate scope
of electoral participation. Consequently, Justice Thomas's narrow theory of
"consent" as an individual, symbolic right,6" marked a significant departure from the
broad protection of minority consent from majority tyranny envisioned by the
Framers of the Constitution and Reconstruction Amendments. 7
Moreover, Justice Thomas's reasoning is flawed materially by his failure to
recognize that determining the textual source for protecting consent (i.e., the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act) has critical implications for the scope of that
protection. 8 Instead, he has conflated both sources.' Justice Thomas equated the
language of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, passed by Congress pursuant to its
enforcement powers, to the language of the self-executing section of the Fifteenth
Amendment:
The use of language taken from the [Fifteenth] Amendment suggests that
the section was intended to protect a "right to vote" with the same scope
as the rightsecuredby the Amendment itself,certainly, no reason appears

'standard, practice, or procedure' thus suggests a focus on rules that regulate the
individualvoter's ability to register and cast a ballot, not a more abstract concern
with the effect that various electoral systems might have on the 'weight' of the
votes cast by a group that constitutes a numerical minority in the electorate.
Id. at 929-30 (first and third emphases added).
603 Id. at 903.
604 Id. at 907.
605 See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 7 (documenting
widespread racially polarized voting in state, county, and municipal elections in the southern
states); cf infra text accompanying notes 737-45 (describing the court's rejection, in LULAC
H, of evidence of racially polarized voting in light of reasoning similar to that of Justice
Thomas).
606 See supranotes 592-600 and accompanying text.
607 See supranotes 61-207 and accompanying text.
608 See supranotes 220-34 and accompanying text.
609 See generally Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 n.l (1994) ("Of course, many of the basic
principles I will discuss are equally applicable to constitutional vote dilution cases."
(emphasis added)).
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from the text of the Act for giving the language a broader construction in
the statute than we have given it in the Constitution. The Court has never
decided, however, whether the Fifteenth Amendment should be
understood to protect against vote "dilution."6 '
Thomas's reasoning suggested that Congress cannot exercise its enforcement powers
to provide greater protection than the Court to voting rights under the Reconstruction
Amendments. If that is the case, he essentially would reverse well established
" ' and has
jurisprudence to the contrary, which originated in McCulloch v. Maryland,61
2
its clearest statement in Katzenbach v. Morgan." In doing so, he would render the
Enforcement Clauses superfluous restatements of the Self-Executing Clauses. Such
a result, however, plainly runs contrary to the legislative intent of the Framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments, who devised the Enforcement and Self-Executing
Clauses as means by which Congress and the courts, respectively, could check and
balance the extent of protection for voting rights provided by the other branch." 3
Justice Thomas's failure to identify and accord proper deference to the textual
source of the voting right in question paled in comparison to "the damage wrought"

Id at 919-20 (emphasis added). Thomas then explained that Bolden remained "the last
word" on the Court's interpretation of section 2 prior to the 1982 amendments, in which a
plurality of justices found that "the Fifteenth Amendment did not extend to reach vote
dilution claims." Id.
at 921. Because the amended section 2 contained "virtually identical
language" as the original version protecting against "denial or abridgement of the right ...
to
vote," Thomas concluded that Congress did not intend section 2 to encompass vote dilution.
Id.
Of course, Thomas failed to reconcile this conclusion with his recognition that prior to
the 1982 amendments, "dilution claims typically were brought under the Equal Protection
610

Clause," id at 893-94 n. 1, and that the 1982 amendments were intended to restore analysis

of dilution cases to the pre-Bolden test devised in White v. Regester. See id.
at 923-24. These
two facts show that Congress intended section 2 to cover vote dilution cases.
611 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
612

384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also supra note 230. Surely, that could not have been

Thomas's intent because he joined with a majority of the Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores,
in which the Court reaffirmed the scope of congressional powers under Morgan:

Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the
sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into "legislative spheres
of autonomy previously reserved to the States." For example, the Court upheld
a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress'
parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, as a
measure to combat racial discrimination in voting, despite the facial
constitutionality of the tests under Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd of

Elections. We have also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights
are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
613

See supra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
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by another feature of "the system [he has] created."6 t4 Justice Thomas has stated
repeatedly that the role ofjudges in protecting consent must be limited as much as
possible.6 15 He opined, therefore, that perverted process claims must be left
unprotected because "vote dilution cases have required the federal courts to make
decisions based on highly political judgments-judgments that courts are inherently
ill-equipped to make."6'16 Specifically, Thomas decried the fact that the judiciary
necessarily must engage in line-drawing in determining whether a perverted process
has diluted the consent of a particular group of voters. In doing so, he observed:
[T]alk of 'debasement' or 'dilution' is circular talk. One cannot speak of
'debasement' or 'dilution' of the value of a vote until there is first defined
a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth." But in setting
the benchmark of what "undiluted" or fully "effective" voting strength
should be, a court must necessarily make some judgments based purely
on an assessment of principles of political theory.
Our interpretation of § 2... has mired the federal courts in an inherently
political task-one that requires answers to questions that are ill-suited to
principled judicial resolution. Under § 2, we have assigned the federal
judiciary a project that involves, not the application of legal standards to
the facts of various cases or even the elaboration of legal principles on a
case-by-case basis, but rather the creation of standards from an abstract
evaluation of political philosophy.6 17
Holder, 512 U.S. at 905 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., id. at 893-94, 896-97, 901-02, 936.
616 Id. at 894 (emphasis added); see also id at 901-02
(I do not pretend to have provided the most sophisticated account of the various
possibilities; but such matters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere
of federal judges. And that is precisely the point. The matters the Court has set
out to resolve in vote dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, not
questions of law.);
id at 926 ("[l]t would be contrary to common sense to read [Voting Rights Act] § 2(b)'s
reference to political opportunity as a charter of federal courts to embark on the ambitious
project of developing a theory of political equality to be imposed on the Nation.").
617 Id. at 936 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)); cf S. REP. No. 417, at 96, 99 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269,
272 (additional views of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that there is "no core value under the results
test other than election results," with the remaining "totality of the circumstances" questions
asked under the test serving as "straight proportional representation analysis or in terms that
totally substitute for the rule of law an arbitrary case-by-case rule of individual judges"); id.
at 137-38, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 309-10 (report of the Senate Subcommittee on
the Constitution) ("There is no 'core value' under the results test except for ... proportional
representation" and "it affords no guidance to courts in deciding suits," thereby substituting
"the arbitrary discretion of judges"); id. at 236, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 406
(minority views of Sen. East) (maintaining that "[i]t will be the whims of countless federal
614

615
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Justice Thomas went so far as to suggest that, in adjudicating constitutional and
statutory matters, judges are precluded from engaging in any substantive decisionmaking,618 a conclusion that is unsupportable both in terms ofthe nation's democratic
theory 9 and practical reality.62 Yet, if Thomas's reasoning is taken to its logical
conclusion, the judiciary is powerless to intervene in any case in which a simple,
formulaic method of adjudication is not present in the constitutional or statutory text.
Furthermore, even when a principled method exists, such as in the one person, one
vote cases, the Court nevertheless would be precluded from adopting it because of
" ' In short,
the significant substantive choice it would require the Court to make.62
Justice Thomas's democratic theory decimates the Framers' intent to have vigorous,
flexible judicial referees protecting the consent of all the governed.622
All that remained under Justice Thomas's approach is one half of Madison's
republican equation: the simple mantra that the judiciary must respect majority rule.

judges that will have to supplement" the "glaring deficiency" created by the "totality of the
circumstances" test and the proportional representation disclaimer of section 2).
618 See Holder, 512 U.S. at 901-02. As support for this proposition, Justice Thomas cited'
Professor Laurence Tribe: "[N]o strategy [in vote dilution cases] can avoid the necessity for
at least some hard substantive decisions of political theory by the federal judiciary." Id. at
901 n.11 (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-7, at 1076 n.7
(2d ed. 1988)). As previously illustrated, however, Tribe reaches the same conclusion about
all matters of constitutional law. See generally TRIBE & DORF, supra note 262, at 66
("Constitutional value choices cannot be made... without recourse to a system of values that
is at least partly external to the constitutional text .....
69

620

See supra notes 48-280 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 281-580 and accompanying text (describing how every type

of process democracy claims, even the pure process view of voting to which Thomas
subscribes, requires that judicial referees make substantive decisions).
621

See generally supra notes 293-325 and accompanying text (describing the value

choices made by the Court in adopting the one person, one vote standard).
622 The following is perhaps the clearest statement of Justice Thomas's rejection of the
Court's role as a judicial referee in the political process:
That our reading of the [Voting Rights] Act has assigned the judiciary the task
of making the decisions I have described.., should suggest.., that something
in ourjurisprudence has gone awry. We might be mighty Platonic guardians

indeed if Congress had granted us the authority to determine the best form of
local government for every county, city, village, and town in America. But under
our constitutional system, this Court is not a centralized politburo appointed for
life to dictate to the provinces the "correct" theories of democratic
representation, the "best" electoral systems for securing truly "representative"
government, the "fairest" proportions of minority political influence, or... the
"proper" sizes for local governing bodies. We should be cautiousin interpreting
any Act of Congress to grant us power to make such determinations.

Holder,512 U.S. at 912-13 (emphasis added). It was not Congress, but the Constitution that
granted the Court "power to make such determinations." See supra notes 48-280 and
accompanying text.
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Thomas discussed his abiding deference to majority rule in explaining his
"participation" theory of democracy:
Some conceptions of representative government may primarily emphasize
the formal value of the vote as a mechanism for participation in the
electoral process, whether it results in a seat or not. Under such a theory,
minorities unable to control elected posts would not be considered
essentially without a vote; rather, a vote duly cast and counted would be
deemed just as "effective" as any other. If a minority group is unable to
control seats, that result may plausibly be attributed to the inescapable fact
that, in a majoritariansystem, numericalminorities lose elections.623
He buttressed this conclusion with the constraints he would impose upon judicial
decision-making. Thomas used the Court's selection of single-member districts as
a benchmark for vote dilution cases to illustrate his criticism ofjudicial interference
with majority rule:
[D]istricting is merely another political choice made by the citizenry in'
the drafting of their state constitutions. Like other political choices
concerning electoral systems and models of representation, it too is
presumably subject to ajudicial override if it comes into conflict with the
theories of representation and effective voting that we may develop under
the Voting Rights Act.624
Justice Thomas missed the point. The "constitutional conception of democracy"
requires the Court to monitor majority rule when that rule comes at the expense of
denying a minority of voters their basic right to fair and equal access to the full
political process,"' a fundamental premise underlying the Madisonian
Compromise.626 Nevertheless, Thomas found that "the Voting Rights Act supplies
' what "objective standard" to "seize
no rule for court to rely upon in deciding"627
62
upon ... for deciding cases" s is a sufficient basis for the Court to refuse to act at all.
In purporting to avoid matters of democratic theory, Justice Thomas, in fact, adopted
the "majoritarian default" position of constitutional law.629 Of course, in doing so,
Thomas himself has taken the anti-majoritarian action of thwarting congressional
intent to afford broad protection for all process democracy claims brought under the
Voting Rights Act.

623

Id.at 900-01 (emphasis added).

Id. at 911. Thomas also pointed out that the Court had exceeded its constitutional
power in the "political decision" to use single-member districts as a benchmark for vote
dilution cases. Id.
at 897-902.
625 See supranotes 270-77 and accompanying text.
626 See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
627 Holder, 521 U.S. at 896 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62 Id.at 899 n.6.
629 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
624
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While Justice Thomas believes that consent only should be protected to the
extent that it is denied by pure process impediments, a majority of the Court has
declined formally to adopt such a narrow view. In Thornburgv. Gingles,63 ° the Court
reaffirmed its conclusion in Allen that the Voting Rights Act included within its
scope perverted process claims in which consent was denied by vote dilution.631
Furthermore, all of the justices in Gingles seemed to find that by their very nature,
vote dilution claims implicate group rights and not individual rights. Writing for the
63 2
majority, Justice Brennan laid out the three factors of geographical compactness,
political cohesiveness, 633 and majority bloc voting 63 4 which "the minority groupmust
be able to demonstrate" to prove a violation of section 2.635 Justice O'Connor, joined
by the remaining three justices, stated that she would abide by the "approach outlined
in Whitcomb and White," under which "a court should consider all relevant factors
bearing on whether the minority group has 'less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of its
choice.' 63 6 It would seem at first glance, then, that in Gingles, the Court endorsed
strong protection for consent regardless of the particular stage of the political process
in which it is denied.
Nevertheless, appearances can be deceiving. The Court in Gingles laid the
foundation for negating the very protection it purported to convey. As an initial
matter, Justice Brennan's departure from the White "totality of the circumstances"
test in favor of his three factor test placed undue emphasis on the electoral success
of the minority group as the key to a section 2 claim.637 It is unsurprising that Justice

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
See generally id. at 45 n. 10 ("Section 2 prohibits allforms of voting discrimination,
not just vote dilution." (emphasis added)); id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although
§ 2 does not speak in terms of 'vote dilution,' I agree with the Court that proof of vote
dilution can establish a violation of §2 as amended.").
632 Geographical compactness requires that "the minority group... demonstrate that it
is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district." Id.
at 50.
633 According to the Court, "[i]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot
be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority
group interests." Id. at 51.
634 Majority bloc voting requires proof "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running
unopposed, usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id. (citations omitted).
635 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added). The Court held that if members of the
minority group are unable to prove "the potential to elect representatives in the absence of
the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure
or practice." Id at 50 n.17. The Court's reasoning, therefore, implies that section 2 plaintiffs
must demonstrate the existence of a remedy as part of their prima facie case of vote dilution.
636 Id. at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
637 See id. at 48-51, 74-77. The Court subsequently held, in Johnson v. De Grandy, that
courts examining section 2 claims must consider other evidence (including the White/Zimmer
factors described in the Senate Report) in the totality of the circumstances in addition to the
630
631
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Brennan emphasized electoral success because it seemed to provide an objective,
readily quantifiable judicial standard for assessing perverted process claims, in much
the same manner as equal population could be used for the one person, one vote
cases. Of course, the danger in focusing on electoral success is that it neglects
violations of consent at other stages of the political process.63 For example, when
the evidence in Gingles purported to show black electoral success in one of the
' or the election of black
challenged districts-through "descriptive representation,"639
candidates-the Court held that such electoral success was inconsistent with the
plaintiffs' ability to state a claim under section 2.64 Undoubtedly, parliamentary
process claims and many types of perverted process claims not readily discernable
by electoral success or failure also are left out of the Gingles formula for analyzing
claims under section 2. "Consent" thereby is narrowed to mean little more than
"electoral success" under this judicial redefinition of the scope of the right to vote
protected under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

three Gingles factors. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-13 (1994).
Nevertheless, the Court in De Grandy also made it clear that proportionality-a key indicator
of electoral success-is an important fact "to be analyzed when determining whether
members of a minority group have 'less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."' Id. at 1000
(qboting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)). As a result, even after De Grandy, electoral success
remains the touchstone of section 2 vote dilution claims.
638 See generally De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000 (observing that the Court's focus on
electoral success has led to "[ilssues of voter participation, effective representation, and
policy responsiveness... [being] omitted from the calculus"); Abrams, supranote 56, at 452
("In Gingles, the Court focused exclusively on the electoral portion of... [the section 2]
guarantee, ignoring the statute's apparent protection of participation in other facets of the
political process."); Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals
of Section 2 Without Sacrificing the IntegrationIdeal, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 405, 412
(1991) ("Although the Supreme Court may have intended its decision to apply only to the
facts presented in the case, Gingles threatens to narrow the concept of 'political participation'
to electoral success."); Sharon N. Humble, Case Note, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 569, 586 n.66
("The Court's exclusive focus on the statutory language guaranteeing the opportunity of
minorities to elect representatives results in the Court's ignoring already existing statutory
language requiring equal participation in the political process.").
639 See supra notes 250-51, 255 and accompanying text.
640 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77; id at 104-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf De Grandy,

512 U.S. at 1000 ("[N]o violation of § 2 can be found ... where, in spite of continuing
discrimination and racial bloc voting, minority voters form effective voting majorities in a
number of voting districts roughly proportional to the minority voters' respective shares in
the voting-age population."). According to Lani Guinier, the Court's holding in Gingles
shows that the Court "clearly established 'descriptive' proportional representation as the
ceiling" in section 2 cases. Guinier, supra note 240, at 1636. The Court's rejection of
parliamentary process claims in Etowah shows the Court is disinclined to afford any
protection for substantive representation to the extent it cannot discern a readily identifiable
equal protection violation. See supra notes 457-506 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor seized on the majority's reasoning to attack the apparent results
of its conclusion: "[E]lectoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard,
as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and.. .'the elements of a vote dilution claim
create an entitlement to roughly proportional representation." 64 ' Such reliance on
electoral success thereby forces courts to confront directly and to overturn majority
rule primarily on the basis of election results. Many lower courts have used Justice
O'Connor's criticism of the Court's electoral success standard in Gingles as a basis
to reject perverted process claims, even in the face of extensive sociological and
narrative data showing the systematic exclusion of minority voters from the political
process. By making it appear that vote dilution is grounded upon a claim of lack of
proportional representation, it becomes far easier for the reviewing court to reject the
claim on the basis of the proportional representation disclaimer contained in
section 2.642 What frequently results, of course, is the adoption by lower courts of the
majoritarian default, sustaining a denial of consent in favor of majority rule.
Moreover, in its attempts to provide a judicially manageable standard for
actionable vote dilution, the Court in Gingles divided on the key issue of what
evidence could be used to prove a violation of section 2. On the one hand, a majority
of the Court approved the use of bivariate ecological regression analysis," 3 which is
used to determine if there is political cohesiveness and majority bloc voting by
showing whether members of the majority and minority groups vote differently from
one another.6 On the other hand, the justices were unable to secure a majority on
whether the cause of racially polarized voting is relevant. Justice Brennan, joined by
three other justices, believed causation was not relevant. According to Justice
Brennan, a vote dilution claim could be stated under section 2 as long as "the use of
a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected group
having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice."" 5

-1 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Many commentators have agreed
with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that electoral success has become the central inquiry
under Gingles. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1093 (1991); Daniel D.
Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of RacialGerrymandering
Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REv. 652, 663 n.60 (1993).
642 See supra notes 554-55 and accompanying text.
643 Bivariate ecological regression analysis "determine[s] the degree of relationship
between two variables-here the relationship between the racial [or ethnic] composition in
each political unit (the independent variable) and the support provided a particular candidate
within that political unit (the dependent variable)." Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1119 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1252 (1994).
64 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21.
64 Id. at 63 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Justice White, who joined with Justice
Brennan in most of his opinion, disagreed with this portion of the opinion because of Justice
Brennan's distinction between the race of the voter and of the candidate in the identification
of racially polarized voting. See id. at 82 (White, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor, joined by three other justices, disagreed with Justice
Brennan's assessment. Justice O'Connor stated:
Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is
admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive
and to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants
cannot rebut this showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial
voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other than race, such
as an underlying divergence in the interests of minority and white voters.
I do not agree, however, that such evidence can never affect the overall
dilution inquiry. Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority
group in a particular election was rejected by white voters for reasons
other than those which made that candidate the preferred choice of the
minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question
whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority
candidates. Such evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally
preferred by the minority group, might be able to attract greater white
support in future elections.
I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons why
white voters rejected minority candidates would be probative of the
likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support
would be willing to take the minority's interests into account. 6
Justice O'Connor's error in focusing upon the cause of racially polarized voting is
twofold. First, it diverts the inquiry from one of determining whether consent has
been denied by a particular voting structure or mechanism to an examination of the
reasons for the violation of consent, something Congress expressly disclaimed in the
1982 amendments to section 2 .7 As a corollary to the first error, an examinination
of causation also creates a proxy for inquiring into the intent of the governmental and
private persons who have deprived a minority group of its ability to consent, thereby
opening the door for resurrecting the Bolden intent test. In the absence of such
"racial animus" or "discriminatory intent," it becomes much easier for defendants to
"explain away" even egregious denials of consent through non-racial factors such as
different partisan affiliations and socioeconomic backgrounds. Justice Thomas
apparently has recognized the difficulty that section 2 claimants will have in
establishing causation because he has seized upon that onerous evidentiary burden
as yet another reason to leave perverted process claims unprotected. 648
Like Gingles, Holder v. Hall also laid the foundation for implicitly limiting
protection of racial or ethnic consent under section 2. In Holder, black voters
challenged the use of a single-commissioner form of county government under
section 2,6 9 claiming that the county "must have a county commission of sufficient
Id. at 100 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
See supra note 562 and accompanying text.
See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 904 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
" They also brought claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which the

646
"
648
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size that, with single-member election districts, the county's black citizens would
constitute a majority in one of the single-member districts"."' The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim.6"' In reaching this result, Justice Kennedy drew on Justice
O'Connor's language in Gingles that "in order to decide whether an electoral system
has made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must
have an idea in mind of how hard it should be for minority voters to elect their
'
preferred candidates under an acceptable system."652
Justice Kennedy therefore
found that "where there is no objective and workable standard for choosing a
reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows
'
that the voting practice cannot be challenged as dilutive under § 2." 653
As a result,
Justice Kennedy concluded the black voters' claim had to fail because "[t]here is no
principled reason why one size [of a government body] should be picked over
'
another as a benchmark for comparison."654
The Holder plurality's reasoning harbors dangerous implications for the
protection of minority consent. As Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent, the
Court's holding substantially cut back on the "broad construction" of the Voting
Rights Act given by the Court in cases such as Allen and endorsed by Congress.65 5
In addition, Holder effectively can be used to bar an otherwise successful vote
dilution claim by preventing imposition of a remedy that alters certain features of the
challenged voting system or structure. Such a result is contrary to the 'general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law whenever that right is invaded."'656 In its attempt to get around this
problem, the Holder plurality engaged in the circular reasoning that the absence of
a remedy-i.e., a benchmark within the government's voting system to evaluate the
challenged practice-meant that no legal right had been invaded. Moreover, the
plurality's logic is particularly troubling because there is little to distinguish the lack
of a "principled reason why one size [of a government body] should be picked over

district court rejected. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 877-78. The constitutional claims were not
before the Supreme Court on appeal. See id at 880.
650 Id. at 878.
651 See id. at 885 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.); id at 891
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part); id, at 946 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
652 Holder, 512 U.S. at 880 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
653 Id at 881 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). Although Justice Kennedy's opinion on this
point was written for only a plurality of three justices, Justices Thomas and Scalia indicated
that Justice Kennedy had "persuasively demonstrate[d] that there is no principled method for
determining a benchmark against which the size of a governing body might be compared to
determine whether it dilutes a group's voting power." Id. at 891 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ.,
concurring).
614 Id at 881 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.).
651 Id. at 949 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
616 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*23).
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another as the benchmark for comparison,""3 7 from the Court's selection in Gingles
of single-member districts as a benchmark for challenges to multimember districts.658
Holder'snarrow construction of the judicial role in protecting consent has caused
some lower courts to give unrelenting deference to the state's interest in maintaining
challenged voting structures at the expense of fair and effective representation for all
voters.659
While, in Gingles and Holder, the Court laid the foundation for implicitly
limiting protection of racial or ethnic minority consent under section 2, the Court
took a more direct approach in Shaw v. Reno.' Shaw v. Reno involved a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan by white
voters who alleged that the plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander."'
' majorityThe North Carolina legislature had created two "unusually shaped"662
minority black districts after the Department of Justice refused to grant section6653
preclearance to an earlier plan which only created one majority-minority district.
Under the plan, white voters, who comprised seventy-eight percent of the state's
population, would still control eighty-three percent of the congressional seats (ten out
of the twelve seats).' The plaintiffs alleged the legislature deliberately sacrificed
traditional districting criteria "'to create Congressional Districts along racial lines'
and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress." 5 It would seem
that the legislature's desire to ensure black electoral success was consistent with a
desire to avoid section 2 liability because in Gingles the Court had made electoral
success the gravamen of a vote dilution claim. The question before the Court was
whether the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim. 6
In addressing this issue, the Court faced two obstacles. First, the Court began by
reaffirming its view that the group right to a vote free of dilution was protected under
section 2.667 Second, the Court was confronted by its earlier opinion in United
Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburgh,Inc. v. Carey ("UJO"), in which it denied
a challenge by Hasidic Jews in suburban New York who alleged that the creation of
nonwhite majority-minority districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment when white
voters as a group were provided with fair representation. 8 Both of these obstacles
seemed to preclude any constitutional claim the Shaw v. Reno plaintiffs might have
Holder, 512 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.).
Justice Thomas made the same point in his Holderconcurrence. See supra note 624.
659 See infra notes 815-34 and accompanying text.
660 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
661 See id. at 633-39.
662 Id. at 635.
663 See id. at 634-35.
664 See id at 634; id at 666-67 (White, J., dissenting).
665 Id at 637.
666 See id at 633-34.
667 See id at 640-41. As the Court noted, the 1982 amendments to section 2 were designed
to "prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group's voting strength,
regardless of the legislature's intent." Id at 641 (second emphasis added).
668 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
657
658
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had: white voters in North Carolina as a group enjoyed better than proportional
representation, making it impossible to state claims for either vote dilution or
discriminatory effects.669
Despite these problems, the Court held that the Shaw v. Reno plaintiffs could
state an "analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting
districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification" 6 7 -- in other words, a
"constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process."67 The
majority reached this conclusion by engaging in what Justice White called a decision
"not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO" and the Court's section 2
jurisprudence.672 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor distinguished UJO by
reasoning that it "set forth a standard under which white voters can establish
unconstitutional vote dilution" which "simply does not apply where . . . a
reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately
'
offends principles of racial equality."673
Instead, Justice O'Connor found
674
675
Gomillion and Wright v. Rockefeller to be on point-an opinion
which the Shaw
676 and many commentators do not share. 677
dissenters
Reno
v.
66 See discussion infra note 684.
670 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 652.
671 Id at 641-42. Much of the language of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Shaw
v. Reno mirrors similar views stated in the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution's views
of the constitutionality of the amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Compare
discussion of Shaw v. Reno, supra notes 660-70 and infra notes 672-94, with S. REP. No.
417, at 110-11, 147-51, 172-73, 180 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 281-82,
320-23, 345-46, 352 (report of the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution).
672 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
673 Id. at 652.
674 See supra notes 425-31 and accompanying text.
675 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (assuming that the allegation that the statute segregated voters on
the basis of race in drawing congressional districts stated a constitutional claim, but holding
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent).
676 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 664-70 (White, J.,
dissenting); id.
at 677-79 (Stevens,
J.,
dissenting); id, at 685-87 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
677 See generally Karlan, supra note 221, at 278 ("[D]espite the Court's invocations of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot and Wright v. Rockefeller, in reality, Shaw v. Reno represents a
dramatic departure from the prior case law."); Parker, supra note 17, at 30
(The Shaw [v. Reno] Court also thought that the Court's voting rights precedents,
Guinn, Gomillion, and Wright v. Rockefeller-involving mostly Fifteenth
Amendment, not Fourteenth Amendment claims-were racial classification cases
in which the Court applied strict scrutiny without proof of discriminatory intent.
However, this constitutional revisionism runs up against the Court's description
of these very same cases as discriminatory purpose cases in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.);
Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality, The Public
Interest,and the PoliticsofRepresentation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION,

supra note 7, at 136-40 (concluding the "distinction between UJO as a vote dilution claim
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According to Justice O'Connor and the Shaw v. Reno majority, Gomillion and
Wright held that a constitutional claim could be stated when reapportionment statutes
that were race-neutral on their face678 had the effect of leaving minority voters
"fenced out" of the political process.679 Under such circumstances, the majority
found that a pure process claim denying individual access had been stated.
[The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause] is to prevent the
States from purposefully discriminating between individualson the basis
of race. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial
grounds fall within the core of that prohibition.
Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race "are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality." They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason
of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individualswho belong
to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical
and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance
to political apartheid. It reinforces the perceptions that members of the
same racial group--regardless of their age, education, economic status,
and Shaw as an 'analytically distinct' claim" was "less tenable" in light of the UJO plaintiffs'
explicit allegations of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering). But see Timothy G.
O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 51 n.32 (maintaining that Justice O'Connor properly
distinguished UJO in her Shaw v. Reno opinion); Mark E. Rush, The Price of Unclear
Precedents: Shaw v. Reno and the Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at 33-36 (asserting that Shaw v.
Reno marked a break from UJO, but only to the extent that it "represents a reconsideration
of a cause of action that failed to win the sympathy of a majority of the Justices" in UJO);
David B. Sentelle, Speech: RacialGerrymandering,45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1251 (1996)
("The Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot recognized and roundly condemned that act
of the Alabama legislature in walling out voters because of their race. Justice O'Connor for
the majority in Shaw v. Reno does the same thing."); cf Issacharoff, supra note 323, at 1268
(agreeing with Judge Sentelle that Shaw v. Reno merely reiterated the Court's conclusion in
Gomillion that racial gerrymandering is subject to constitutional review, but implying strict
scrutiny is not necessarily appropriate as in Gomillion because "racial demands for
representation [do not] constitute anything more than a more cartographically imaginative
version of what has always gone on in back-room redistricting").
678 See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 646 (stating that reapportionment and
redistricting plans typically are facially race-neutral because they usually do not "classify
persons at all," but instead classify "tracts of land, or addresses").
679 Id. at 644-47.
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or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.68
Justice O'Connor went on to cite with approval Justice Douglas's dissent in Wright
that suggested a color-blind society when "the individual is important, not his race,
his creed, or his color."6 '' Because the Shaw v. Reno majority drew a parallel
between the "fencing out" in Gomillion and the stigma that individual voters faced
in racial gerrymandering and the "balkanization" or representational harm it
purportedly fostered,6" 2 the five justices ruled that the plaintiffs stated a cognizable
pure process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 83 Of course, the four
dissenting justices strongly disagreed with the Court's holding, reasoning that no
individual pure process claim was alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint.684
642-43, 647 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
648 (emphasis added) (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
682 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 657.
683 See id. at 658.
684 Justice White explained the majority's error:
To date, we have held that only two types of state voting practices could give
rise to a constitutional claim. The first involves direct and outright deprivation
of the right to vote [a pure process claim], for example by means of a poll tax or
literacy test. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by [plaintiffs'] allegations and
need not detain us further. The second type of unconstitutional practice is that
which "affects the political strength of various groups" [the remaining process
democracy claims], in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As for this latter
680 Id. at
681 Id at

category, we have insisted that members of the political or racial group

demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly
diminishing their influence on the political process.
Id. at 659-60 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Cf id. at 681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(In districting... the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of
another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others ... . 'Dilution' thus
refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power
viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group.
(emphasis added)). Justice White went on to find that the goal of "improving the minority
group's prospects of electing a candidate of its choice" did not implicate discriminatory
intent and, even if it did, there was no discriminatory effect because white voters still enjoyed
better than proportional representation. See id at 666-67 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, there
was no unconstitutional deprivation of a group right free of dilution. See id. at 673-75
(White, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions are replete with additional references to the
treatment of geographical process claims-such as the one alleged in Shaw v. Reno-as a
group right. See generally id. at 661 (White, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have asked that an
identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a

successful gerrymandering claim." (emphasis added)); id at 663 (White, J., dissenting)
("[T]he group must exhibit 'strong indicia of lack of political power and the demand of fair
representation"' (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986))); id. at 676
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the
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While Shaw v. Reno simply stood for the proposition that allegations that a
district is racially gerrymandered states a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,
other language contained in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion did not bode well
for continued protection of vote dilution claims under section 2. First, Justice
O'Connor made it clear that even when a legislature engaged in efforts to afford
minorities equal access to the political process, if the plaintiffs proved the legislature
did so by racial gerrymandering then strict scrutiny would apply to the challenged
districts.68 In reaching this conclusion, the majority's opinion contained extensive
citations to Croson8 6 and Wygant,687 two opinions which interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause in a manner that marked a significant retreat from affirmative
action measures designed to level the playing field for minorities.688 The threat that
these decisions posed to remedial measures for minorities in legislative and
congressional reapportionment could not be overstated, as Justice O'Connor wrote:
"We have made clear, however, that equal protection analysis is 'not-dependent on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.""'6 9 Rather, she
emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment protected "'personal rights' guaranteed
'
to the individual and not to groups."69

Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular
group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly."
(emphasis added)); id at 678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The difference between
constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders [is] whether their purpose is to enhance the
power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority
group. ... " (emphasis added)). In the same vein, much of the criticism that commentators
have leveled at Shaw v. Reno is that, at least with respect to districting claims (deemed
geographical process claims in this Article), the Court made a dramatic shift from the grouprights focus which had been the norm, see United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1977); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971), to
an individual-rights focus that simply is incompatible with claims that are not based merely
on lack of ballot access. See, e.g., Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supranote 240; Jennifer L. Gilg,
Note, Back to the Drawing Board: Equal ProtectionClashes with the Voting Rights Act in

Shaw v. Reno, NEB. L. REV. 383, 399-400 (1994); Mark E. Rush, The Price of Unclear
Precedents: Shaw v. Reno and the Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at 30-42.
685 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 658; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies when a "legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles.., to racial considerations").
686 Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
687 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Elections, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
68 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642-43, 650-51, 656; see also supra note 583
(summarizing the holdings of these decisions). Some commentators, however, correctly have
found that section 2 is not an affirmative action statute. See supra note 7.
689 Id. at 650-51 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion)).
690 Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality, The
Public Interest, and the Politics of Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 132 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
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Second, the Shaw v. Reno Court suggested that while the "States certainly have
a very strong interest in complying with federal anti-discrimination laws that are
constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied," such compliance does not
insulate the States from a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.69 ' Justice White
disagreed, stating that he had "no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting
Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. 69 2 He distinguished Croson and
Wygant by reasoning that "state efforts to remedy vote dilution are wholly unlike
what typically has been labeled 'affirmative action' because "[t]o the extent that no
other racial group is injured, remedying a Voting Rights Act violation does not
involve preferential treatment."693 Justice White concluded that the "Equal
Protection Clause... surely, does not stand in the way" of using the Voting Rights
Act "to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in
'
the political process."694
Nevertheless, the "analytically distinct" claim created in
Shaw v. Reno bore an ill wind for broad protection of the consent of minority groups.
The Court's clarifications of the contours of the Shaw v. Reno Fourteenth
Amendment challenge in subsequent decisions proved just how narrow the protection
for statutory perverted process claims would be. After the North Carolina case came
back before the Court in Shaw v. Hunt,695 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
majority which included Justice O'Connor, retreated from Justice O'Connor's
conclusion in Shaw v. Reno that a vote dilution claim under section 2 was a group
right:
To accept that [a] district [designed to remedy a voting rights violation]
may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate
right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs
to the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does
6
69

not.

In addition, the Court continued to engage in a fundamental shift away from the basic
'
premise that the Voting Rights Act "was not limited to remedying past harms."697
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 653-54.
Id at 674 (White, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor subsequently agreed with this point
in her concurrence in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990-95 (1996). See infranotes 705-06 and
accompanying text.
693 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 675 (White, J., dissenting).
694 Id (White, J., dissenting); see also id at 680-81 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the
need "to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the
districting plans they adopt").
695 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
696 Id. at 917 (emphasis added) (citing the reference in the Voting Rights Act to "the right
of any citizen").
697 Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality, The
Public Interest, and the Politics of Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 138 & n.46; see also Mark E. Rush, The Priceof Unclear
Precedents: Shaw v. Reno and the Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at 25 (noting the leeway which
691

692
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Instead, applying the reasoning of Croson and Wygant just as Shaw v. Reno had
foreshadowed, the Court held that a state must have a "'strong basis in evidence' for
believing it is violating the Act" before it can take steps to assure that all voters have
equal access to the political process.698
Perhaps the most troubling conclusion the Court reached came in Bush v. Vera,699
in which Justice O'Connor wrote in her plurality opinion that a state remained free
to rely upon political data to draw districts-even when that data resulted in political
gerrymandering that benefited majority groups at the expense of those in the
minority-but a state could not use similar data to engage in racial gerrymandering
that created equal participational opportunities for minority voters."'
This final point creates the ominous presence of conflict between the group rights
protected under the Voting Rights Act and the individual right protected under a
Shaw v. Reno-like Fourteenth Amendment claim.'' Echoing the words of Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Shaw v. Reno," 2 Justice Stevens noted in his Vera dissent:
After Miller and today's decisions, States may find it extremely difficult
to avoid litigation flowing from decennial redistricting. On one hand,
States will risk violating the Voting Rights Act if they fail to create

the Court previously had given to states in their attempts to comply with the Voting Rights
Act).
698 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 908-09 n.4; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922
(1995).
699 507 U.S. 952 (1996).

100 Id. at 969-70. Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, in which Justice Scalia joined,
leaves no question that a majority of the justices agreed with the plurality opinion on this
point. See id. at 999-1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70 Many commentators have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Bernard Grofinan,
The Supreme Court, The Voting Rights Act, and Minority Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 187-89; Samuel Issacharoff, The
RedistrictingMorass, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 209;
Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality, The Public
Interest,and the Politics ofRepresentation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION,
supra note 7, at 131, 141, 149-52; Mark E. Rush, The Price of UnclearPrecedents: Shaw
v. Reno and the Evolution of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 29, 42.
702 Justice Stevens noted that the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno "suggests that AfricanAmericans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific
benefits from redistricting." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 679 n.4. Justice Stevens observed:
If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for
rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for
Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for
the members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave
birth to the Equal Protection Clause. A contrary conclusion could only be
described as perverse.
Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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majority-minority districts. If they create those districts, however, they
may open themselves to liability under Shaw and its progeny.7" 3
When racial minorities have their consent denied, most remedial measures
adopted under the Voting Rights Act necessarily must be race-based."'
Consequently, when new districts are created to avoid or correct a section 2 violation,
they undoubtedly would be considered the product of "racial gerrymandering" and
trigger strict scrutiny under Shaw v. Reno. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor tried to
reconcile the Voting Rights Act with the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that the
results test under section 2 "canco-exist in principle and in practice with Shaw"
under a principled judicial framework.7 5 O'Connor reasoned that a state's interest
in avoiding section 2 liability was compelling, and there would be no equal
protection violation "if a State pursues that compelling interest by creating a district
that 'substantially addresses' the potential liability and does not deviate substantially
from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for predominately racial reasons." 7" Yet,
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Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1037 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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See Anthony A. Peacock, Shaw v. Reno and the Voting Rights Conundrum: Equality,

The Public Interest, and the Politics of Representation, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

AND

REPRESENTATION, supra note 7, at 145-46; see also infra note 835 and accompanying text.
705 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 990 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d
1414, 1424-26 (11 th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing the Shaw v. Reno and Miller standards for
racial gerrymandering from the Gingles standards for racially polarized voting).
706 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 994 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 918 (1996)). In fact, in a recent ruling, the Court summarily affirmed a three judge
panel's conclusion that the Fourth Congressional District in Illinois, a racially gerrymandered
Hispanic majority-minority district in Chicago designed to remedy a section 2 violation,
survived strict scrutiny analysis. See King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.
III. 1996) (three judge panel), affd, 118 S.Ct. 877 (1998). The Court's lack of any
explanation for its decision in King, however, leaves lower courts without guidance as to how
they are to reconcile section 2 remedies with the Fourteenth Amendment Shaw v. Reno claim.
In addition, the Court summarily has affirmed at least two cases in which separate three judge
courts upheld majority-minority districts in California and Ohio by concluding that they did
not constitute "racial gerrymanders." See Quilter v. Voinovich, 981 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (three judge panel), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.
Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three judge panel), affd in part,appealdismissed in part,515
U.S. 1170 (1995). Again, the summary affirmances provide no guidance as to what
differentiates these particular cases from those in which the courts found that the particular
districting plan was adopted for primarily race-based reasons. In his concurring opinion in
Bush v. Vera, Justice Scalia made it clear that the lower courts should not read too much into
DeWitt, which "cannot justify exempting intentional race-based redistricting from [the
Court's] well-established Fourteenth Amendment [Shaw v. Reno] standard," and did not
"eviscerate the explicit holding of Adarandor [ undermine the force of our discussion of
Georgia's concessions [of racial gerrymandering] in Miller." Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 100102 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In fact, Justice Scalia expressly noted probable jurisdiction in both
King and Quilter,giving some indication as to his disagreement with the conclusions reached
in those cases. See Quilter, 118 S.Ct. 1358; King, 118 S.Ct. at 877.
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it is hard to agree with Justice O'Connor that such a framework will allow states to
play a "primary role," with courts relegated to "their secondary role."70 7
In fact, the opposite is true. The irony of the Shaw v. Reno line of cases is that
the Court has intervened in its role as judicial referee over the political process to
stop the states from enhancingminority access to the political process. This result
was not lost on Justice Ginsburg. In her Millerdissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out
that under Madisonian democracy, it generally is unnecessary for the judiciary to
provide protection for those in the majority:
Special circumstances justify vigilant judicial inspection to protect
minority voters-circumstances that do not apply to majority voters. A
history of exclusion from state politics left minorities without clout to
extract provisions for fair representation in the lawmaking forum. The
equal protection rights of minority voters thus could have remained
unrealized absent the Judiciary's close surveillance. The majority, by
definition, encounters no such blockage. White voters in Georgia do not
lack means to exert strong pressure on their state legislators. The force
of their numbers is itself a powerful determiner of what the legislature
will do that does not coincide with perceived majority interests.7' 8
Once districts of equal population are in place, the republican principle of
majority rule will secure the rights of those in the majority."° Therefore, when the
courts overturn legislative measures designed to ensure the equal opportunity of
minority groups to consent, they engage in anti-majoritarian action which is
unjustifiable because it enhances the exclusion of those minority groups from the
political process. Judicial tyranny has replaced majority tyranny.
Thus, while a majority of the Court has declined to go as far as Justice Thomas
did in Holder in the scope of protection it gives to minority consent, the result of its
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 995 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In light of the lack of
guidance provided by the Court's Shaw v. Reno jurisprudence, see supra note 706, it seems
likely that the federal courts will litigate more cases to determine if either a Fourteenth
Amendment or section 2 violation has occurred.
70 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 948 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing to the
exhortation in the Carolene Products footnote to engage in a "more searching judicial
inquiry" for classifications adversely affecting "discrete and insular minorities"); see supra
note 330 (discussing the CaroleneProducts footnote).
" See supra notes 82, 324 and accompanying text. In some of the Shaw v. Reno
challenges, the Justice Department refused to give section 5 preclearance to redistricting
plans that did not provide greater opportunities for minority representation. See, e.g., Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 911-13; Miller, 515 U.S. at 906-07. Under such circumstances, it might
be argued that the redistricting plans adopted in these states were not the product of majority
rule. Such an argument would be mistaken. States always retain the right to challenge the
Justice Department's refusal to give section 5 preclearance, by filing an action in federal
court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The failure of the states to do so in Shaw v. Reno and
Miller explicitly endorses their redistricting plans as the products of majority rule in the
appropriate legislative bodies.
707
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decisions in Gingles and Shaw v. Reno is largely the same. Voting is seen as an
individual and not a group right, without any distinctions between the different types
of process democracy claims. Flexible judicial referees, who determine whether
minority consent has been denied through application of a functional approach to the
"totality of the circumstances" of the electoral system or mechanism, are replaced
with inflexible judges who apply rigid formulaic criteria to "avoid" making
substantive decisions or engaging in matters of democratic theory. These criteria,
which were set forth in Gingles and further elaborated on in De Grandy,71° redefine
consent to mean electoral success, thereby leaving minorities unprotected at many
stages in the political process. Even when a claimant apparently succeeds in
demonstrating vote dilution under the Court's theory of democracy, it is often a
hollow victory, with the use of mechanisms such as proportionality or causation to
explain away the electoral injury.
Moreover, the elevation of the "color blind" equal protection claim created in
Shaw v. Reno makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to devise a group-based
remedy for dilution that the courts will not strike down under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This paradoxical result has a number of significant consequences.
Preliminarily, the Court effectively has reversed the role of the judicial referee from
one of protecting the minority from majority tyranny to one of protecting the majority
from equal access to the political process by minorities in all but individual access
cases. As a corollary to the first point, the Court now sustains majority rule at the
expense of "fair and effective representation" for those in the minority. The
Founding Fathers surely would reel in disbelief at this distortion of the Madisonian
Compromise. Moreover, the Court has used its interpretative powers under the selfexecuting sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to set the floor and
the ceiling for congressional protection under the enforcement sections of those
Amendments. In doing so, the Court has all but conflated the protection of consent
under the Voting Rights Act with the limits of the Equal Protection Clause. In
addition, the Court has upset the delicate checks and balances scheme that the
Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments devised, negating the Framers' intention
that Congress could provide more expansive protection for the right to vote under its
enforcement powers when the Court failed to do so. The injury done to separation
of powers is almost as great as the damage done to the right to vote.
In sum, the Court's actions evince a democratic theory whereby "the right to vote
is granted in form but denied in substance."7 1 In the Court's attempts to "avoid"
engaging in substantive decisions on matters of democratic theory it has done just the
opposite, destroying the democratic theory that Congress codified in section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Specifically, a majority of this activist Court indirectly has
accomplished what Justice Thomas proposed to do by direct means in his Holder
concurrence: judicially abrogate the use of section 2 to protect minority consent
beyond individual ballot access. In the process, the Court has made it more likely
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See supra note 637.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that "the right to vote provides the politically powerless with nothing more than the
right to cast meaningless ballots."7 2
B. PervertedProcess. JudicialReferees and the Reinforcement of
Majority Tyranny
In the face of a line of Supreme Court decisions which are increasingly hostile
to the rights of all voters to have fair and effective participation in the political
process, it is unsurprising that the lower federal courts also have become tacit
accomplices to wrongful violations of consent. A growing number of district and
appellate decisions have relied upon the Court's jurisprudence to find ways to
"explain away" even the most egregious cases of majority tyranny. In doing so, these
courts have redefined what "consent" means. They have shifted away from
section 2's protection of the rights of individuals and groups to fair and equal
opportunities to participate in government, towards an inconsistent view that restricts
such "participation" to unobstructed individual access to the ballot box. At the same
time, these courts have limited their roles as referees over the political process,
respecting majority rule at the expense of protecting minority groups from the
tyranny of that rule. What has resulted is a perversion of the political process and of
the role of the judiciary in protecting fair and equal opportunities to participate in it.
This section will outline three principle bases that lower courts have used to
refrain from remedying wrongful deprivations of consent. First, several courts have
relied upon partisan politics as a means to nullify a factual showing that widespread,
systematic, majority bloc voting denies minority consent.7 3 LULACI74 is the most
representative example of this line of cases. Second, other courts have interpreted
section 2 as including a requirement of proof that racial bias or animus has driven the
voting community to reject consistently a racial or ethnic minority group's candidates
of choice.715 Judge Tjoflat's opinions in Solomon716 and Nipper"7 are characteristic
of this school of thought. Third, some courts either have rested their rejection of a
section 2 claim on the absence of a viable remedy under Holder, or have refused to
impose a remedy for a section 2 violation in the face of the Court's admonition in
Shaw v. Reno that race-conscious relief is presumptively unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.7"' During the course of this discussion, this section will
outline the implications of this judicial activism by the lower courts.

Id.at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 See supra notes 719-60 and accompanying text.
7 14 League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC II"),
999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
75 See supranotes 761-810 and accompanying text.
716 Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012 (11 th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
717Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
718 See supranotes 811-48 and accompanying text.
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1. Judge Higginbotham's LULAC II Opinion: Partisan Politics
A growing number of federal courts are rejecting section 2 claims on the basis
that partisan politics and not race causes majority bloc voting.1 9 Judge
Higginbotham's majority opinion in LULAC 11720 is representative of this line of
decisions. In LULAC II, black and Hispanic voters alleged that the use of at-large
districts in the election of state courtjudges in nine Texas counties diluted their votes
in violation of section 2.12 The district court found a violation in each of the
counties by holding that plaintiffs only need show that minorities and non-Hispanic
white voters generally supported different candidates-and not the reasons for those
differences-in establishing the third Gingles factor of majority bloc voting.722 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court erred by failing to consider nonracial causes of voting preferences, such as partisan affiliation, in its analysis of
racially polarized voting. 723 The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that "[e]lectoral losses
that are attributable to partisan politics do not implicate the protections of § 2. ' '724
See generally Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d
1281, 1293-94 (11 th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming lower court's holding that factors other
than race, including party politics and the lack of qualified minority candidates, were
responsible for the results of at-large elections of Alabama trial judges), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1045 (1996); Houston v. Lafayette County, 56 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
evidence of divergent voting patterns attributable to partisan affiliation or interests other than
race is probative in a vote dilution action on the issue of a minority group's future success
at the polls, but evidence that fails to evaluate voters' possible motivations is still relevant);
Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Voting
Rights Act does not guarantee that nominees of the Democratic Party will be elected, even
if black voters are likely to favor that party's candidates."), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907
(1993); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("The results
test of VRA § 2 protects racial minorities against a stacked deck but it does not guarantee that
they will enjoy a winning hand-i.e., an electoral structure is not illegal if defeat represents
nothing more than the routine operation of political factors."), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that evidence that partisan politics caused majority bloc voting precluded section
2 claim); Armstrong v. Allain, 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1329 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (noting that the
LULAC H holding requires a court to look "not only at the results but also at probable
explanations for election results, e.g., race, interest-group politics, etc."); Harper v. City of
Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 790-92 (N.D. III. 1993) (discussing role of partisan
affiliation in assessing majority bloc voting); Arizonans for Fair Representation v.
Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684 (D. Ariz. 1992) (three judge panel) (finding that majority bloc
voting resulted from partisan affiliation, and not race or ethnicity), aff'd sub nom. Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce v. Arizonans for Fair Representation, 507 U.S. 981 (1993).
720 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC
11"), 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
721 See id.at 837.
722 See id at 850.
723 See id.
724 Id. at 863.
719
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According to Judge Higginbotham, "[w]hen the record indisputably proves that
partisan affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting patterns among
minority and white citizens

. . .

the district court's judgment [in favor of the

'
plaintiffs] must be reversed."725
In reaching the conclusion that the vote dilution inquiry must consider causation
(and party affiliation in particular), Judge Higginbotham relied upon two primary
sources: Whitcomb v. Chavis726 and Justice O'Connor's Gingles concurrence. 27 The
LULACIImajorityfound that Whitcomb's rejection of dilution based upon "political
defeat at the polls 7 2' required courts to "undertake the additional inquiry into the
reasons for, or causes of, ... electoral losses in order to determine whether they were
the product of'partisan politics' or 'racial vote dilution,' 'political defeat' or 'built-in
bias."'729 Similarly, the majority endorsed Justice O'Connor's approach in Gingles
which rejected limiting proof of majority bloc voting to whether the majority and
minority citizens usually supported different candidates "in favor of an inquiry into
the possible explanations of these divergent voting patterns."73 Therefore, the

Id.at 850. Commentators widely have criticized Judge Higginbotham's conclusion.
See, e.g., Grofman & Handley, supra note 20, at 222-33; Matthew M. Hoffman, The
725

Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935,
991-92 (1996) (describing LULAC I as an "outlier in § 2 caselaw"); Karlan & Levinson,
supra note 7, at 1223 (noting that "[t]he many difficulties attending the disaggregation of
race and politics ... all result from the fact that race and political affiliation are, in fact,
substantially correlated"); Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, OneVote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1178-79 (1996)
(rejecting LULAC 11's "resurrection of an intent requirement for vote dilution"). For an
additional discussion of the problems of permitting proof of the causes of majority bloc
voting, see infra note 775.
726 See supra notes 540-44 and accompanying text.
727 See supra notes 646-47 and accompanying text.
728 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
729 LULACI1, 999 F.2d at 853-54. On the other hand, Judge King asserted in her dissent
that Whitcomb does not support the majority's conclusion. Rather, she contended that
Whitcomb stands for the proposition that where there is evidence of partisan
voting or interest group politics and no evidence that members of the minority
group have an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on
account of race or color, the minority group's vote dilution claim will fail.
joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
Id.at 907 (King, J.,
730 Id at 857. Judge Higginbotham stated that a majority of the justices in Gingles
endorsed Justice O'Connor's acceptance of causal evidence. See id at 851, 855-58. As Judge
King properly pointed out in her dissent, however, Justice White only agreed with Justice
O'Connor's conclusion "that the race of the candidate is relevant to the racial bloc voting
inquiry," and not "that minority plaintiffs must negate partisan politics ... in order to
demonstrate polarized voting." Id.at 906-07 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson,
J., dissenting); see also supra note 645 (discussing why Justice White did not join in this
portion of Justice Brennan's opinion).
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L ULAC II majority held that "§ 2 is implicated only where Democrats lose because
they are black, not where blacks lose because they are Democrats."73'
The assumptions underlying Judge Higginbotham's reasoning are instructive in
the dramatic implications they hold for protection of minority consent from majority
tyranny. As an initial matter, Judge King is correct in her conclusion that Judge
Higginbotham and the L ULAC II majority erroneously treated "a racial or language
minority group as a mere 'interest group' rather than as a politically cohesive
minority group striving to make its voice heard. ' 732 The LULAC II majority
recognized that race and politics typically intersect, and noted "that even partisan
affiliation may serve as a proxy for illegitimate racial considerations. 733 Under the
facts of the case before it, however, the majority found that no such wrongful proxy
was present:
Minority voters ...have tended uniformly to support the Democratic
Party . . . . [W]hite voters constitute the majority of not only the
Republican Party, but also the Democratic Party ....
The suggestion that
Republican voters are galvanized by a "white" or "anti-minority" agenda
is plausible only to the extent that the Democratic Party can be viewed as
a vehicle for advancing distinctively minority interests, which clearly is
not the case. At the same time, white Democrats in recent years
experienced the same electoral defeats as minority voters. If we are to
hold that these losses at the polls, without more, give rise to a racial vote
dilution claim warranting special relief for minority voters, a principle by
which we might justify withholding similar relief from white Democrats
is not readily apparent.'
Yet, Judge Higginbotham failed to enunciate any occasion when racial or ethnic
minorities who support a party containing members of the majority race would be
able to state a cognizable claim of vote dilution under section 2.735 The result is that

LULACII, 999 F.2d at 854.
Id at 910 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting). Compare Judge
Higginbotham's dissenting opinion in the initial panel decision in LULAC I. League of
United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC 1"), 986 F.2d 728, 847
(5th Cir. 1993) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("'Racial politics' implies racially conscious
politics. It does not include politics in which minority voters only fail to achieve maximum
feasible success because they were outvoted by other interest groups." (emphasis added)),
vacated on reh 'gen banc, LULAC II, 999 F.2d 831.
713LULAC I1,
999 F.2d at 860; cf Karlan & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1223 ("The many
difficulties attending the disaggregation of race and politics.., all result from the fact that
race and political affiliation are, in fact, substantially correlated.").
734 LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 860-61.
711In each of the nine counties that were the subject of plaintiffs' challenge, the LULAC
II majority found that the majority bloc voting was the product of partisan affiliations and not
racial polarization. See id.
at 877-93; id.
at 903-04 (King, J.,
joined by Politz, C.J., and
Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing the majority's findings).
731

732
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the L ULAC II"majority has effectively eviscerated section 2 of the Voting Rights
'
Act in communities where there is any measurable crossover voting by whites."736
In addition, the LULAC II majority assumed that minority voters "can wield
influence over elections even when those votes are cast for losing candidates. 737
Judge Higginbotham's supposition rests upon reasoning similar to that which
supported Justice Thomas's view in Holder,that the use of race to remedy violations
of consent dissolves any motivations that minority voters have to build bridges with
those in the majority. 738 Higginbotham opined that "[t]his ability to form coalitions
and influence the elections of all judges in Harris County would be lost in the system
of single-member districts proposed by the plaintiffs. 739 In tying race to partisan
politics, Judge Higginbotham further asserted that "the open channels of
communication facilitate a recognition of points of common ground that might
otherwise go undetected." 740 Yet, the LULAC IImajority's assumption simply is not
in accord with its own recognition of the inability of minority voters to find common
ground with the majority in the face of sustained racially polarized voting:
Both parties' analyses show that the majority of Anglo voters always
opposed the candidate preferred by the geographically compact and
cohesive combined minority population in the general elections. The
minority-preferred candidate was always defeated by this Anglo
majority. 4
The LULAC IIcourt undoubtedly was correct in rejecting the proposition that "all
measures of success be found in the win-loss column. 7 42 By the same token, that
does not mean that no measures of success should be based upon electoral victories
because consent is protected to the extent that voters are entitled to "fair and effective
representation, 743 including (but not limited to) an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.7 " Moreover, it is disingenuous to say that there can be no
violation of minority consent when members of the minority group have the
opportunity to change their "substantive political positions" to the majority's political
view.745 Such a conclusion would nullify the Madisonian Compromise by giving
blind, unyielding deference to the will of the majority, regardless of any adverse

Id. at 910 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 873 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 98-99 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
738 See supra notes 604-07 and accompanying text.
719 LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 884.
740 Id at 858.
741 Id. at 891 (emphasis added).
742 Id. at 873. As argued in the previous Section, section 2 itself is intended to protect
736
17

more than just electoral success, notwithstanding the Gingles majority's conclusion to the
contrary. See supranotes 507-80 and accompanying text.
74' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
744 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
74' LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 879.
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consequences to those in the minority (whether in the political process itself, or in its
attendant outcomes).
Furthermore, Judge Higginbotham's assumption about the nature of what
"representation" entails is equally devastating to the ability of minority groups to
have fair and equal opportunities to participate in the political process. In marshaling
factual evidence to support his conclusion "that the defeat of black-preferred
candidates was the result of the voters' partisan affiliation,"746 it is evident that Judge
Higginbotham and the LULAC I majority believed that consent is not denied when
minority voters have descriptive representation: 47
The race of the candidate did not affect the pattern [of majority bloc
voting]. White voters' support for black Republican candidates was equal
to or greater than their support for white Republicans. Likewise, black
and white Democratic candidates received equal percentages of the white
vote. Given these facts, we cannot see how minority-preferred judicial
candidates were defeated "on account of race or color." Rather, the
minority-preferred candidates were consistently defeated because they ran
as members of the weaker of two partisan organizations. We are not
persuaded that this is racial bloc voting as required by Gingles.'4
Under the consent model of democracy, however, it is not a right to descriptive
representation, but "actual" or "substantive" representation that is protected.749
Section 2 likewise adopts a right to actual representation by according protection to,
racial or language minorities when their "members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."75 At the same time, the section's proportional
representation clause explicitly rejects a right to descriptive representation."' The
LULACIImajority apparently abandoned the congressional intent codified in section
2, by finding that-the presence of descriptive representation was sufficient to defeat
the minority groups' claims that their consent had been denied.752
746

Id

747
748

But see supra note 255 and accompanying text.
LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 879; see also id. at 889 ("Anglo voters gave a majority of their

votes to Republicans, and Hispanic voters gave a majority of their votes to Democrats, even
when Hispanic Republican candidates faced Anglo Democratic opponents."); id. at 893
("The undisputed facts indicate that partisan affiliation controlled the outcomes of the general
elections .... [W]hile Hispanic Democratic candidates lost the Anglo vote, Barrera, a
Hispanic Republican, won a majority of the Anglo vote running against his white Democratic
opponent ....).
149 See supranotes 253-55 and accompanying
text.
750 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
751

See id.

Cf LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 913 n. 14 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J.,
dissenting) ("[lit is interesting to note that the majority, in proclaiming that minorities are
overrepresentedon the district court bench, frequently considers minority judges who were
not minority-preferred candidates.").
712
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Judge Higginbotham's opinion of the role effects of past discrimination play in
the section 2 calculus likewise assumes a narrow view of what "participation in the
political process" means. Among the Senate factors that the courts should consider
in the totality of the circumstances inquiry is "'the extent to which members of the
minority group ...bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participatein the political
process."'753 Judge Higginbotham and the LULAC II majority interpreted this
'
evidence as "pertain[ing] solely to the 'politicalaccess' prong of a § 2 claim."754
Conversely, as Judge King elucidated in her dissent, "the question of whether the
lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination hinder the ability of minorities to
participate in the political process is much broader than asking whether they register
and vote at rates equal to whites." ' To hold otherwise leads to the LULAC II
majority's perverse conclusion that the lack of eligible minority candidates for
judicial office in Texas, arising from the present effects of past discrimination,
weighs against a finding of actionable vote dilution.7 6 When the LULAC II
majority's limited perspective of present effects of past discrimination is joined with
its view of racial and language minorities as political interest groups it becomes
evident that L ULAC II only affords section 2 protection to individual ballot access.
This judicial sleight-of-hand has devastating consequences for the ability of minority
groups to have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the political process.

...Id at 863 (quoting S. REP. No.417, at 29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,

206).

754LULAC

711Id

II, 999 F.2d at 863 (emphasis added).

at 915 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 507-80 and accompanying text (describing the broad view of the political process
adopted by Congress in the Voting Rights Act).
756 LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 865-66. Judge Higginbotham acknowledged that
the
"[u]ndisputed evidence shows that in all of the counties, the percentage of minority lawyers
was much smaller than the percentage of minority voters." Id at 865. Nevertheless, he
concluded that "minority lawyers disproportionatelyserve as judges, when their percentage
among all eligible lawyers is considered." Id. (emphasis added). The dissent reached the
opposite conclusion:
Unlike the majority, however, this indisputable fact would not argue againsta
finding of dilution; it would be compelling evidence of the extent to which
blacks and Hispanics continue to "bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education [and] employment ....which hinder their ability to participate

effectively in the political process."
Id.
at 915 (King, J.,
joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No.
417, at 29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206).
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In summary, Judge Higginbotham's opinion in LULACIIisjudicial activism of
the worst kind." 7 At the beginning of his opinion, Judge Higginbotham recognized
the difficulties inherent in a section 2 vote dilution case:
Over the past fifty years, the steady march of civil rights has been to New
Orleans and this court. It continues but the demands have changed.
Relatively clear lines of legality and morality have become more difficult
to locate as demands for outcomes have followed the cutting away of
obstacles to full participation. With our diverse ethnic makeup, this
demand for results in voting has surfaced profound questions of a
democratic political order such as the limits on rearranging state structures
to alter election outcomes, and majority rule at the ballot box and even in
legislative halls, questions Congress has provoked but not answered."'
Reaching this conclusion allowed Judge Higginbotham and the LULAC Imajority
to accomplish "what it set out to do in this case: ... overhaul the Voting Rights
'
Act."759
In this manner, Judge Higginbotham followed the letter of the Act by
leaving its language in place, but violated its spirit by interpreting it in a manner that
foreclosed any reasonable chance of minority groups to show that they "have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 760 By disregarding the broad protections
afforded by section 2, he engaged in the anti-majoritarian action of rejecting the will
of the people, as expressed by their representatives in Congress. In the process, all
that Judge Higginbotham and the L ULAC II majority left was a narrow definition of
consent that sparingly protects the individual's right to ballot access.
2.

Judge Tjoflat and the "Racial Bias" Straw Man

In L ULACII, Judge Higginbotham "implie[d]-without deciding the issue-that
minority plaintiffs may have to affirmatively prove racial animus in the electorate to
meet their burden with respect to legally significant white bloc voting and racially
polarized voting. '' 711 On the other hand, Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit has
As previously discussed, all constitutional matters involve some' substantive linedrawing, which critics frequently have labeled "judicial activism." See supra notes 208-13
and accompanying text. In engaging in such "activism," nevertheless, it is of paramount
importance that the judicial referee maintain an abiding respect for the intent and purpose
codified in the particular constitutional or statutory provision under review. This Article
argues that Judge Higginbotham simply failed to do so.
758 LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 837 (emphasis added).
711 Id. at 900 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting).
760 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
76' LULAC 11, 999 F.2d at 902 (King, J., joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J.,
dissenting). The LULAC H majority did not adopt expressly the racial bias test because it
concluded that partisan affiliation was a sufficient basis to reverse the lower court's finding
of actionable vote dilution. See id at 859-60 (summarizing Judge Higginbotham's views on
the racial bias test). In two earlier opinions, however, Judge Higginbotham made it clear that
717
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been more resolute in his adoption of the "racial bias" or "racial animus" test, by
elaborating on this approach in two divisive opinions. In Solomon v. Liberty County,
762 four other judges joined Judge Tjoflat on an
Florida,
evenly divided en banc court
in holding that racial bias is the touchstone of a section 2 vote dilution claim.763 In
Nipper v. Smith,"' only one other judge joined Judge Tjoflat in reaching the same
conclusion.765 Although the widely criticized 7" racial bias test is not the law in the
he believed racial bloc voting necessitated proof of racial animus or bias in the relevant
voting community. See LULAC 1, 986 F.2d 728, 846 (5th Cir. 1993) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J.,
specially concurring from denial of rehearing). In order to make such a showing, he
maintained that the reviewing court would have to rely upon multivariate regression analysis
to eliminate non-racial causes of voting behavior. See id at 234-35.
762 899 F.2d 1012 (11 th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

Id. at 1021-37 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring). Solomon represents an unusual
appellate decision. Because the en banc panel was evenly "divided on the legal effect" of
763

proving the Gingles factors, it remanded the case to the district court with instructions to

"proceed in accordance with Gingles, giving due consideration to the views expressed in
Chief Judge Tjoflat's and Judge Kravitch's specially concurring opinions." Id. at 1013 (per
curiam). On remand, the lower court rejected Judge Tjoflat's assertion that racial bias was
determinative of a section 2 claim. See Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 957 F. Supp.
1522 (N.D. Fla. 1997). Instead, the court concluded "[riacial bias may be considered in
assessing a vote dilution claim, as one factor among many under the totality of the
circumstances." Id. at 1551. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded Solomon,
finding that the district court's finding of no vote dilution was clearly erroneous. Solomon
v. Liberty County Comm'r, No. 97-2540, 1999 WL 46839, at * 15 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999).
One judge dissented in this holding. See id. at *16 (Black, J., dissenting). However, all the
judges agreed that the district court had formatted properly the legal standard for vote
dilution claims under section 2. See id. at *6 ("The parties do not dispute the legal accuracy
of [the district court's section 2] framework."); id. at * 16 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The parties,

the Court, and I all agree as to the applicable law in this case.").
764 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
765 See id. at 1547 (four judges concurring, with one judge joining Chief Judge
Tjoflat in
adopting the racial bias test).
766 See Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 956 F. Supp. 326, 353-55 (E.D.N.Y.
1997);
Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 957 F. Supp. at 1543-50, rev'd on other grounds,
Solomon v. Liberty County Comm'r, 1999 WL 46839; Richard R. Hesp, Comment, Electoral
Data in Racial-BlocAnalysis: A Solutionfor Staleness andSpecial CircumstancesProblems,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409,431-34 (1995); Randall Thomas Kim, "SpecialCircumstances"
and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Defining a Standard,28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
605, 623-25 (1997). But see THERNSTROM, supra note 240, at 205 ("Voting patterns must

be analyzed to determine not only the level of support for competing candidates, but the
reasons why voters have cast their ballots as they have."); David D. O'Donnell, Wading into
the "SerbonianBog" of Vote Dilution Claims Under Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: Making the Way Towards a PrincipledApproach to "RaciallyPolarized Voting," 65

Miss. L.J. 345, 383 (1995) ("[C]ourts have now come to the realization that the section 2
plaintiff's burden remains to show that the community is driven by racial animus and the
electoral scheme allows that animus to dilute the minority population[']s voting power.");
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Eleventh Circuit, 7 7 both of Judge Tjoflat's opinions are important because they
illuminate significant judicial departures from the right to vote that Congress
protected in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Quite simply, Judge Tjoflat has
raised the racial bias "straw man" as a means "to accomplish [a] purpose otherwise
' 8-the reintroduction of the intent test into the section 2 analysis.769
not allowed ' 76
The racial bias test marks a radical judicial redefinition of section 2. Judge
Tjoflat summarized the test as follows:
I submit that section 2 prohibits those voting systems that have the effect
of allowing a community motivated by racialbias to exclude a minority
group from participation in the political process. Therefore, if a section
2 defendant can affirmatively show, under the totality of the
circumstances, that the community is not motivated by 77°
racial bias in its
voting, a case of vote dilution has not been made out.

Paula W. Render, Comment, Straight Party Tickets and Redistricting Thickets: Nonracial
Motivationsfor Voter Preferences, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 505, 506 (1995) ("Courts should
consider voter motivations" because such evidence can show "the degree to which racial bias

interacts with the challenged electoral practice to dilute a minority group's vote.").
767 On the other hand, the First and Fifth Circuits and a district court in the Second Circuit
have adopted the racial bias test. See generally Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 290
(5th Cir. 1996) ("Plaintiffs are to present evidence of racial bias operating in the electoral
system by proving up the Gingles factors. Defendants may then rebut the plaintiffs' evidence
by showing that no such bias exists in the relevant voting community." (citing Judge Tjoflat's
plurality opinion in Nipper)); Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) ("We
believe it follows that, after De Grandy,plaintiffs cannot prevail on a VRA §2 claim if there
is significantly probative evidence that whites voted as a bloc for reasons wholly unrelated
to racial animus. We so hold."); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 877 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) ("The Court adopts the holding in [LULAC II] that losses by minority-preferred
candidates attributable to partisan voting rather than racial bias would not constitute legally
significant bloc voting under the third Gingles prong."); see also Bradford County NAACP
v. City of Starke, 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1541 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (applying the racial bias test that
Judge Tjoflat announced in the initial hearing of Solomon which was subsequently vacated).
768 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1421 (6th ed. 1990). Specifically, a "straw man" refers to
a "'front' ....[A] [p]erson who purchases property for another to conceal identity of real
purchaser, or to accomplish some purpose otherwise not allowed." Id
769 Interestingly enough, both Richard Engstrom and Peyton McCrary pointed out, in 1985
(before Gingles), that some lower federal courts already were beginning to look to non-racial
causes of racially polarized voting as a backdoor mechanism to reestablish the intent test. See

Richard L. Engstrom, The Reincarnationof the Intent Standard: FederalJudges andAtLarge Election Cases, 28 HOW. L.J. 495 (1985); Peyton McCrary, DiscriminatoryIntent:
The ContinuingRelevance of "Purpose" Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 HOW. L.J.
463 (1985). The following discussion in the text illustrates how Judge Tjoflat (like many
other judges) has relied on the Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence to fashion a

reincarnated intent standard that no longer requires bringing in intent evidence through the
back door.
770

Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012, 1022 (11 th Cir. 1990) (en banc)

(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (emphasis added); accordNipper, 39 F.3d at 1497, 1514-
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Judge Tjoflat reasoned .thatwhen a defendant shows that "racial bias does not play
a major role in the political community... then obviously [Congress] did not intend
the plaintiff to win, even if the plaintiffhasproven bloc voting., 771 In reaching that
conclusion, he disclaimed any implication that proof of the absence of racial bias
somehow rebuts the plaintiff's showing of racially polarized voting.772 Instead, he
apparently would find that the plaintiffs showing was meaningless under the
circumstances because it was an unintended consequence of majority rule.
According to Judge Tjoflat, his approach is necessary to strike an appropriate balance
between "equal access to the political processes" without creating "a right to
proportional representation. 773 In his struggle to create a new standard that imposes
on section 2 plaintiffs a burden that is neither "too heavy" nor "too light,"774 however,
Judge Tjoflat erred in favor of reimposing the weighty burden of intent which
77
Congress expressly repudiated in the 1982 amendments to section 2. 1

15 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.). Judge Tjoflat's use of the
phrase "motivated by racial bias" makes it clear that "racial bias" is equivalent to
discriminatory purpose or intent. See Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1012.
771 Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1034 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring). Judge Tjoflat
contended that "[n]ot to allow a defendant to rebut a plaintiff's proof' in this manner would
allow a section 2 plaintiff to "establish an irrebutable case with proof of only one objective
factor." Id at 1033 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring). Judge Tjoflat's argument is similar
to one made by some of the dissenting Senators in the Senate Report. See S. REP. No. 417,
at 97-98 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 270-71 (additional views of Sen.
Hatch); id at 143, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 315 (Report of the Senate
Subcommittee on the Constitution). As the Senate Report articulates, however, this is a
spurious argument because applying the results test under the totality of the circumstances
necessarily dictates that no single factor is sufficient by itself to state a vote dilution claim
under section 2. See id. at 33-34, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 211-12.
772 See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1524 n.60 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined
by
Anderson, J.); Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1035 n. 12 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
771 Id. at 1037 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring); see also Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515
(plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (holding, among other things, that
the results test in section 2(b) "can only be understood in light of ... the final clause of
subsection (b), which makes it clear that the 1982 amendment was not designed to create a

right of proportional representation.").
"' Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1036 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
71 See supra notes 550-66 and accompanying text. The racial bias test revives intent
merely by requiring a defendant to offer some evidence of other factors suggesting "that the
voting community is not driven by racial bias," in order to shift the burden to the plaintiff to
prove the existence of racial bias. Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1035 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially
concurring). In this manner, section 2 plaintiffs can take little solace from Judge Tjoflat's
conclusion that his racial bias test is not "'[a] rule conditioning relief under § 2 upon proof
of the existence of racial animus in the electorate would require plaintiffs to establish the
absence of not only partisan voting, but also all other potentially innocent explanations for
white voters' rejection of minority-preferred candidates."' Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1525 n.64'
(plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (quoting League of United Latin
Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC II"), 999 F.2d 831, 859 (5th Cir.
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1993)).
Moreover, there are a number of problems with requiring proof of racial bias in the voting
community. First, such a requirement involves the fundamental error of "ask[ing] the wrong
question," dictating that a court focus on the motivations of the voting community instead of
"whether minorities have equal access to the process of electing their representatives." S.
REP. No.417, at 36 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214. Second, when courts
which review section 2 claims avoid inquiring into the motivations for adopting or
maintaining an electoral scheme because of the "divisiveness" of inquiring into the
motivations of "individual.., citizens," then they contravene congressional intent. Id.at 27,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205. Third, because the racial bias test requires an
examination of individual voter motivations for casting secret ballots, it raises a number of
practical concerns, not the least of which is the specter of violating the voters' First
Amendment right not to reveal their thought processes in voting for particular candidates.
joined by Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J.,
See, e.g., LULAC II, 999 F.2d at 909-10 (King, J.,
dissenting); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 785 F.2d 565, 573-74. (6th Cir. 1986); Johnson v.
Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (Hatchett, J., dissenting); Solomon v.
Liberty County, Florida, 957 F. Supp. 1545 (N.D. Fla. 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
Solomon v. Liberty County Comm'r, No. 97-2540, 1999 WL 46839 (11 th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999).
Fourth, proof of racial bias necessarily would entail multivariate regression analysis (that is,
consideration of at least two independent variables-presumably the race of voters and
whether they cast their ballots for racially motivated reasons--compared to the dependent
999 F.2d at 907-08 (King, J., joined by
variable of candidate support). See, e.g., LULAC I1,
Politz, C.J., and Johnson, J., dissenting); Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 957 F. Supp.
at 1546-48. A majority of justices in Gingles held that bivariate regression analysis
(consideration of one independent variable-the race of voters-compared to the dependent
variable of candidate support) was the proper methodological framework for assessing racial
bloc voting. See supra note 643 and accompanying text. In fact, multivariate regression
analysis is the very type of "junk science" that federal judges, as the "gatekeepers" of expert
evidence, must keep out of the courtroom. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing the role of federal judges in assessing expert evidence not
generally accepted within the expert's field). Federal courts presently are divided on the use
of multivariate regression analysis. For opinions refusing to admit evidence of causation by
using a multivariate approach, see, for example, Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 628 (8th
Cir. 1989) (dissenting opinion of Judge Heaney); League of United Latin Am. Citizens,
Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1501 n.14 (5th Cir.), vacated
on reh'g, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Jackson v. Edgefield County, South
Carolina Sch. Dist., 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1194 n.1 (D.S.C. 1986). But see, e.g., Rollins v. Fort
Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d
807 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995); McCord v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,
787 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir.), vacated, 804 F.2d 611 (1 th Cir. 1986); Lee County Branch of
NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (11th Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. Red Clay
Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1996 WL 172327, at *10 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 1996), aff'd sub
nom. Jenkins v. Manning, 116 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1997). For competing views of social
scientists on the propriety of using multivariate regression analysis, see generally David A.
Freeman et al., Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, 15 EVAL. REV. 673 (1991)
(supporting use of multivariate regression analysis); Grofman, supra note 323, at 141 n.272
(criticizing use of multivariate regression analysis).
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Nevertheless, Judge Tjoflat rejected the assertion that his racial bias test entailed
a return to the Bolden intent test."7 Rather, he found that such an assertion "ignores
the very important distinction between racial bias in general and racially
7 77
' This splitting
discriminatoryintent on the part of legislators in particular."
of
legal hairs becomes readily apparent in an examination of Judge Tjoflat's patent
misconstruction of the meaning of Whitcomb v. Chavis778 and White v. Regester.779
He read these cases as incorporating explicitly a requirement of proof of "invidious
discrimination," ' by one of two methods:
First, the plaintiff could prove invidious discrimination with proof of the
legislators' intent-the intent either of those who designed the scheme or
those who maintained it. Second, the plaintiff could prove invidious
discrimination with circumstantial evidence of racial bias in all levels of
78
the voting community. '
In other words, the objective factors discussed in Whitcomb and White were not just
relevant to what Judge Tjoflat calls "'official' discrimination," but also to "racial bias
in the political organizations and all levels of the voting community."782 He
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, proof of racial bias is contrary to congressional
intent and imposes a virtually insurmountable burden on section 2 plaintiffs. As one
commentator has observed, one "cannot even begin to envision a way for vote dilution
plaintiffs to suggest, much less prove, the thought processes of thousands of individual
voters. Requiring a showing of such intent would necessitate plaintiffs finding a 'smoking
gun' under circumstances where none would likely be found." Kim, supra note 766, at 62425.
116 See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520-23 (11 th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (plurality
opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995);
Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1036 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
777 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1520-21 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson,
J.)
(emphasis added).
77' 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
779 412 U.S. 755 (1973). See supranotes 540-49 and accompanying text; supra note 729
(discussing Whitcomb and White).
710 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1517-20 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined
by Anderson, J.);
Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1023-26 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
711 Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1024 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
782 Id. at 1024-25. (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring); Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1517-20
(plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.). Judge Tjoflat further explained
what he believed the Court's objective factors actually prove:
I submit that the Court was concerned about the interaction between the voting
scheme and racial bias in all levels of the voting community. Why else would a
private organization's racial campaign tactics be relevant? Why would the Court
consider neutral rules that enhance the opportunity to discriminate? If the Court
was concerned only with public officials' bias, then it would have looked only
to the motive behind enacting and maintaining those rules, not to the opportunity
for discrimination that those neutral rules created.
Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1025 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
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characterized the holding in Bolden as saying that these objective factors were not
sufficient to support a finding of official "purpose," indicating "that the Court was
requiring proof of the other form of invidious discrimination-i.e., racial bias on the
'
part of legislators or other responsible officials."783
Therefore, Judge Tjoflat
maintained that the 1982 amendments marked Congress' desire to overturn Bolden's
mandate that vote dilution under section 2 be proven exclusively by "legislative or
official intent" in favor of an approach that allowed a plaintiff to prove racial bias by
either officials or the relevant voting community.8
Judge Tjoflat further attempted to support his erroneous conclusion by a selective
parsing of the language contained in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982
amendments to section 2. As an initial matter, he contended that the section 2
language "'result[s] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on accountofrace or color,' explicitly retains racial bias as the
' even though Congress made it clear that the
gravamen of a vote dilution claim,"785
language merely was a requirement to show there was a correlation between the
majority bloc voting and the race or ethnicities of the groups of voters.7 6 Like Judge
Higginbotham in LULAC II,Judge Tjoflat believed that this reading was necessary
to ensure that vote dilution was "not on account of some other racially neutral
787

cause."

He also attempted to circumvent the congressional mandate "that the plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of
discriminatorypurpose,"' by making three separate arguments. First,just as he had

Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1025 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
783 Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1026-27 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring); accordNipper, 39
F.3d at 1522-23 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
784 See Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1027-32 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring); Nipper, 39 F.3d
at 1520 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
785 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)).
786 See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1552-53 (Hatchett, J., joined by Kravitch, J., dissenting); supra
note 562.
787 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.)
(emphasis added); see analagous discussion id. at 1525-26 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J.,
joined by Anderson, J.); cf supra notes 726-31 and accompanying text. In other words, like
the LULAC II majority, Judge Tjoflat implicitly relied upon Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Gingles that causation is relevant to the section 2 inquiry; see also Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1514
n.43 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (quoting with approval Justice
O'Connor's opinion that causal evidence is relevant to the section 2 inquiry). As discussed
supra note 562, however, the Senate Report expressly disclaims the need for an inquiry into
causation. See generally Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1017 n.3 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring)
("Chief Judge Tjoflat's analysis takes a tack similar to that of Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Gingles," which "failed to obtain the support of a majority of the Court").
788 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1521 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.)
(emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 417, at 28 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 205-06).
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asserted when describing the holding in Bolden, he opined that the Senate Report's
language referred only to official discrimination and not to discrimination in the
voting community.7" 9 Second, he maintained that the LULAC II majority's own
misreading of the Senate Report supported his strained interpretation. 79" His last
argument, however, was perhaps the most revealing of all: he declared that "nothing
in the [Senate] report indicates that the Judiciary Committee's interpretation of White
differs from my interpretation of that case. 79 1 By saying nothing about an
unreasonable interpretation of the results test, Congress presumably had endorsed
Judge Tjoflat's redefinition of section 2.792 No clearer example of rampant judicial
activism could strike at the very heart of this representative government. 793 .
Judge Tjoflat rested his racial bias test on many of the same faulty assumptions
that Justice Thomas used to eviscerate the democratic theory embodied in section 2.
Like Justice Thomas, Judge Tjoflat apparently conflated the protections under section
2 with those under the self-executing section of the Fifteenth Amendment. Judge
Tjoflat purported to recognize that Congress possesses "broad power to enforce" the
Reconstruction Amendments "by appropriate legislation," under the expansive test
that the Court adopted in Katzenbach v. Morgan.7 "4 He also acknowledged that
"the Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatoryin effect is an
appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits
'
only intentional discrimination in voting."795
Yet, at the same time, Judge Tjoflat rendered the distinction between discriminatory
effect and intentional discrimination meaningless by concluding that "'discriminatory
result,' or 'effect,' implies the existence of two things: a suspect scheme and racial
bias in the voting community."' He claimed that any other reading of the amended
Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1521-22 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
Judge Hatchett strongly disagreed with this conclusion, noting that "the two judges simply
desecrate the legislative history surrounding [the] amendment" to section 2. Id at 1555
(Hatchett, J., joined by Kravitch, J., dissenting).
790 See id at 1521 n.53, 1523 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
71 Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012, 1029 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
792 Cf Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1024 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (arguing that
789

"[a]lthoughthe Court did not expressly recognize that it was talking about racialbias in two

differentgroups," the Court nevertheless meant to impose a requirement of proving invidious
discrimination by not only public officials, but people in the voting community as well
(emphasis added)).
791 Cf Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1547 (Hatchett, J., joined by Kravitch, J., dissenting) (noting that
Judges Tjoflat and Anderson "would have us hold, for the first time in American law.., a
plaintiff-class must also show the existence of racial bias motivating the voting community").
194 Id. at 15l6 & n.44 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by
Anderson, J.).
711 Id. at 1516 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J.,joined by Anderson, J.) (quoting City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980)) (emphasis added).
796 Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1032 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
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section 2 would render it "outside the limits of Congress' legislative powers and
therefore unconstitutional. 797 In light of this narrow interpretation, it becomes
evident that Judge Tjoflat believes Congress can do nothing more in enforcement
legislation passed under the Reconstruction Amendments than simply restate the
protections that the Court provided under the self-executing sections.798 Such a result
directly contravenes the intent of the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment.799
In addition, Judge Tjoflat evinced a strong disdain for substantive decisionmaking by judges. His Solomon opinion would seem to suggest a different result; at
one point, he criticized Judge Kravitch for departing from the flexible "totality-ofthe-circumstances test" in favor of a "completely mechanical test."" 0 Tjoflat himself,
however, departed from having flexible judicial referees examine the subtle nuances
of particular voting systems in favor of a rigid, mechanical test. Under his reasoning,
"invidious discrimination" 8 0 -his code words for official or private "intent"-must
be shown as a part of the totality of the circumstances. In this manner, he arrived at
the very "core value" Justice Thomas said must be present to constrain judges
evaluating section 2 claims:
If, however, the results test was given a "core value," that is, if Congress
admitted that the test was intended to prevent invidious discrimination in
voting systems, then the defendant could overcome the plaintiff's
evidence with evidence that invidious discrimination was not present."0 2
Therefore, Judge Tjoflat would use the presence or absence of official or private
intent to constrain judges evaluating vote dilution claims from making any
substantive decisions. If intent is present and the Gingles factors are otherwise met,
reviewing judges would be compelled to find a section 2 violation. Conversely, if
no intent was present, they would have no choice but to enter judgment in favor of
the defendants. This construction denigrates judges from their roles as vigorous
guardians of the consent of the governed, to little more than legal automatons. It also
cuts against Judge Tjoflat's own recognition that "'[no single statistic provides
courts with a short-cut to determine whether a set of [electoral structures] unlawfully
dilutes minority voting strength."'8 0 3
Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
798 Imposition of either official or private discriminatory intent mirrors the requirements
for constitutional vote dilution challenges brought under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. See supranote 232.
9 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
800 Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1033 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring); see also id.
at 1034-35
(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) ("Indeed, Judge Kravitch's occasionally rigid
interpretation of Gingles ...flies in the face of the [Senate] Committee's mandate.").
801 Id. at 1028 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
02 Id.; see also Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1517 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by
Anderson, J.)
("[R]acial bias in the voting community remains the keystone of section 2 vote
dilution claims." (emphasis added)).
803 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1527 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.)
(quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020-21 (1994)).
7
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Judge Tjoflat apparently was willing to concede that "'[t]he right to vote can be
affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting
a ballot."' 8 Similarly, he acknowledged that districting plans or other practices can
"provide the opportunity for subtle discrimination" and thereby impair the ability of
a minority group "'to elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other
voters."'" °5 Nevertheless, his imposition of proving the presence or negating the
absence ofracial bias in the voting community itself marked a significant impairment
of the ability of minority voters "to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."" ° He concluded his discussion of his racial bias test
by stating:
[A] court gradually draws together a picture of the challenged electoral
scheme and the political process in which it operates by accumulating
pieces of circumstantial evidence. Like a Seurat painting, a portrait of the
challenged scheme emerges against the background of the voting
'community. Only by looking at all of the dots on the canvas is a district
court able to determine whether vote dilution has occurred. A court
should not exclude certain types of relevant evidence-certain colors on
the canvas-from its examination if doing so would leave an incomplete
view of the circumstantial evidence picture."0 7
Judge Tjoflat painted a bleak picture of what it means to secure for minorities their
right to exercise unimpaired consent within the political process."08 The color on his
painting was virtually the same throughout; by allowing racial bias to be the
dominant (if not sole) inquiry under section 2, he made it a distinctly white picture,
with racial and ethnic minority groups relegated to the recesses and shadows of
majority tyranny. Under the circumstances, there would be little difference in the
results of Judge Tjoflat's narrow vision of the right to vote if he left the white canvas
blank and denied the ability of minority voters to put their "dots on the canvas"
altogether. The bitter irony in the fate of this judicial artisan is that he has fallen
victim to exactly what he chided Judge Kravitch for doing in Solomon: "significantly
depart[ing] from the intent of Congress in enacting amended section 2."''°9
Apparently Judge Tjoflat no longer believes the truth of his earlier statement that "the

Id. at 1510 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.)
(quoting Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)).
805 Id.(plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (quoting Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1996)).
806 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (amended 1982) (regarding enforcement of voting rights).
807 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1527 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.).
808 Cf id. at 1556 (Hatchett, J., joined by Kravitch, J., dissenting) ("If this court ever
adopts the rejected racial bias/intent test, the court will ensure that a politically cohesive and
geographically compact racial minority will rarely be permitted to elect representatives of
their choice when serious racially polarized voting exists.").
809 Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
804
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policy choice [embodied in section 2] belongs to Congress," and not to federal
judges.8"'
3.

Holder, Shaw, and Section 2: Even When There's a "Wrong," There's
No Remedy

The final analytical method that courts use to deny relief for perverted process
claims rests on their purported inability to fashion a remedy for the alleged violation.
There are two theoretical strains to this methodology. First, in the context ofjudicial
elections in particular, some courts have refused to impose remedial plans that would
require alteration of features of the challenged electoral structure. The rationales of
these decisions are based upon Holder's proscription for imposing remedies in the
absence of an existing "benchmark," as well as a need to accord strong deference to
the state governments' policy choices in selecting the challenged voting structures
or mechanisms. Second, courts more generally have declined to adopt ameliorative
plans for section 2 violations by relying upon Shaw v. Reno's warning about the
presumptively unconstitutional nature of race-conscious remedies. These courts
typically conclude that group-based relief is inherently contrary to the constitutional
mandate to treat all voters as individuals without regard to their race or ethnicity.
The refusal of federal judges to correct deprivations of minority consent under these
circumstances defies the well accepted rule that for every wrong, there must be a
remedy.8" ' This Article recommends that these courts must remedy the wrong they
have inflicted upon the ability, of all voters to have a fair and equal opportunity to
give or withhold their consent.
Judicial elections present a special challenge to courts reviewing vote dilution
claims brought under section 2. On the one hand, the use of electoral methods to
select state and local judges necessarily implies that voters should receive a fair and
equal opportunity to cast ballots for their chosen candidates-including the right to
cast undiluted votes. On the other hand, judges are not required to be (nor should
they be) responsive to the needs of their constituents in the same manner as
representatives in a legislative body. As a result, eliciting the "consent of the
governed" does not have the same meaning in judicial elections. However, the Court
properly has recognized that when popular elections select judicial officers, then
these officers are "representatives" for the purpose of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.8" 2 Similarly, the Court is correct in finding that the "[s]tate's interest in
maintaining an electoral system ... is a legitimate factor to be considered," although
that interest "does not automatically, and in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote
' Nevertheless,
dilution."813
certain lower courts have disregarded the latter mandate.
Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 865 F.2d 1566, 1583 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated
on reh'g, 873 F.2d 248 (1989) (en banc).
811 See supra note 656.
812 See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 423-24 (1991);
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991).
813 Houston Lawyers'Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 426-27.
810
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Under the approach these courts have taken, the absence of.a benchmark within the
state's judicial scheme precludes imposition of any section 2 remedy, even where
there is widespread and severe majority bloc voting that repeatedly dilutes the voting
power of minority groups."1 4
Judge Higginbotham's LULAC II opinion is one example of this troubling
approach." 5 In LULAC II, Texas's asserted interest in keeping elections for trial
judges countywide was to maintain the linkage between "the jurisdictional and
electoral bases ofthe district courts."' 1 6 The majority found that this linkage "is a key
component of the effort to define the office of a district judge."8 7 As a result, the
majority ruled that "proof of dilution, considering the totality of the circumstances,
must be substantialin order to overcome the state's interest in linkage established
here." 8 In view of its holding that partisan affiliation caused majority bloc voting,
the L ULACIImajority's conclusion that the state's interest outweighed the plaintiffs'
proof of dilution in each and every county at issue was to be expected." 9
Nevertheless, the extraordinary lengths to which Judge Higginbotham was prepared
togo in order to validate the state's interest would seem to preclude a section 2 claim
under any circumstances, tilting the scales of justice against racial and language
minority groups in favor of maintaining the majoritarian status quo. 2 °

779.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements ("LULAC II"),
999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied,510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
816 Id. at 868.
8I7 d. at 872.
818 Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
819 See generally id. at 877 (finding that even if the district court was correct in finding
racial vote dilution in some counties, "the evidence would be outweighed by the State's
substantial interest in linkage," and observing that "partisan voting at the least so weakens
the proof of dilution that it loses in the weighing of the totality of the circumstances").
820 See generally Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting Rights Act to
814 See infra note
815

JudicialElections, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION, supranote 7, at 344-45

(observing that LULAC H "advanced a new 'balancing test' that would, in some instances,
allow the state's interest in the challenged election scheme to defeat Voting Rights Act
liability even if the challenged scheme would have violated the Act under the totality of the
circumstances test"). A close reading of LULAC II reveals that Judge Higginbotham's
"balancing" of the state interest-which should be a part of any section 2 analysis, see supra
note 261 and accompanying text-is really nothing of the sort. Instead, Judge Higginbotham
ensured that section 2 plaintiffs only will be able to state a claim in the judicial context in the
rarest and most unusual cases (i.e., when a mechanism or structure is not deemed to be
"integral" to the State's electoral scheme). Cf. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 853 (1998)
(describing the State's interest as "powerful, indeed dispositive, unless the plaintiffs show

gross racial vote dilution" (emphasis added)).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

Judge Tjoflat and a majority ofjudges took a similar tack in Nipper.82 In that
case, black voters and black attorneys alleged vote dilution in the at-large election of
circuit and county court judges and sought a remedy such as sub-districts that would
provide them with an equal opportunity to elect judges of their choice.822 The Nipper
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim---even though they had proven "that racial bloc
voting exists.., in such a way that the white majority usually defeats the minority's
candidate of choice" 8 23-because the relief they sought "would undermine the
administration ofjustice" in the courts at issue.124 The majority accurately pointed
out that the three Gingles factors require an examination into whether a remedy was
feasible in the challenged system. The court then took this a step further and
concluded:
Implicit in the first Gingles requirement [geographical compactness] is a
limitation on the ability of a federal court to abolish a particular form of
government and to use its imagination to fashion a new system. Nothing
in the Voting Rights Act suggests an intent on the part of Congress to
permit the federal judiciary to force on the states a new model of
government; moreover, from a pragmatic standpoint, federal courts
simply lack legal standards for choosing among alternatives.
Accordingly, we read the first threshold factor.., to require that there
must be a remedy within the confines of the state'sjudicialmodel that
does not undermine the administrationofjustice.825
Judge Tjoflat found further support for his conclusion in Holder, which he
interpreted as saying "the existence of a workable remedy within the confines ofthe
state's system ofgovernment is critical to the success of a vote dilution claim." '26
There are a number of flaws in Judge Tjoflat's reasoning. First, he assumed that
federal judges cannot and should not engage in substantive decision-making in
devising a remedial plan. That assumption cuts against the fundamental nature of
guaranteeing consent, which makes substantive judicial decision-making an
indispensable part of protecting the right to vote.827 Second, he disregarded the broad
82!

A majority of six judges joined this portion of Judge Tjoflat's opinion. See Nipper v.

Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., joined by three judges

concurring in the opinion in part and in the result), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
822

See id.at 1496-97.

Id.at 1542 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., and Anderson, J.).
Id.at 1498. The Nipper majority concluded that no remedy was possible even though
the district court never had reached the issue of a remedy and there was no record evidence
pertaining to proposed remedies. See id.
at 1509; see also id.
at 1556-57 (Hatchett, J., joined
by Kravitch, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying upon a barren record to reject
plaintiffs' section 2 claim and engaging in "speculation and conjecture to support its holding
that Florida's interest in conserving its current at-large voting system precludes any possible
remedy").
825 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1531 (emphasis added).
826 Id.at 1533 (emphasis added) (interpreting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994)).
827 See supra notes 281-580 and accompanying text.
823

824
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remedial purposes of the Voting Rights Act, which the Court acknowledged most
clearly in Allen. 2 ' Third, he failed to recognize that there can be no better example
of "undermin[ing] the administration of justice" '29 than allowing the majority
effectively to fence minority voters out of the process of selecting judicial officers.
Fourth, he repeated the Holder plurality's circular reasoning by stating that the
absence of a remedy precludes the existence of a wrong to be remedied. 30 In fact,
Judge Tjoflat's outright rejection of single-member districts as a remedy for
demonstrated vote dilution in at-largejudicial elections s' flies in the face of Gingles'
express recognition of single-member districts (whether called "sub-districts" or
otherwise) as an acceptable benchmark.3 2 Finally, he apparently could not identify
the truism that if the existing electoral system wrongfully denies a particular group
of voters their right to cast an undiluted ballot, then there exists no other recourse to
remedying that violation of consent except altering one or more features of that
system. In short, Judge Tjoflat's analysis does little more than place a judicial seal
of approval on the majoritarian default, at the expense of minority consent.
But even Judge Tjoflat's approach pales in comparison to Judge Edmondson's
unflagging deference to the asserted state interest in perpetuating the existing
electoral scheme. While Judge Tjoflat was at least willing to go through an analytical
exercise before rejecting the plaintiffs' section 2 claim, Judge Edmondson did not
even bother to engage in such false pretenses. In Nipper,Judge Edmondson reasoned
that
[t]he State of Florida's legitimate interest in maintaining linkage between
jurisdiction and the electoral bases of its trial judges is, as a matter of law,
great and outweighs (either at the vote-dilution-finding stage or at the
remedy stage) whatever minority vote dilution that may possibly have
been shown here. 33
Similarly, in a vote dilution challenge to the system of electing trial judges in
Alabama, he wrote:

See supra notes 531-44 and accompanying text.
Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1498. The Nipper majority concluded no remedy was possible even
though the district court never had reached the issue of a remedy and there was no record
evidence pertaining to proposed remedies. See id.
at 1509; see also id.
at 1556-57 (Hatchett,
J., joined by Kravitch, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying upon a barren record
to reject plaintiffs' section 2 claim, and engaging in "speculation and conjecture to support
its holding that Florida's interest in conserving its current at-large voting system precludes
any possible remedy").
830 See supra notes 648-59 and accompanying text.
831 See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1543-45 (plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., and Anderson, J.).
832 See supranote 632 and accompanying text. There simply is no evidence that the Court
intended to preclude the use of single-member districts to remedy proven vote dilution in
judicial elections.
833 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1547 (Edmondson, J.,
joined by three judges, concurring in part)
(emphasis added).
828
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Most important, no need (and I think no rightful, federal judicial power)
exists to compare the strength and weaknesses-as a matter of political
science--of Alabama's current system of electing trial judges with the
system for which plaintiffs contend. Even if in a head-to-head
comparison plaintiffs' proposed system were "better" (that is, the wiser
choice--in terms of good government or political science practice and
theory) than Alabama's present system, federal courts could not properly
compel Alabama to change, given the circumstances of this case.
The basic structure of Alabama's judicial branch of government,
including the shape of its judicial jurisdictions and the manner of
selecting trial judges, is in the hands of Alabama's people. 34
The extent to which such a position endangers full and effective participation by
minority groups cannot be overemphasized. 8" In virtually every vote dilution case,
the challenged electoral feature will be a part of the state's constitutional or statutory
scheme. The fact that a section 2 remedy cannot be imposed without altering the
state's scheme should not be a bar to an otherwise successful vote dilution claim. 36

834 Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1298
(I1th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045 (1996).
835 In Davis v. Chiles, a panel ofjudges in the Eleventh Circuit discussed the problem with
the approach taken by Judge Tjoflat and Judge Edmondson:
[W]e are troubled by the analysis and the conclusion that our precedents appear
to require in cases such as the one at bar. The Supreme Court has clearly and
repeatedly held that Section Two applies to state judicial elections. Moreover,

the Court has explicitly stated that ...the State's interest ...does not

automatically, and in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote dilution. In
interpreting Chisom and Houston Lawyers', our circuit in Nipper and SCLC has

placed what now seems, in hindsight, to be an insurmountable weight on a state's
interest in preserving its constitution's judicial selection system and in
maintaining linkage between its judges' jurisdictions and electoral bases.
Together with Nipper, SCLC, and the additional case of White v. Alabama, we

will with this decision have disallowed redistricting, subdistricting, modified
subdistricting, cumulative voting, limited voting, special nomination, and any
conceivable variant thereof as remedies for racially polarized voting in at-large
judicial elections. Given such rulings, neither we, nor [the parties] have been
able to envision any remedy that a court might adopt in a Section Two vote
dilution challenge to a multi-member judicial election district. Thus, in this
circuit,Section Two ofthe Voting Rights Act frankly cannot be saidto apply, in
any meaningful way, to at-largejudicial elections.

Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).

836 Cf Kirsten Lundgaard Izatt, Note, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections:
Accommodating the Interests ofStates Without Compromisingthe Goals of the Act, 1996 U.

ILL. L. REv. 229, 264 (1996) ("The balancing tests of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
illegitimately elevate the role of the state's interest above the other enumerated factors in the
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The same holds true with the need to have race-conscious remedies for wrongful
deprivations of minority consent. It is apparent that any remedy to "found violations
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by definition employs race."' " The reason is quite
simple. If a particular electoral feature operates in a way that wrongfully inhibits
minority consent, then section 2 requires the reviewing court to identify the particular
feature and ensure that any remedy it adopts does not replicate that harm to minority
voters. Consequently, the court at all times must be conscious of the race of the
voters in assessing the known or potential impact on their ability to consent in order
to give any meaning to section 2 protection. Nevertheless, the Shaw v. Reno holding
treated such awareness as anathema to a "color-blind" society. 38 As a result, the
Shaw v. Reno line of cases creates the likelihood that in remedying a section 2
violation, a federal court will violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of individual
members of the majority group. 39 Not surprisingly, a growing number of federal
courts have relied upon such an impending constitutional violation as yet another
reason to deny successful section 2 litigants any relief?" 0
Many of the reasons these courts have articulated for rejecting otherwise
cognizable section 2 claims echo the language that the Court used in Shaw v. Reno
and its progeny. One example will illustrate this point. In Lewis v. Alamance
County, North Carolina, Judge Wilkinson vigorously criticized the dissent's
"intensely race-conscious approach" to the Gingles vote dilution inquiry. 4'
According to Judge Wilkinson, although Gingles required such an inquiry, "it cannot
be read to require us to adopt rules that unconstitutionally tie American politics to
racial identity" thereby leading to "racially separate electorates and a racially separate

Senate Report, implicitly diminishing the role that Congress intended the other factors to
play.").
137

Clark v. Calhoun County, Mississippi, 88 F.3d 1393, 1408 (5th Cir.), petitionfor reh'g

and reh 'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d 1151 (5th Cir. 1996); accord Sanchez v. Colorado, 97
F.3d 1303, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A]dherence to Gingles to remedy violations of § 2

necessarily implicates race."), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1820 (1997); Houston v. Haley, 859
F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that, in analyzing a section 2 claim, the court "must
evaluate the use of race-conscious remedies to create a more fluid political process without

countenancing any move toward installing a structure of proportional representation not in
keeping with our theory of government"), vacatedon reh 'g, 869 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989);
Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1408 n.13 (N.D. I1. 1997) ("It would

approach theater of the absurd to impose a rule stating that a remedy intended to correct racebased discrimination in districting could not be race-conscious."); see supra note 704 and
accompanying text.
838

839

See supra notes 679-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 701-07 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Cannon v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 917 F. Supp. 387, 389-91 (E.D.N.C.
1996); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 870-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Jeffers v.
Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 661-62 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (three judge panel).
84,Lewis v. Alamance County, North Carolina, 99 F.3d 600, 618 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1820 (1997).
840
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society. ' As a result, he faulted the dissent for seeking to remedy a section 2
violation by restructuring the county's electoral districts "along racial lines." '43
Judge Wilkinson attacked such remedies as viewing "voters as members of
racial blocs rather than as individuals." ' In addition, he questioned the very
feasibility of section 2 remedies in a changing multicultural society:
Where will this road of race-consciousness end? ...[T]he Gingles
inquiry is complicated enough in a biracial community. Is the inquiry to
become ever more refined and ever more complex as America becomes
more multicultural? ....At some point, this race-based calculus will
demonstrate only how far the law has set us in the path to disunion.
Entering this maze of racially laden inquiries reflects a view of
American political life as a competition between highly segregated racial
forces. Indeed, this is precisely the mistake of the dissent. The dissent's
interpretation of Gingles will not allow courts to accept the votes of
minority individuals as expressing their personal preferences.
It will be said that racial bloc voting is already ensconced in
American political life and that courts must learn to embody in law what
is established in fact. A Constitution, however, has its aspirational as well
as descriptive aspect. It is informed by the way things ought to be. Were
the Fourteenth Amendment no more than a concession to the racial
realities of the day, Brown v. Board of Commissioners would have
remained an untaken step. Separation of the races is no better for
America now than it was in 1954.4 s
Judge Wilkinson is wrong. Surely section 2's guarantee of an equal opportunity
to participate in the political process must mean more than protecting the right of
individuals to express their preferences. Such an interpretation nullifies anything
extending much beyond the pure process right to cast a ballot and have it counted.
It also ignores the lengthy legislative and judicial history of the Voting Rights Act. 6
There is no way to avoid the use of race-conscious remedial measures to eradicate
race discrimination, unless one does what Judge Wilkinson suggests and turns one's
back on the protection of a right to fair and effective participation in government.
Moreover, while everyone would like to believe that they live in a society in which
race no longer matters, the harsh reality is that race does matter, 47 leaving large
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846 See supra notes 507-80 and accompanying text.
847 See generally CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (Connie M. Yu & William L. Taylor eds., 1997)
(describing Justice Department announcements of racial discrimination that "belie the notion,
so popular with previous [presidential] Adminstrations, that the nation has arrived at a
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racial and ethnic segments of the population are submerged into de facto
disenfranchisement. "Color-blindness" should not require courts to be blind to
discrimination against minority groups. The courts must not heed Judge Wilkinson's
call to "rebuild the walls [of discrimination against minorities] they once brought
down. ,, 848
IV. A RETURN TO CONSENT: RESTORING MEANING TO SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REFEREES IN ENFORCING IT

Certain members of the present Supreme Court have shown disdain for what they
call "judicial activism" in defining the right to vote. They have resisted their unique
constitutional role in promoting the rights of minority voters to have a full and
meaningful voice in the political process. Instead, the justices have adopted
mechanical rules to limit the ability of judges to engage in substantive decisionmaking in voting rights cases. In cases in which use of formulaic rules is unavailing,
such as vote dilution challenges, the Court has marked a steady retreat by
acknowledging the right to a ballot cast free of dilution, but denying the substance
of that right. Moreover, these same justices have embraced an individual view of the
right to vote, which is inconsistent with the broad group protection codified in section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. In the process, a majority of the present Court has
"declined" to engage in matters of democratic theory. However, the Court's inability
to recognize the illegitimacy of its own misbegotten democratic theory has thrust it
into the very position it has sought to avoid: squarely in the middle of the political
thicket, where judges make (not interpret) law, and create (not enforce) democratic
views.
This Article has urged the Court to pull itself out of the political thicket by using
the consent theory of democracy as a basis for reviewing voting rights claims.
Consent of the governed is a cornerstone of government in the United States. The
Constitution itself is a product of attempts by the Founding Fathers to reconcile the
democratic element of majority rule with the accompanying and competing need to
protect minorities-whether individuals or groups-from the tyranny of that rule.
The Reconstruction Amendments, especially the Fifteenth Amendment, gave

blissful state of 'color blindness' making obsolete the affirmative remedies and enforcement
machinery that had brought progress in earlier times"). The report further notes "that this
notion has yet to reach the paint where the great bulk of citizens are 'color blind,' where race
has ceased to matter, and where children do not suffer disadvantage because of their race or
national origin." Id at 2. A fifteen month study of race in America by the Advisory Board
of the President's Initiative on Race recently reached a similar conclusion. See generally
ADVISORY BD. OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST

CENTURY: FORGING ANEW FUTURE 33 (1998) ("Does race matter in America?.. . 'Yes, race
matters.' It became increasingly clear that America is still struggling with the impact of past
policies, practices, and attitudes based on racial differences-what we are calling the legacy
of race and color.").
141 Lewis, 99 F.3d at 620 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
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Congress extensive power to pass legislation protecting the right to equal consent.
The Voting Rights Act is the culmination of congressional efforts under its
enforcement powers to eradicate voting discrimination once and for all. The Act
encompasses both the individual right to cast a ballot that is counted, as well as the
right of members of all racial and ethnic groups to have fair and effective
participation in every stage of the political process. Section 2 of the Act elaborates
on these protections by providing that all voters shall have the same opportunity "to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."' 9 A
violation of section 2 turns on whether minority consent has been denied wrongfully,
and not whether that result was intended. In addition, vote dilution challenges
brought under that provision necessarily imply a group right.
But every election system is different. No two voting communities have the
same level of minority participation, electoral features, past (or even present) legacies
of discrimination, or history of majority bloc voting at the polls. Consequently, the
Court recognized in its early interpretations of vote dilution claims, the need for
flexible judicial referees who carefully could engage in a comprehensive analysis of
voting conditions under the totality of the circumstances. Rigid, mechanical rules are
not possible, nor even desirable, if consent is to be protected to the extent that the
Framers (in constitutional claims) and Congress (in section 2 claims) intended. Use
of inflexible criteria precludes the courts from differentiating between the unique
fact-specific nature of voting rights claims at the risk of sustaining majority. tyranny.
Substantive decision-making by judges is unavoidable, even in the "simple" cases,
if consent is to have any meaning at all.
Therefore, it is up to the Court to lift itself "out of the so-called 'political' arena
and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation" ' in assessing vote
dilution claims brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. To do so, this
Article suggests that it is time for the Court to retum to first principles: interpreting
and applying duly enacted statutory protections under section 2, without rewriting
those protections in a manner that distorts congressional intent. In addition, the
Court must undo the damage created by its ill-conceived emphasis on such things as
electoral success and "benchmarks," and its discomfort in adopting race-conscious
remedies to racial electoral harms. In short, the Court must accept the fact that it
cannot avoid making difficult choices in giving content to the right to vote, and must
not directly or indirectly adopt the "neutral position" of the majority default that
essentially nullifies minority consent. This Article proposes that the Court examine
allegations of vote dilution by determining whether the electoral system has operated
to deprive minority consent in a manner that is inconsistent with constitutional and
statutory remedial measures.
To do so does not amount to the creation of a democratic theory or improper
"judicial activism," as Justice Thomas asserted in his Holder concurrence. Rather,
Justice Stevens aptly described it as a necessary by-product of advancing the
democratic theories embodied in the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act:
849
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There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to
resolve difficult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an
interpretation that Congress has thrice approved. Statutes frequently
require courts to make policy judgments. The Sherman Act, for example,
requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic organization.
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has required the courts to
formulate a theory of equal opportunity. Our work would certainly be
much easier if every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary,
may not invoke
but when Congress has legislated in general terms,judges
85
judicial modesty to avoid difficult questions. '
The Court must accept the force of Justice Stevens's argument. It cannot escape
substantive decision-making. The only question is whether the substantive decisions
the Court makes are consistent with the textual source of the voting right they are
considering. A return to consent, enforced by vigorous and flexible judicial referees,
would fulfill the promise of the Voting Rights Act. It would ensure that minority
voters no longer will have to raise their voices against judicial tyranny.
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